THIS chapter contains no entirely new element, but a fresh view of several which have already been repeatedly exhibited. The first of these is the great truth, that the sufferings of God’s people are the necessary fruit of their own sins, vs. 1. The second is the power of Jehovah to accomplish their deliverance, vs. 2. 3. The third is the -Servant of Jehovah, his mission, his qualifications for it, his endurance of reproach and opposition on account of it, vs. 4-9. The fourth is the way of salvation and the certain doom of those who neglect it, vs. 10, 11.
This perpetual recurrence of the same great themes in various combinations makes the mere division of the chapters a comparatively unimportant matter, although some writers seem to attach great importance to the separation of the first three verses from what follows, and their intimate connexion with what goes before. It should be ever borne in mind that these divisions are conventional and modern, and that in this part of Isaiah more especially they might have been omitted altogether without any serious inconvenience to the reader or interpreter. A much greater evil than the want of these divisions is the habit of ascribing to them undue authority and suffering the exposition to be governed by them, as if each were a separate prediction or discourse, instead of being arbitrary though convenient breaks in a continued composition, not materially differing from the paragraphs now used in every modern book. The re-arrangement of the chapters in the present case would answer no good purpose, since the first three verses are not more closely connected with the end of the preceding chapter than what follows is with its beginning. The true course is to make use of the common divisions as convenient pauses, but to read and expound the text as one continuous discourse.
1. Thus saith Jihovah. This prefatory formula has no doubt had some influence on the division of the chapters. It does not, however, always indicate the introduction of a new subject, as may be seen by a comparison of ch. 48: 17 with ch. 49: I.— Where is or what is? “^ by itself is the interrogative adverb where 1 When joined with HT, it seems to be equivalent to our interrogative what or which, but always with reference to place, and for the most part with a noun of place following. The most frequent combination is, which way 1 This leaves it doubtful whether it is used in the general sense of what, as explained by Ewald, or in the more specific one of a-hat place i. e. where, preferred by Gesenius and most other writers. This is a question of but little moment as to the general meaning of the sentence; since the question ‘ where is it?’ as we shall see below, is here substantially equivalent to ‘what is it?’—The bill of divorcement, literally, writing of excision or repudiation, translated in the Septuagint fiiptiov zoi> anoGiaoiov, which form is retained in the New Testament (Matth. 19:7. Mark 10: 4) though sometimes abridged (Matth. 5: 31). The Hebrew phrase denotes the legal instrument by which the Mosaic law allowed a husband to repudiate his wife (Deut. 24: 1-3).—Of your mother. The persons addressed are the individual members of the church or nation; their mother is the church or nation itself. These are of course distinguished O from each other only by a poetical figure.— Whom I have sent (or put) away. These words admit of a twofold construction. According to the common Hebrew idiom, the relative pronoun, when the object of a verb, is followed by the personal pronoun which it represents. According to this idiom, whom I have sent her means nothing more that whom I have sent, except that it more distinctly indicates the gender of the object. This construction is recommended here, not only by its strict conformity to general usage, but by its recurrence in the very next clause, where “ib c^rx hfi~3^ IES; is agreed on all hands to mean to whom I sold you. But as the verb to send governs two accusatives in Hebrew, the relative may take the place of one of them, denoting the end for which or the means by which, as it actually does in ch. 55: 11. 2 Sam. 11: 22. 1 Kings 14: 6, and in the case before us, according to the judgment of most modern writers, who explain the words to mean wherewith I have sent her away.—The use of the disjunctive or in Hebrew is comparatively rare, and consequently more significant when it does occur, as in this case, where it seems designed to intimate that the two figures of the clause are to be taken separately, not together, that is to say that the punishment of the people is not compared to the repudiation of a wife and the sale of her children in the same ideal case, but represented by the two distinct emblems of a wife divorced and children sold. Or which of my creditors (is it) to whom I have sold you 1 We have here an allusion to another provision of the Mosaic law, which allows debtors to be sold in payment of their debts (Matt. 18: 25), and even children by their parents (Exod. 21: 7).—The answer follows in the other clause. Behold, for your iniquities ye have been sold. The reflexive meaning, ye have sold yourselves, is frequently expressed by this form of the verb, but not invariably nor even commonly; it is not, therefore, necessary here, nor even favoured by the parallelism, as the corresponding term is a simple passive of a different form, and one which cannot, from the nature of the case, denote a reflexive or reciprocal action.—And for your transgressions. Vitringa’s suggestion, that one of the parallel terms may signify civil and the other religious offences, is entirely gratuitous. Your mother has been sent (or put) away. The repetition of your, where her transgressions might have been expected, only serves to show more clearly the real identity of those who are formally distinguished as the mother and the children.—The interrogation in the first clause of this verse has been variously understood. Jerome and the Rabbins explain it as an indirect but absolute negation, implying that she had not been divorced at all, but had wilfully forsaken h«r husband, and, as Abarbenel says, gone out from his house of herself or of her own accord (p>3t> ]fl t>f>5’ Drirp f»r>). This, though a good sense in itself, is not an obvious one, or that which the words would readily suggest. If this had been the writer’s meaning, and he had chosen to express it in the form of an interrogation, he would more probably have said, Have I given your mother a bill of divorcement? Have I sold you to my creditors? Besides, the explanation of this clause as an absolute negation is at variance with the positive statement in the last clause that she had been put away, as well as with the parallel assertion that they had been sold, which last indeed may be explained away by adopting the reflexive sense, but no such explanation OQO CH AP T E R L. is admissible in the other case. In order to avoid this objection, some explain the clause not as an absolute negation but a qualified one. Thus Vitringa understands it to mean that she had been put away and they sold, not by him, i. e. not by the husband and the father, but by judicial process, which he undertakes to reconcile with ancient Jewish usage by the authority of Buxtorf and Selden. It is evident, however, that the qualification, which is needed to reconcile the clauses, is, in this interpretation, wholly sup plied by the imagination of the reader or interpreter, without the least foundation in the text or context. The same remark applies, though in a less degree, to the modification of this negative hypothesis by Grotius, who supposes it to be denied that she had been divorced without sufficient reason, and by Gesenius, who explains it as denying that she had received a bill or writing of the ordinary kind. The difficulty common to all these hypotheses is that the qualification assumed is altogether arbitrary and dependent on the fancy or discretion of the reader.—This is equally true of some interpretations which assume that she had been put away, for example that of Hitzig, who ingeniously supposes that the bill of divorce ment is called for that it may be cancelled, and the creditor that he may be paid. The most emphatic and significant portion of the sentence is in this case not expressed at all, and never would occur to any reader but the one whose ingenuity invented it.—The simplest and most obvious interpretation of the first clause is the one suggested by the second, which evidently stands related to it as an answer to the question which occasions it. In the present case, the answer is wholly unambiguous, viz. that they were sold for their sins, and that she was put away for their transgressions. The question naturally corresponding to this answer is the question, why the mother was divorced, and why the sons were sold. Supposing this to be the substance of the first clause, its form is very easily accounted for. Where is your mother’s bill of divorcement? produce it that we may see the cause of her repudiation. Where is the creditor to whom I sold you? let him appear and tell us what was the occasion of your being sold. Gesenius’s objection, that the Jewish bills of divorcement did not state the cause, is trivial, even if the fact alleged be admitted to be true, for which there is no sufficient reason. The objection that God could not have a creditor, from which some have argued that the first clause must be negatively understood, has no more force than the objection that he could not be a husband or a writer, both involving an egregious misconception or an utter disregard of the figurative nature of the passage. If Jehovah’s casting off his people might be likened to a Jewish husband’s repudiation of his wife, then the same thing might be likened to a Jewish debtor’s sale of himself or his children to his creditors, without any greater incongruity or contradiction in the one case than the other. The general idea of rejection is twice clothed in a figurative dress, first by emblems borrowed from the law and custom of divorce, arid then by emblems borrowed from the law and custom of imprisonment for debt.— The restriction of this passage to the Babylonish exile is entirely arbitrary. If it admits of any special application, it is rather to the repudiation of the Jewish people at the advent.
2. Why did I come, and there was no man? (why) did I call, and there was no one answering 1 The idiom of occidental languages would here admit, if not require, a more involved and hypothetical construction. ’ Why, when I came, was there no one (to receive me), and, when I called, no one to answer me?’ (See above, ch. 5: 4, and the Earlier Prophecies, p. 66.) The Targum explains this of God’s coming and calling by the Prophets, and the modern Germans adopt the same interpretation. Vitringa and many other writers understand it of Christ’s coming in the flesh. Both explanations are erroneous if exclusive, both correct as specific applications of a general expression. In themselves, the words imply nothing more than that God had come near to the people, by his word and providence, but without any suitable response on their part. The clause is explanatory of their being sold and put away, as represented in the foregoing verse. The general truth which it teaches is, that God has never and will never put away his people even for a time without preceding disobedience and alienation upon their part. Particular examples of this general truth are furnished by the Babylonish exile and by every season of distress and persecution.— The other clause precludes the vindication of their unbelief and disobedience on the ground that they had not sufficient reason to obey his commands and rely upon his promises. Such doubts are rendered impious and foolish by the proofs of his almighty power. This power is first asserted indirectly by a question implying the strongest negation: Is my hand shortened, shortened, from redemption 1 and is there with me no power (i. e. have I no power) to deliver? Shortness of hand or arm is a common oriental figure for defect of power, especially in reference to some particular effect, which is thus represented as beyond the reach. (See ch. 59: 1. Num. 1 1: 23. cf. ch. 37: 17.) According to Gesenius, Artaxerxes Longimanus was so called, not in reference to any corporeal peculiarity, but as being possessed of extraordinary power. The emphatic repetition of the Hebrew verb may, as usual, be variously expressed in translation by the introduction of intensive phrases, such as altogether or at all, or by a simple repetition of the verb in English. From redemption, i. e. so as not to redeem or deliver from distress. (See above, on ch. 49: 15.)—Behold, by my rebuke (a term often used to express God’s control over the elements) I will dry up the sea. I can make a complete change in the face of nature. Most of the modern writers use the present form, I dry up the sea. But this, as expressing an habitual act, fails to give the sense of the original, which is not a description of what he usually does, but a declaration of what he can do and what he will do in the present instance if it should be necessary. Hence the best translation of the verb is the exact one which adheres to the strict sense of the future. As in many other cases, this general expression may involve a particular allusion, namely, to the crossing of the Red Sea at the exodus from Egypt. But to make this the direct and main sense of the words, is equally at variance with good taste and the context. It is only upon this erroneous supposition that Vitringa could imagine himself bound to apply what follows (I will make streams a wilderness) to the passage of the Jordan, and to justify the plural designation of that river by appealing to its magnitude, historical importance, etc. It is really a poetical reiteration of what goes before, extending what was there said of the sea to streams and other waters. The remaining words of this verse are intended merely to complete the picture, by subjoining to the cause its natural effect.—Let their fish stink for want of water and die of thirst. The abbreviated form Pan seems to show that the writer here passes from the tone of prediction or general description to that of actual command. It may however be a poetic variation of the ordinary future form, in which case the sense will be, their fish shall die etc.; or the abbreviated form may indicate an indirect or oblique construction, so that their fish shall stink etc., which last explanation is the one preferred by the latest writers. The pronoun their refers to sea and rivers, or to the last alone, which is masculine, though feminine in form.— For map Lowth reads irr^n (their fish is dried up), on the authority of one manuscript confirmed by the Septuagint version (fyQav&faovrai). The collective use of the word fish is the same in Hebrew and in English. For the true sense of -pxa, see above, ch. 5:9, and the Earlier Prophecies, p. 70.
3. The description of Jehovah’s power, as displayed in his control of the elements, is still continued. I will clothe the heavens in blackness. The Hebrew noun, according to its etymology, denotes not merely a black colour, but such a colour used as a sign of mourning. Thus understood, it corresponds exactly to the following words, where the customary mourning dress of ancient times is mentioned. And sackcloth I will place (or make) their covering. The reference of this verse to the plague of darkness in the land of Egypt is admissible only in the sense explained above with respect to the passage of the Red Sea, namely, as a particular allusion comprehended in a general description. J. D. Michaelis and some later writers understand it as referring to the usual phenomena of storms, or even to the obscuration of the sky by clouds; but it is inconceivable that such an every-day occurrence should be coupled with the drying up of seas and rivers, as a proof of God’s power over nature and the elements. The sense required by the connexion is that of an extraordinary darkness (such as that of an eclipse), or even an extinction of the heavenly bodies, as in ch. 13: 10. (See the Earlier Prophecies, p. 253.)
4. The Lord Jehovah hath given to me. As Jehovah is the speaker in the foregoing verse, Cocceius, Vitringa, and many others, regard this clause as a proof that these are the words of the Messiah, who, in virtue of his twofold nature, might speak in the person of Jehovah, and yet say, Jehovah hath given to me. The rabbins and the Germans explain them as the words of Isaiah himself, speaking either in his own name or in that of the prophets as a class. But some of the things which follow are inapplicable to such a subject, an objection not relieved by assuming with Grotius that Isaiah is here a type of Christ. The true hypothesis is still the same which we have found ourselves constrained to assume in all like cases throughout the foregoing chapters, namely, that the servant of Jehovah, as he calls himself in v. 10 below, is the Messiah and his People, as a complex person, or the Church in indissoluble union with its Head, asserting his divine commission and authority to act as the great teacher and enlightener of the world. For this end God had given him a ready tongue or speech. Most interpreters adopt a different version of o^fib in the first and last clause, giving it at first the sense of learned, and afterwards that of learners. These two ideas, it is true, are near akin, and may be blended in the Hebrew word as they are in the English scholar, which is used both for a learner and a learned person. It is best, however, for that very reason, to retain the same word in translation, as is done by Hitzig, who translates it disciples, Ewald apostles, and Henderson those who are taught. Grotius agrees with the Septuagint in making c^iJsb an abstract noun meaning instructive—ylMavav nai8eia(;} *an instructive tongue. Gesenius considers it equivalent to *taught or practised tongue. In every other case the word is a concrete, meaning persons taught, disciples. (See above, ch. 8: 16, and below, ch. 54: 13.) From this expression Hitzig and Knobel strangely infer that Isaiah was an uneducated prophet like Amos (7:14), which would be a very forced conclusion, even if Isaiah were the subject of the passage. As applied to Christ, it is descriptive of that power of conviction and persuasion which is frequently ascribed in the New Testament to his oral teachings. As his representative and instrument, the Church has always had a measure of the same gift enabling her to execute her high vocation.—To know (that I might know) to help or succour the weary (with) a word. This explanation of the verb MS, which occurs only here, is that given by Aquila (ynoffTijgtfftti), Jerome (sustentare), Gesenius (starkeri), and several of the later writers. Near akin to this, and founded on another Arabic analogy, is the sense of refreshing, which is expressed by Riickert, Ewald, and Umbreit. J. D. Michaelis explains it to mean change, and applies it to the endless variety of our Saviour’s instructions. Paulus and Hitzig make the b radical, and identify the word with the Arabic LiJ to speak; but this, according to Knobel, would be applicable only to frivolous, unmeaning speech. Most of the older writers understand rw as a denominative verb from F5 time, meaning to speak seasonably. This explanation seems to be implied in the Septuagint paraphrase (TOV yiwvai jjvixu dzidnsiv loyov). But according to the probable etymology of ns? the verb derived from it would assume another form, and the construction with two objects, as Gesenius observes, would be harsh; whereas it is not uncommon with verbs of supporting or sustaining. (See Gen. 47:13. 1 Kings 18:4.) The Chaldee paraphrase, ‘that I might know how to teach wisdom to the righteous panting for the words of the law,’ or, as Jarchi and Kimchi have it, (thirsting for the words of God,’ appears to be conjectural.—He will waken, in the morning, in the morning, he will waken for me the ear, 5. e. he will waken my ear, rouse my attention, and open my mind to the reception of the truth. (See ch. 48: 8. 1 Sam. 9: 15. 20: 2. Ps. 41:7.) The present tense (he wakeneth) asserts a claim to constant inspiration; the future expresses a confident belief that God will assist and inspire him.—The accents require in the morning in the morning to be read together, as in ch. 28: 19, where it is an intensive repetition meaning every morning. It might otherwise be thought more natural to read the sentence thus, he will waken in the morning, in the morning lie will waken, a twofold expression of the same idea, viz. that he will do so early. In either case the object of both verbs is the same; the introduction of the pronoun me after the first in the English Version being needless and hurtful to the sentence.—The last words of the verse declare the end or purpose of this wakening, to hear (i. e. that I may hear) like the disciples or the taught, i. e. that I may give attention as a learner listens to his teacher. Luzzatto understands this verse as an assertion of the pious and believing Jews, that God enables them to hear and speak as if they were all prophets, which, if correctly understood and duly limited, appears to be the true sense as explained above.
5. The Lord Jehovah opened for me the ear, and I resisted not. The common version, 1 was not rebellious, seems to convert the description of an act into that of a habit.—I did not draw back, or refuse the office, on account of the hardships by which I foresaw that it would be accompanied. There may be an allusion to the conduct of Moses (4:13) in declining the dangerous but honourable work to which the Lord had called him. (Compare Jer. 1: 6. 17: 16.) Henderson’s reflection on this sentence is, “ How different the conduct of the Messiah from that of Jonah!”
6. My Lack I gave to (those) smiting. We may understand by gave either yielded unresistingly or offered voluntarily. (Compare Matth. 5: 39.) The punishment of scourging was a common one, and is particularly mentioned in the history of our Lord’s maltreatment.—And my cheeks to (those) plucking (the beard or hair). It is well observed by Hitzig that the context here requires something more than the playful or even the contemptuous pulling of the beard, the vellere barbam of Horace and Persius, to which preceding writers had referred. A better parallel is Neh. 13: 25, where the Tirshatha is said lo have contended with the Jews, and cursed them, and smote them, and plucked off their hair. (Compare Ezra 9: 3.) This particular species of abuse is not recorded in the history of our Saviour’s sufferings, but some suppose it to be comprehended in the general term buf feting.—My face I did not hide from shame and spitting. The plural form rviaVs may be either an intensive or emphatic expression for extreme shame or abundant shame, or a term comprehending various shameful acts, such as smiting on the face, spitting in it, and the like. In the phrase I did not hide my face there may be an allusion to the common figure of confusion covering the face (Jer. 51: 51), in reference no doubt to the natural expression of this feeling by a blush, or in extreme cases by a livid paleness overspreading the features. Some have imagined that by spitting nothing more is meant than spitting on the ground in one’s presence, which, according to the oriental usages and feelings, is a strong expression of abhorrence and contempt. But, as Lowth well says, if spitting in a person’s presence was such an indignity, how much more spitting in his face; and the whole connexion shows that the reference is not to any mitigated form of insult but to its extreme. That this part of the description was fulfilled in the experience of our Saviour, is expressly recorded, Matth. 26: 67. 27: 30. That it was literally verified in that of Isaiah, is not only without proof but in the last degree improbable, much more the supposition that it was a common or habitual treatment of the prophets as a class. As to Isaiah himself, it is worthy of remark that a learned and ingenious rabbin of our own day (Samuel Luzzatto) argues against this application of the prophet’s language, first, because he was not a prophet of evil, and could not therefore be an object of the popular hatred; secondly, because his predictions were not addressed to his contemporaries but to future ages; thirdly, because even on the supposition that he lived at the time of the Babylonish exile, he must have written in the name and person of an older prophet, and could not therefore have exposed himself to any public insult. From this impossibility of proving any literal coincidence between the prophetic description and the personal experience of the prophet himself, when taken in connexion with the palpable coincidences which have been already pointed out in the experience of Jesus Christ, many interpreters infer that it was meant to be a literal prediction of his sufferings. But even Vitringa has observed that if it were so, its fulfilment, or the record of it, would be imperfect, since the points of agreement are not fully commensurate with those of the description. (See for example what has been already said with respect to the plucking of the beard or hair.) The most satisfactory solution of the difficulty is the one suggested by Vitringa himself, who regards the prophecy as metaphorical, and as denoting cruel and contemptuous treatment in general, and supposes the literal coincidences, as in many other cases, to have been providentially secured, not merely to convict the Jews as Grotius says, but also to identify to others the great subject of the prophecy. But if the prophecy itself be metaphorical, it may apply to other subjects, less completely and remarkably but no less really, not to Isaiah, it is true, from whom its terms, even figuratively understood, are foreign, but to the church or people of God, the body of Christ, which like its head has ever been an object of contempt with those who did not understand its character or recognise its claims. What is literally true of the Head is metaphorically true of the Body. ’ I gave my back to the smiters and my cheeks to the pluckers, my face I did not hide from shame and spitting.’
7. And the Lord Jehovah will help me, or afford help to me. The adversative particle, which most translators have found necessary here to show the true connexion, is not required by the Hebrew idiom. (See above, on ch. 40: 8.)—Therefore I am not confounded by the persecution and contempt described in the foregoing verses. The common version, I shall not be confounded, is not only arbitrary but injurious to the sense, which is not that God’s protection will save him from future shame, but that the hope of it saves him even now. The words strictly mean I have not been confounded, which implies of course that he is not so now.— Therefore I have set my face as a flint. This is a common description of firmness and determination, as expressed in the countenance. It is equally applicable to a wicked impudence (Jer. 5:3. Zech. 7:12) and a holy resolution (Ezek. 3:8, 9). The same thing is expressed by Jeremiah under different but kindred figures. (Jer. 1: 17, 18. 15:20.) It is probable, as J. H. Michaelis suggests, that Luke alludes to these passages, when he says that our Lord stedfastly set his face (TO TTQOGWTZOV avrov lariJQi^e) to go to Jerusalem. (Luke 9:51.) The strong and expressive English phrase set my face is in all respects better than those which later versions have substituted for it, such as place (Barnes), present (Noyes), etc.—And I know that I shall not be ashamed. The substitution of because for and is an unnecessary deviation from the Hebrew idiom.
^ V. 8. Near (is) my justifier (or the one justifying me). strictly a forensic term meaning to acquit or pronounce innocent, in case of accusation, and to right or do justice to, in case of civil controversy. The use of this word and of several correlative expressions, may be clearly learned from Deut. 25: 1. The justifier is of course Jehovah”! His being near is not intended to denote the proximity of an event still future, but to describe his intervention as constantly within reach and available. It is not the justification which is said to be near to the time of speaking, but the justifier who is said to be near the speaker himself. The justification of his servant is the full vindication of his claims to divine authority and inspiration. At the same time there is a designed coincidence between the terms of the prediction and the issue of our Saviour’s trial; but the prophecy is not to be restricted to this object. The general meaning of the words is, all this reproach is undeserved, as will be seen hereafter. Since God himself has undertaken his defence, the accuser’s case is hopeless. He therefore asks triumphantly, Who will contend with me? The Hebrew verb denotes specifically litigation, or forensic strife. Rom. 8: 33, 34, is an obvious imitation of this passage as to form. But even Vitringa, and the warmest advocates for letting the New Testament explain the Old, are forced to acknowledge that in this case Paul merely borrows his expressions from the Prophet, and applies them to a different object. In any other case this class of writers would no doubt have insisted that the justifier must be Christ and the justified his people; but from this they are precluded by their own assumption, that the Messiah is the speaker. Both hypotheses, so far as they have any just foundation, may be reconciled by the supposition that the ideal speaker is the Body and the Head in union. In the sense here intended, Christ is justified by the Father, and at the same time justifies his people.— ^6 will stand (or kt us stand) together, at the bar, before the judgment-seat, a frequent application of the Hebrew verb (See Num. 27: 2. Deut. 19: 17. 1 Kings 3: 16.) This is an indirect defiance or ironical challenge; as if he had said, If any will still venture to accuse me, kt us stand up together.-The same thing is then expressed in other words, the form of interrogation and proposal being still retained. Who is my adversary? This is more literally rendered in the maro-in of the English Bible, who is the master of my cause? But even this fails to convey the precise sense of the original, and may be even said to reverse it, for the master of my cause seems to imply ascendency or better right, and is not therefore applicable to a vanquished adversary whose case was just before described as hopeless. The truth is that the pronoun my belongs not to 90S CHAPTER L. the last word merely but to the whole complex phrase, and ^?2 simply means ‘ possessor,’ i. e. one to whom a given thing belongs. Thus a causemaster (elsewhere called d*n^ bsa, Exod. 24: 14) means one who has a cause or lawsuit, a party litigant, and my cause-master means one who has a controversy with me, my opponent or adversary; so that the common ver sion really conveys the meaning better than what seems to be the more exact translation of the margin. In sense, the question is precisely parallel and tantamount to the one before it, who will contend with me 1—Let him draw near to me, confront me, or engage in conflict with me.—The forensic figures of this verse and some of its expressions, have repeatedly occurred in the course of the preceding chapters. (See ch. 41:1, 21. 43: 9, 26. 45:20. 48: 14, 16.)
9. Behold, the Lord Jehovah will help me; who (is) he (that) will condemn me 1 The help specifically meant is that afforded by an advocate or judge to an injured party.?n^”:n is the technical antithesis to p^sri used in v. 8. Both verbs with their cognate adjectives occur in Deut. 25: 1.— The potential meaning (can condemn) is included in the future (will condemn), though not directly much less exclusively expressed by it,—The last clause adds to the assurance of his own safety that of the destruction of his enemies. All they (or all of them, his adversaries, not expressly mentioned but referred to in the questions which precede) like the garment shall grow old (or be worn out), i. e. like the garment which is worn out or decays.—The moth shall devour them. Gesenius condemns the relative construction which the moth devours (referring to ^an as a collective), because inadmissible in the parallel passage, ch. 51: 8. He nevertheless adopts it in his own German version (wie ein Gewand das die Motte verzehrt). The real objection to it is, that it is needless and rests upon a frivolous rhetorical punctilio. By a perfectly natural and common transition, the writer passes from comparison to metaphor, and having first trans formed them into garments, says directly that the moth shall devour them, not as men, in which light he no longer views them, but as old clothes. This is a favourite comparison in Scripture to express a gradual but sure decay. (Compare ch. 51: 8 and Hos. 5: 12.) In Job 13: 28. Ps. 39: 12, it seems to denote the effect of pining sickness. Not contented with this obvious and natural interpretation of the figure, Vitringa supposes an allusion to the official dresses of their chief men, which is not a whit more reasonable than the notion of Cocceius, which he sets aside as far-fetched, that the prophets, priests, and rulers of the old economy were but a garment, under which the Messiah was concealed until his advent, and of which he stripped himself (anexdvcdftwoi;, Col. 2:15) at death. The necessity of thus explaining why the enemies of Christ and his people are compared to garments is precluded by the obvious consideration, that the main point of the simile is the slow consuming process of the moth, and that the clothes are added simply as the substances in which it is most frequently observed.
10. Who among you is a fearer of Jehovah, hearkening to the voice of his servant, who wallceth in darkness and there is no light to him 1 Let him trust in the name of Jehovah, and lean upon his God. The same sense may be attained by closing the interrogation at his servant, and read ing the remainder of the sentence thus: whoso walltcth in darkness and hath no light, let him trust etc. This construction, which is given by De Wette, has the advantage of adhering more closely to the masoretic interpunction. A different turn is given to the sentence by J. D. Michaelis, who terminates the question at Jehovah, and makes all the rest an answer to it. ( *Who among you is a fearer of Jehovah? He that hearkeneth to the voice of his servant, that walketh in darkness where he has no dawn, yet trusts in Jehovah and relies upon his God.’ To this ingenious and original construction it may be objected, first, that it divides the sentence into two very unequal parts, directly contrary to Hebrew usage; and in the next place, that it makes the participle, present, and future, all precisely synonymous and equally descriptive of the pious man’s habitual conduct. All the constructions which have now been mentioned give the ^ its usual and proper sense, as an interrogative pronoun corresponding to the English *who? But Vitringa, Rosenmiiller, Gesenius, and Maurer, choose to give it an indefinite sense, whoso or whoever, and exclude the interrogation altogether, the same superficial lexicography which confounds a&n. with nssi, because the Hebrew employed one form of expression where we should more naturally use the other. Because whoever might be used, and would be used more readily by us in such a case than who, it does not follow that the former is the true sense of the Hebrew word in that case. All the instances alleged by Gesenius in his Lexicon as proofs that h» is sometimes an indefinite, admit, with one exception, of the usual interrogative translation, not only without damage to the sense, but with a more exact adherence to the genius of the language, which delights in short detached propositions, where an occidental writer would prefer a series of dependent members forming one complex period. Thus in Judg. 7: 3 the occidental idiom would be, Whosoever is fearful and afraid let him return; but the genuine Hebrew form is, Who is fearful and afraid? let him return. The same thing is true of Exod. 24: 14. Prov. 9:4. Eccl. 5: 9. Is. 54: 15, in all which cases there is nothing whatever to forbid the application of the general rule, that the usual and proper sense must be retained unless there be some reason for departing from it; and such a reason cannot be afforded by the bare possibility of a different construction. The single exception above mentioned, 14 and the only case of the indefinite use of ^ alleged by Ewald in his Gram mar, is 2 Sam. 18: 12, which is too anomalous and doubtful to prove any thing, and which may be as properly alleged on one side as the other. The occasional combination of “a with iitix, instead of favouring the views here combated, affords an argument against them, as the obvious meaning of the words, both in Exod. 32: 33 and 2 Sam. 20: 11, is, who (is he) that 1 All that need be added upon this point is, that the latest German writers have returned to the old and true translation, who?—Obedience to the word is implied in hearing it, but not expressed. Lowth, on the authority of two ancient versions, reads SE^ for?«{i5, let him hearken, which is copied by Gesenius, perhaps through inadvertence, as he says nothing of a change of text, and no such sense can possibly be put upon the participle. This mistake or oversight, if such it be, although corrected by the later Germans, has been carefully retained by Noyes (let him hearken to the voice of his servant). Henderson, on the other hand, retains the common interrogative translation, but explains the “^ 5 in his note, as “a substitute for the relative ^K, he who’’ which is scarcely intelligible.—Darkness is here used as a natural and common figure for distress. (See above, ch. 8:20. 9: 1.) J. D. Michaelis gives to fi$b the specific sense of dawn, break of day, or morning light, like ^nw in ch. 8: 20 and 47: 11. Vitringa understands it to mean splendor or a great degree of light, and thus avoids the absolute negation of all spiritual light, which would not suit his exegetical hypothesis. The great majority of writers, late and early, are agreed in making it a poetical equivalent or synonyme of “lix.—The futures in the last clause may, with equal propriety, if not still greater, be translated, he will trust and lean; the exhortation being then implied but not expressed. —The preterite T^ may be intended to suggest that the darkness spoken of is not a transient state, but one which has already long continued. Trusting in the name of Jehovah is not simply trusting in himself, or in the independent self-existence which that name implies, but in his manifested attributes, attested by experience, which seems to be the full sense of the word name, as applied to God in the Old Testament.—Two exegetical questions, in relation to this verse, have much divided and perplexed interpreters. The first has respect to the person speaking and the objects of address; the other to the servant of Jehovah. These questions, from their close connexion and their mutual dependence, may be most conveniently discussed together. There would be no absurdity, nor even inconsistency, in supposing that his servant means the prophet or the prophets indefinitely, as the organs of the divine communications. This may be granted even by those who give the title a very different meaning elsewhere, as it cannot reasonably be supposed that so indefinite a name, and one of such perpetual occurrence, is invariably used in its most pregnant and emphatic sense. It 211 is certain, on the contrary, that it is frequently applied to the prophets and to other public functionaries of the old economy. There is therefore no absurdity in Calvin’s explanation of the phrase as here descriptive of God’s ministers or messengers in general, to whom those who fear him are required to submit. The verse may then be connected immediately with what precedes, as the words of the same speaker. But while all this is unquestionably true, it cannot be denied that the frequency and prominence with which the Servant of Jehovah is exhibited in these Later Prophecies, as one distinguished from the ordinary ministry, makes it more natural to make that application of the words in this case, if it be admissible. The only difficulty lies in the mention of the Servant of Jehovah in the third person, while the preceding context is to be considered as his own words. (See above, on ch. 49: 1.) This objection may be easily removed, if we assume, as Ewald does, that the words of the Servant of Jehovah are concluded in the preceding verse, and that in the one before us the Prophet goes on to speak in his own person. This assumption, although not demonstrably correct, agrees well with the dramatic form of the context, both£ before and after, and the frequent changes of person, without any explicit intimation, which even the most rigorous interpreters are under the necessity of grant ing. On this hypothesis, which seems to be approved by the latest as well as by the older writers, the Servant of Jehovah here referred to is the same ideal person who appears at the beginning of the forty-ninth and forty-second chapters, namely, the Messiah and his People as his type and representative, to whose instructions in the name of God the world must hearken if it would be saved. The question, which part of the complex person here predominates, must be determined by observing what is said of him. If the exhortation of the verse were naturally applicable to the world at large, as distinguished from the chosen people, then the latter might be readily supposed to be included under the description of the Servant of Jehovah. But as the terms employed appear to be descriptive of the people of Jehovah, or of some considerable class among them, the most probable conclusion seems to be, that by the Servant of Jehovah we are here to understand the Head as distinguished from the Body, with a secondary reference, perhaps, to his official representatives, so far as he employs them in communicating even with the Body itself. There is no need of pointing out the arbitrary nature of Vitringa’s theory, that this verse relates to a period extending from the advent to the reign of Trajan or Hadrian,—a chronological hypothesis in which the terminus a quo is only less gratuitous and groundless than the terminus ad quern.
11. Lo, allof you kindling fire, girding sparks (or fiery darts), go in the light of your fire, and in the sparks ye have kindled. From my hand is this to you; in pain (or at the place of torment) shall ye lie down. The construction of the first clause is ambiguous, as kindling and girding, with their adjuncts, may be either the predicates or subjects of the proposition. J. D. Michaelis, Hitzig, and Hendewerk, prefer the latter supposition, and explain the clause to mean, all of you are kindling fire etc. This being inconsistent with the character described in the preceding verse, Hitzig supposes that the speaker here acknowledges his error, or admits that the fearers of Jehovah, whose existence he had hypothetically stated, were in fact not to be found. As if he had said, ‘ But you are not such, all of you are kindling,’ etc. The harshness of this interpretation, or perhaps other reasons, have induced the great majority of writers to adopt the other syntax, and explain the participles as the subject of the proposition, or a description of the object of address, all of you ‘kindling, i. e. all of you who kindle. Thus understood, the clause implies that the speaker is here turn ing from one class of hearers to another, from the gentiles to the Jews, or from the unbelieving portion of the latter to the pious, or still more gene rally from jjie corresponding classes of mankind at large, without either national or local limitation. The wider sense agrees best with the comprehensive terms of the passage, whatever specific applications may be virtually comprehended in it or legitimately inferable from it. This is of course too vague an hypothesis to satisfy the judgment or the feelings of the excellent Vitringa, by whom it is repeatedly affirmed that all who admit the application of the prophecy to Christ, must grant that this verse is addressed to the Pharisaic party of the Jews,—a consequence the logical necessity of which is very far from being evident.—There is also a difference of opinion with respect to the import of the figures. That of kindling fire is explained by Junius and Tremellius as denoting the invention of doctrines not revealed in Scripture^ while the sparks represent the Pharisaical traditions. The rabbinical interpreters suppose the fire to denote the wrath of God, in proof of which they are able to allege not only the general usage of the emblem in that sense, but the specific combination of this very noun and verb in Deut. 32:22. Jer. 15: 14. 17:4. In all these cases the meaning of the figure is determined by the addition of the words in my anger, or as some absurdly choose to render it, in my nose. (See above, on ch. 48: 9.) This is certainly a strong analogical argument in favour of the rabbinical interpretation, and Vitringa’s method of evading it is not a little curious. He rests his proof on the omission of this very phrase (^3), in default of which, he says, nemo hie necessario cogitat de ira Dei. The same rule, if applied with equal rigour to his own interpretations, would exclude a very large proportion of his favourite conclusions. Even in this case, he has no dicMQiTixov, as he calls it, to compel the adoption of his own idea, that the fire kindled is the fire of sedition and intestine strife, still less to prove that the particular sedition and intestine conflict meant is that which raged among the Jews before the final downfal of Jerusalem. Lowth seems unwilling to reject this explanation, though his better taste inclines him to prefer the wider sense of human devices and worldly policy, exclusive of faith and trust in God. This is substantially the explanation of the words now commonly adopted, though particular interpreters diverge from one another in details, according to the sense which they attach to the parallel metaphor, ™P** “‘t-fKia • The rabbinical tradition gives the noun the sense of *sparks, which is retained in many versions. But others follow Albert Schultens in explaining it to mean small bundles of combustibles, employed like matches or as missiles in ancient warfare. This is generalized by Lowth into fuel, while Gesenius makes it signify specifically burning arrows, fiery darts, the fi&ri TtsTivncopsva of Eph. 6: 16. J. D. Michaelis adopts the kindred sense of torches. No less doubtful is the meaning of the verb in this connexion. Lowth translates the whole phrase, who heap the fuel round about, and Vitringa, qui circumponitis malleolos. Gesenius retains the usual sense of girding, and supposes them to be described as wearing the r^P”1! at the girdle. Most interpreters incline to the generic sense surrounding, as equally compatible with several different interpretations of the following noun. Any of these interpretations is better than the desperate device of emendation, which is here resorted to by Cappellus and Seeker, the last of whom suggests hT^; Hitzig proposes “^D^j which seems to be approved by Ewald.—Common to all the explanations is the radical idea of a fire kindled by themselves to their own eventual destruction. This result is predicted, as in many other cases, under the form of a command or exhortation to persist in the course which must finally destroy them. Go (i. e. go on) in the light of your fire. This seems to favour the opinion that the fire is supposed to have been kindled for the sake of its light, which is implied indeed in Lowth’s interpretation. Hitzig, however, understands the fire to be kindled for the purpose of destroying the righteous, instead of which result those who kindle it are called upon to enter into it and be con sumed. For this is their appointed doom.—From my hand is this to you, i. e. my power has decreed and will accomplish what is now about to be declared, viz. that you shall lie down in sorrow, or a place of sorrow, if with Ewald we give the noun the local sense usual in words of this formation. The expression is a general one, denoting final ruin, and of course includes, although it may not specifically signify, a future state of misery.— It may here be mentioned, as a specimen of misplaced ingenuity, that J. D. Michaelis understands the scene depicted to be that of travellers in the dark who strike a light, and when it is extinguished find it darker than before, in consequence of which they fall among the rocks and hurt themselves severely, which is meant by lying down in pain. It is characteristic of this writer and his age, that although rather supercilious and reserved in allowing the aesthetic merits of Isaiah, he describes this passage, thus dis torted by himself, as a specimen of oriental imagery which (really deserves to be introduced even into our poetry;’ while many of the Prophet’s loftiest flights elsewhere, if not entirely overlooked, are noticed in a kind of apolo getic tone, as if the critic were ashamed of his subject. The spirit of such criticism is not yet extinct, although its grosser forms are superseded by a purer taste, even in Germany.
