The Necessity Of The Priesthood Of Christ On The Supposition Of Sin And Grace

1. The necessity of the priesthood of Christ, of what nature and on what grounds asserted. 2. The general nature of justice or righteousness. 3. The nature of the righteousness of God, as declared in the Scripture—The universal rectitude of his nature. 4. Right of rule in God, whence it proceeds. 5. The righteousness of God in particular exercise. 6. "Justitia regiminis" in God, the nature of it. 7. Sundry things supposed to the necessary exercise of vindictive righteousness. 8. The necessity and special nature of the priesthood of Christ founded thereon. 9. Some attributes of God produce the objects about which they are exercised, some suppose them with their qualifications—Vindictive justice no free act of God's will—The righteousness of rule exerted in the prescription of a penal law—Punishment, as punishment, necessary; not the degrees of it —God not indifferent whether sin be punished or not, but free in punishing; yet is it necessary that sin should be punished. 10. Justice and mercy not alike necessary as to their exercise. 11. The opinion of the Socinians, in opposition to the justice of God, declared. 12. Positions to be proved. 13. First argument taken from the holiness of God, Hab. 1:13—Of God's jealousy, Josh. 24:19—In what sense compared to a consuming fire, Heb. 12:29. 14. God the supreme judge and governor of the world, Gen. 18:25. 15. The sum of what hath been pleaded concerning the righteousness of God. 16. Opposition made to this righteousness of God, by whom. 17. The arguments of Socinus examined—Justice and mercy not opposite. 18. The twofold righteousness assigned unto God by Socinus examined. 19, 20. The righteousness of God in the punishment of sin further vindicated against him; 21. And against the exceptions in the Racovian Catechism; 22. As also those of Crellius, who is further refuted.

1. IT appears from the precedent discourse that the priesthood of Christ was founded in sundry free acts of the will of God. Into that, therefore, is it principally to be resolved. The actual appointing of him also unto this office was a free act of the sovereign will and pleasure of God, which might not have been. The redeeming of man was no more necessary on the part of God than his creation. Howbeit on this supposition, that God, in his infinite grace and love, would save sinners by the interposition of his Son, there was something in the manner of it indispensable and necessary; and this was, that he should do it by undergoing the punishment that was due unto them or their sins who should be saved, or offer himself a sacrifice to make atonement and reconciliation for them. This God did require; nor could it have been ordered otherwise, but that an inconsistency with the glory of his holiness, righteousness, and veracity, would have ensued thereon. The priesthood of the Son of God was necessary, not absolutely and in itself, but on the supposition of the law and entrance of sin, with the grace of God to save sinners.

This being a matter of great importance, and without a due stating whereof the doctrine concerning the priesthood of Christ, or the nature and use of this office of his, cannot be rightly conceived or apprehended, I must somewhat largely insist upon it. And I shall do it the rather because the truth in this matter is strenuously opposed by the Socinians, and the defence of it deserted by some otherwise adhering unto sound doctrine in the main of our cause: for I shall not mention them who in these things are not wise beyond the writings of two or three whom they admire; nor those who, being utter strangers to the true reasons and grounds of truth herein, do boldly and confidently vent their own imaginations, and that with the contempt of all who are not satisfied to be as ignorant as themselves.

2. Whereas we assert the necessity of the priesthood of Christ to depend on the righteousness of God, it is requisite that some things I should be premised concerning the nature of righteousness in general, and in particular of the righteousness of God. Aristotle divides justice into that which is universal and that which is particular; and he makes the former to be the same with virtue in general; only it hath, as he supposeth, a respect unto others, and is not merely for itself, Ethic. lib. v. cap. i. ii. Particular justice is either distributive or commutative; and in its exercise it consists in words or deeds. That justice which consists in words, respects either commands, and it is called equity; or promises and assertions, and is veracity or truth. And both these, even equity in his commands, and truth or faithfulness in his promises, are frequently in the Scripture called the "righteousness of God." See Ezra 9:15; Neh. 9:8; Ps. 31:1; Rom. 1:17, 3:21; 2 Tim. 4:8. And this is the righteousness of God which David and other holy men so often plead and appeal unto, whilst in the meantime they plainly acknowledge that in the strictness of God's justice they could neither stand before him nor find acceptance with him, Ps. 130:3, 143:1, 2. The righteousness which consisteth or is exercised in works or actions is either the righteousness of rule in general, or of judgment in particular. And this latter is either remunerative or corrective; and this also is either chastening or avenging. And all these are subordinate unto distributive justice; for commutative hath no place between God and man. "Who hath given first unto him, that it should be recompensed unto him again?"

3. And these distinctions are of use in the declaration of the various acceptations of the "righteousness of God" in the Scripture. But their explication and further illustration is not at present necessary unto us; for I shall take up with a more general consideration of the righteousness of God and distribution of it, whereunto whatever is ascribed unto it in the Scripture may be reduced. Wherefore, the righteousness of God is taken two ways:—first, Absolutely in itself, as it is resident in the divine nature; secondly, With respect unto its exercise, or the actings of God suitably unto that holy property of his nature.

In the first sense or acceptation it is nothing but the universal rectitude of the divine nature, whereby it is necessary to God to do all things rightly, justly, equally, answerably unto his own wisdom, goodness, holiness, and right of dominion: Zeph. 3:5, "The just LORD is in the midst thereof; he will not do iniquity: morning by morning doth he bring his judgment to light." I say it is the essential, natural readiness and disposition of the holy nature of God to do all things justly and decently, according to the rule of his wisdom and the nature of things, with their relation one to another. And this virtue of the divine nature, considered absolutely, is not πρὸς ἕτερον, or doth not consist in a habitude of mind with respect into others, as all justice in men doth, but is the infinite, essential rectitude of God in his being. Hence it doth so preside in and over all the works of God, that there is none of them, though proceeding immediately from mercy and goodness on the one hand, or from severity or faithfulness on the other, but that God is said to be righteous therein, and they are all represented as acts of righteousness in God; and this not only because they are his acts and works who will do no evil, who can do none, but also because they proceed from and are suited unto that holy, absolute, universal rectitude of his nature, wherein true righteousness doth consist. So are we said to obtain faith "through the righteousness of God," 2 Pet. 1:1,—the same with "abundant mercy," 1 Pet. 1:3; Isa. 51:6, "My salvation shall be for ever, and my righteousness shall not be abolished;" that is, "my faithfulness." See the description of it in general, Job 34:10–15. The absolute rectitude of the nature of God, acted in and by his sovereignty, is his righteousness, Rom. 9:8, 14, 15.

4. For between the consideration of this righteousness of God and the actual exercise of it, which must respect somewhat without him, to be made by him, somewhat in his creatures, there must be interposed a consideration of the right of God, or that which we call "jus dominii," a right, power, and liberty of rule or government; for it is not enough that any one be righteous to enable him to act righteously in all that he doth or may do with respect unto others, but, moreover, be must have a right to act in such and those cases wherein he doth so. And this right, which justice supposeth, is or may be twofold:—(1.) Supreme and absolute; (2.) Subordinate. For we speak of justice and right only with respect unto public actings, or actings of rule, which belong unto righteousness as it is distributive; for that which is commutative, and may have place in private transactions among private persons, we have here no consideration of. Now, for that which is subordinate, it is a right to distribute justice or things equal unto others, according to the direction and by the authority of a superior: and this superior may be either real only, as is a law,—in which sense the law of nature is a superior unto all rulers on the earth, and the respective laws of nations to most; or personal also, which is that which is denied, where any one is acknowledged as a supreme governor. That this right hath no place in God is evident. He hath no greater whereby he may swear, and therefore swears by himself, Heb. 6:13.

The right, therefore, which God hath to act his righteousness, or to act righteously towards others, is supreme and sovereign, arising naturally and necessarily from the relation of all things unto himself; for hereby,— namely, by their relation unto him as his creatures,—they are all placed in an universal, indispensable, and absolutely unchangeable dependence on him, according to their nature and capacities. The right of God unto rule over us is wholly of another kind and nature than any thing is or can be among the sons of men, that which is paternal having the nearest resemblance of it, but it is not of the same kind; for it doth not arise from the benefits we receive from him, nor hath any respect unto our consent, for he rules over the most against their wills, but depends merely on our relation unto him as his creatures, with the nature, order, and condition of our existence, wherein we are placed by his sovereignty. This in him is unavoidably accompanied with a right to act towards us according to the counsel of his will and the rectitude of his nature. The state and condition, I say, of our being and end, with the relation which we have unto him and to his other works, or the order wherein we are set and placed in the universe, being the product or effect of his power, wisdom, will, and goodness, he hath an unchangeable, sovereign right to deal with us and act towards us according to the infinite, eternal rectitude of his nature. And as he hath a right so to do, so he cannot do otherwise. Supposing the state and condition wherein we are made and placed, with the nature of our relation unto and dependence on God, and God can act no otherwise towards us but according to what the essential rectitude of his nature doth direct and require; which is the foundation of what we plead in the case before us concerning the necessity of the priesthood of Christ.

5. Secondly, The righteousness of God may be considered with respect unto its exercise, which is so frequently expressed in the Scripture, and whereon depends the rule and government of the world. This supposeth the right of God before declared, as that right itself is no absolute but a relative property of God, supposing the creation of all things, in their nature, order, and mutual respects, according unto his wisdom and by his power. On this supposition it followeth naturally and necessarily, not as a new thing in God, but as a natural and necessary respect which his nature and being hath unto all creatures upon their production; for suppose the creation of all things, and it is as natural and essential unto God to he the ruler of them and over them as it is to be God. Now, the exercise of the righteousness of God, in pursuit of his right of rule, is either absolute and antecedent, or respective and consequential. As it is absolute and acted antecedently unto the consideration of our obedience or disobedience, so it is put forth and exercised in his laws and promises; for they are acts or effects of righteousness disposing things equally, according to their nature and the will of God. God's ways are equal. His justice in legislation is universal equity; for all things being created in order by divine wisdom, there arose from thence a τὸ πρἐπον, a meetness and condecency, whereunto respect was had in God's legislation, whereby his law or the commandment became equal, holy, meet, just, and good. And whereas it was necessary that the law of God should be accompanied with promises and threatenings, the eternal rectitude of God's nature acting righteously in their execution or accomplishment is his truth. Hence truth and righteousness are in the Scripture frequently used to express the same thing.

6. Again, there is a respective righteousness in actions, which also is either of rule or of judgment. First, there is "justitia regiminis," or the particular righteousness of actual rule. I do not place this [next] as though it were absolutely consequential unto that of legislation before mentioned; for take the righteousness of rule or government in its whole latitude, and it comprehends in it the righteousness of legislation also as a part thereof. For so it is the virtue or power of the nature of God, whereby he guideth all his actions or works in disposing and governing of the things created by him, in their several kinds and orders, according to the rule of his own eternal rectitude and wisdom; for righteousness of government must consist in an attendance unto and observation of some rule. Now, this in God is the absolute righteousness of his nature, with his natural right unto rule over all, in conjunction with his infinitely wise and holy will, which is that unto him which equity or law is unto supreme rulers among men. And therefore God, in the exercise of this righteousness, sometimes resolves the faith and obedience of men into his sovereign right over all, Job 41:11, 33:12, 13, 34:12–15; Jer. 18:1–6; Isa. 45:9; Rom. 9:20, 11:32, 33;—sometimes into the holiness of his nature, Zeph. 3:5; Ps. 47:8;—sometimes into the equity and equality of his ways and works themselves, Ezek. 18:25. But there is a particular exercise of this righteousness of rule which hath respect unto the law, any law given unto men immediately by God, as confirmed with promises and threatenings. The ruling and disposing of the temporal and eternal states or conditions of men, according to the tenor and sentence of the law given unto them, belongeth hereunto. And as this is actually executed, it is called "justitia judicialis," or the righteousness of God whereby he distributes rewards and punishments unto his creatures according to their works. Hereof one part consisteth in the punishing of sin as it is a transgression of his law; and this is that wherein at present we are concerned, for we say that the righteousness of God, as he is the supreme ruler of the world, doth require necessarily that sin be punished, or the transgression of that law which is the instrument of his rule be avenged.

7. The exercise of this righteousness in God presupposeth sundry things; as,—

(1.) The creation of all things, in their kind, order, state, and condition, by a free act of the will and power of God, regulated by his goodness and infinite wisdom: for our God doth whatever he pleaseth; he worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will.

(2.) In particular, the creation of intelligent, rational creatures in a moral dependence on himself, capable of being ruled by a law, in order unto his glory and their own blessedness. The being and nature of mankind, their rational constitution, their ability for obedience, their capacity of eternal blessedness or misery, depend all on a sovereign free act of the will of God.

(3.) The nature of the law given unto these creatures, as the means and instrument of their moral, orderly dependence on God; whereof the breach of that law would be a disturbance.

(4.) The eternal, natural, unchangeable right that God hath to govern these creatures according to the tenor of that law which he hath so appointed for the instrument of his rule. This is no less necessary unto God than his being.

(5.) The sin of those creatures, which was destructive of all that order of things, which ensued on the creation and giving of the law. For it was so, —[1.] Of the principal end of the creation, which could be no other but the glory of God from the obedience of his creatures, preserving all things in the order and state wherein he had made and placed them; [2.] Of the dependence of the creature on God, which consisted in his moral obedience unto him according to the law; and, [3.] It was introductory of a state of things utterly opposite unto the universal rectitude of the nature of God. Only the right of God to rule the sinning creature unto his own glory abode with him, because it belongs unto him as God. And this represents the state of things between God and the sinning creature; wherein we say, that upon a supposition of all these antecedaneous free acts, and of the necessary continuance of God's righteousness of rule and judgment, it was necessary that the sinning creature should be punished according to the sentence of the law. Only observe, that I say not that this righteousness of judgment, as to the punitive part or quality of it, is a peculiar righteousness in God, or an especial virtue in the divine nature, or an especial distinct righteousness, which the schoolmen generally incline unto; for it is only the universal rectitude of the nature of God, sometimes called his righteousness, sometimes his holiness, sometimes his purity, exercising itself not absolutely, but on the suppositions before laid down.

8. On this state of things, on the necessary exercise of this righteousness of God upon the supposition mentioned, depend both the necessity and especial nature of the priesthood of Christ. Designed it was in grace, as we have before proved, on supposition that God would save sinners. But it was this justice that made it necessary, and determined its especial nature; for this was that which indispensably required the punishment of sin, and therefore was it necessary that he who would save sinners should undergo for them the punishment that was due unto them. This was therefore to be done by the Son of God, in the interposition that he made with God on the behalf of sinners. He was to answer the justice of God for their sin. But because this could not be done by mere suffering or enduring punishment, which is a thing in its own nature indifferent, the will and obedience of Christ in the manner of undergoing it was also required. This made his priesthood necessary, whereby whilst he underwent the punishment due unto our sins, he offered himself an acceptable sacrifice for their expiation. This is that, therefore, which is now distinctly proposed unto confirmation, namely, that the justice or righteousness of God, as exercised in the rule and government of his rational creatures, did indispensably and necessarily require that sin committed should be punished, whence ariseth the especial nature of the priesthood of Christ. And this I shall do,—First, By premising some observations making way unto the true stating and explication of the truth; Secondly, By relating the judgment or opinion of the Socinians, our professed adversaries in and about these things; Thirdly, By producing the arguments and testimonies whereby the truth contended for is established, wherewithal the exceptions of the adversaries unto them shall be removed out of the way.

9. First, There are some attributes of God which, as to their first exercise ad extra, require no object antecedently existing unto their acting of themselves, much less objects qualified with any sort of conditions. Such are the wisdom and power of God, which do not find but produce the objects of their first actings ad extra. These, therefore, in their actings must needs be absolutely and every way free, being limited and directed only by the sovereign will and pleasure of God; for it was absolutely free to God whether he would act any thing outwardly or no, whether he would make a world or no, or of what kind. But on the supposition of the determination of his will so to act in producing things without himself, it could not be but he must of necessity, by the necessity of his own nature, act according to those properties, that is, infinitely powerfully and infinitely wisely. But herein were they no way limited by their first objects, for they were produced and had being given unto them by themselves. But there are properties of the divine nature which cannot act according unto their nature without a supposition of an antecedent object, and that qualified in such or such a manner. Such are his vindictive justice and his pardoning mercy; for if there be no sinners, none can be punished or pardoned. Yet are they not therefore to be esteemed only as free acts of the will of God; for not their existence in him, but their outward exercise only, depends on and is limited by the qualification of their objects. So then,—

Secondly, The rule of God's acting from or by his vindictive justice is not a mere free act of his will, but the natural dominion and rule which he hath over sinning creatures, in answer unto the rectitude and holiness of his own nature; that is, he doth not punish sin because he will do so merely, as he made the world because he would, and for his pleasure, but because he is just and righteous and holy in his rule, and can be no otherwise, because of the holiness and rectitude of his nature. Neither doth he punish sin as he can, that is, to the utmost of his power, but as the rule of his government and the order of things in the universe, disposed unto his glory, do require.

Thirdly, This justice exerted itself in one signal act antecedent unto the sin of man, namely, in the prescription of a penal law; that is, in the annexing of the penalty of death unto the transgression of the law. This God did not merely because he would do so, nor because he could do so, but because the order of all things, with respect unto their dependence on himself as the supreme ruler of all, did so require. For had God only given men a law of the rule of their dependence on him and subjection unto him, and not inseparably annexed a penalty unto its transgression, it was possible that man by sin might have cast off all his moral dependence on God, and set himself at liberty from his rule, as it was some such thing that was aimed at in the first sin, whereby man foolishly hoped that he should make himself like unto God; for having broke and disannulled the sole law of his dependence on God, what should he have had more to do with him? But this case was obviated by the justice of God, in predisposing the order of punishment to succeed in the room of the order of obedience, if that were broken. And that this provision should be made, the nature of God did require.

Fourthly, The justice of God required a punishment of sin as a punishment. Hereunto do belong the way and degree, the time, season, and manner of it; but these things are not necessarily stated in the justice of God. The assignation and determination of them belong unto his sovereign will and wisdom. So would things have been ordered in the execution of the sentence of the law on Adam, had it not been taken off by the interposition of the Mediator. Whatever, therefore, God doth in this kind, when he hasteneth or deferreth deserved punishments, in the aggravation or diminution of penalties, it is all in the disposal of his holy will.

Fifthly, Whereas, upon the suppositions mentioned, I do affirm that it is necessary, on the consideration of the nature of God and his natural right to govern his creatures, that sin should be punished, yet I say not that God punisheth sin necessarily; which would express the manner of his operation, and not the reason of it. He doth not punish sin as the sun gives out light and heat, or as the fire burns, or as heavy things tend downwards, by a necessity of nature. He doth it freely, exerting his power by a free act of his will. For the necessity asserted doth only exclude an antecedent indifferency, upon all the suppositions laid down. It denies that, on these respects, it is absolutely indifferent with God whether sin be punished or no. Such an indifferency, I say, is opposite unto the nature, law, truth, and rule of God, and therefore such a necessity as excludes it must herein be asserted. It is not, then, indifferent with God whether sin, or the transgression of his law, be punished or no, and that because his justice requireth that it should be punished; so far, therefore, it is necessary that so it should be. But herein is God a free agent, and acts freely in what he doth, which is a necessary mode of all divine actings ad extra; for God doth all things according to the counsel of his own will, and his will is the original of all freedom. But suppose the determination of his will, and the divine nature necessarily requireth an acting suitable unto itself. It is altogether free to God whether he will speak unto any of his creatures or no: but supposing the determination of his will that he will so speak, it is absolutely necessary that he speak truly; for truth is an essential property of his nature, whence he is "God that cannot lie." It was absolutely free to God whether he would create this world or no: but on supposition that so he would do, he could not but create it omnipotently and infinitely wisely; for so his nature doth require, because he is essentially omnipotent and infinitely wise. So there was no necessity absolute in the nature of God that he should punish sin: but on supposition that he would create man, and would permit him to sin, it was necessary that his "sin should be avenged;" for this his righteousness and dominion over his creatures did require.

10. It is objected, "That on the same suppositions it will be no less necessary that God should pardon sin than that he should punish it. For mercy is no less an essential property of his nature than justice; and if, on supposition of the proper object of justice and its qualification, it is necessary that it should be exercised,—that is, that where sin is there also should be punishment,—why then, on the supposition of the proper object of mercy and its qualification, is it not necessary that it also should be exercised,—that is, that where there is sin and misery there should be pity and pardon? And whereas one of these must give place unto the other, or else God can act nothing at all towards sinners, why may we not rather think that justice should yield as it were to mercy, and so all be pardoned, than that mercy should so far give place to justice as that all should be punished?"

Ans. (1.) We shall make it fully appear that God hath, in infinite wisdom and grace, so ordered all things in this matter that no disadvantage doth redound either to his justice or his mercy, but that both of them are gloriously exercised, manifested, and exerted. That this was done by the substitution of the Son of God in their stead, to answer divine justice, who were to be pardoned by mercy, and that it could be done no otherwise, is that which we are in the confirmation of. And those by whom this is denied can give no tolerable account why all are not condemned, seeing God is infinitely righteous, or all are not pardoned, seeing he is infinitely merciful. For what they fancy concerning impenitency will not relieve them; for if God can forgive sin without any satisfaction unto his justice, he may forgive every sin, and will do so, because he is infinitely merciful; for what should hinder or stand in the way, if justice do not? But,—

(2.) There is not the same reason of the actual exercise of justice and mercy; for upon the entrance of sin, as it respects the rule of God, the first thing that respects it is justice, whose part it is to preserve all things in their dependence on God; which without the punishment of sin cannot be done. But God is not obliged unto the exercise of mercy, nor doth the forbearance of such an exercise any way intrench upon the holiness of his nature or the glory of his rule. It is true, mercy is no less an essential property of God than justice; but neither the law, nor the state and order of things wherein they were created, nor their dependence on God as the supreme governor of the whole creation, raises any natural respect or obligation between mercy and its object. God, therefore, can execute the punishment which his justice requireth without the least impeachment of his mercy; for no act of justice is contrary unto mercy. But absolutely to pardon where the interest of justice is to punish, is contrary to the nature of God.

11. (3.) It is denied that sin and misery do constitute the proper object of mercy. It is required that every thing contrary to the nature of God in sin and the sinner be taken out of the way, or there is no proper object for mercy. Such is the guilt of sin unsatisfied for. And moreover, faith and repentance are required to the same purpose. Socinus himself acknowledged that it is contrary to the nature of God to pardon impenitent sinners. These [faith and repentance] none can have but on the account of an antecedent reconciliation, as is evident in the fallen angels. And on these suppositions even mercy itself will be justly exercised, nor can it be otherwise.

These things are premised to give a right understanding of the truth which we assert and contend for. It remains that we briefly represent what is the opinion which the Socinians advance in opposition unto this foundation of the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ; for they are awake unto their concernments herein, and there is none of them but in one place or other attempts an opposition unto this justice of God, and the necessity of its exercise upon the supposition of sin, though the defence of it hath been unhappily and causelessly by some deserted. The judgment of these men is expressed by Socinus, Prælec. Theol. cap. xvi. lib. i., de Jesu Christo Servator., lib. iii. cap. i.; Catech. Racov., cap. viii. quest. 19; Ostorod. Institut. cap. xxxi.; Volk. de Ver. Relig. lib. v. cap. xxi.; Crellius, Lib. de Deo, cap. xxviii.; Vindic. Socin. ad Grot. cap. i.; de Causis Mortis Christi, cap. xvi.; Smalcius adv. Franzium, Disputat. Quarta; Gitichius ad Lucium. Woolzogen.; Compend. Relig. Christianæ, sect. 48. The sum of what they all plead is, that there is no such thing as justice in God, requiring that sin be punished; that the cause and fountain of punishment in God is anger, wrath, or fury; that these denote free acts of the will of God, which he may exercise or omit at his pleasure. If he punish sin, he doth nothing against justice, nor if he omit so to do. In all these things he is absolutely free. Such a governor of his creatures do they fancy him to be! Hence it follows that there was no necessity, no just or cogent reason, why the punishment of our sin or the chastisement of our peace should be laid on Christ; for there was neither need nor possibility that any satisfaction should be made to the justice of God. Only he hath freely determined to punish impenitent sinners, and as freely determined to pardon them that repent and believe the gospel. For this hath he sent the Lord Christ to testify and declare unto us; with respect whereunto he is called and to be esteemed our Saviour. The words of Socinus are express to this purpose, De Christo Servatore, lib. i. cap. ii., "Quærente aliquo, qui fiat, ut mortem æternam meriti, nihilominus ad vitam æternam perveniamus, non est germanum responsum, quia Christum Servatorem habemus: sed quia supplicium mortis æternæ a Deo, cujus libera voluntate atque decreto id meriti fueramus, nobis pro ineffabili ipsius bonitate condonatum fuit; atque ejus loco datum vitæ æternæ præmium; dummodo resipiscamus, et abnegata omni impietate vitæ innocentiæ ac sanctimoniæ deinceps studeamus. Quod si, qua ratione istud nobis innotuerit, quæratur, cum neque Deum videamus unquam, neque audiamus loquentem, quisve nobis tantæ divinæ liberalitatis non dubiam fidem fecerit, respondendum est, Jesum Christum id nobis enarrasse, et multis modis confirmasse." This is the substance of the persuasion of these men in this matter; which how contradictory it is unto the whole mystery and design of the gospel, and contains a complete renunciation of the mediation of Christ, will in our ensuing discourse be made to appear.

12. That, therefore, which we are engaged in the confirmation of may be reduced unto two heads:—First, That the justice of God, whereby he governeth the world and ruleth over all, is an essential property of the divine nature, whence God is denominated "just" or "righteous;" and that on the account hereof it is necessary that sin should be punished, or not be absolutely pardoned without respect unto satisfaction given unto that justice of God. Secondly, That hence it became necessary, that in the designation of the Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, unto his office of priesthood, he should make his soul an offering for sin, to make an atonement thereby for it; without which there could have been no remission, because without it there could be no satisfaction given or reconciliation made.

13. Our first argument is taken from the consideration of the nature of God and his holiness. Whatever is spoken of the purity and holiness of God, with his hatred of and aversation from sin and sinners on the account thereof, confirmeth our assertion; for we intend no more thereby but that God, the great ruler of the world, is of so holy a nature as that he cannot but hate and punish sin, and that so to do belongs unto his absolute perfection; for the purity and holiness of God is nothing but the universal perfection of his nature, which is accompanied with a displicency in and a hatred of sin, whence he will punish it according to its desert. So is it expressed, Hab. 1:13, "Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity." Not to be able to look on or behold iniquity, expresseth the most inconceivable detestation of it. God is עֵינַם טְהוֹר; which expresseth the infinite holiness of his nature, with what respect therein he hath, and cannot but have, towards that which is perverse and evil. So when the prophet had made his inference from hence, namely, that he was holy, רָע מֵרְאוֹת, that any look or aspect unsuitable thereunto towards sin or evil is not to be expected from him, expressly, תוּכָל לֹא אֶל־עָמָל וְהַבִּיט; he adds and he cannot (that is, because of the holiness of his nature, which such an action would be contrary unto) "look on," that is, pass by, spare, or connive at, "iniquity." For that is the rule of what God can do or cannot do. He can do every thing that is not contrary to himself; that is, to the essential properties of his nature. He can do nothing that is contrary unto or inconsistent with his truth, holiness, or righteousness. Wherefore, whereas not to look on sin, not to behold it, do include in them, and by the negation of contrary acts express, the punishing of sin,—that is, all sin, or sin as sin,—and these are resolved into the nature of God, or his essential holiness, this testimony declares that the punishment of sin is thence necessary unto God, as he is the holy, supreme governor of the world.

Hence this holiness of God is sometimes expressed by jealousy, or hath jealousy joined with it, or accompanying it: Josh. 24:19, "He is an holy God; he is a jealous God: he will not forgive your transgressions nor your sins." And God makes mention of this his jealousy, when he would instruct men in his severity in the punishing of sin, Exod. 20:5: for the nature of jealousy is not to spare, Prov. 6:34; nothing but the executing of vengeance will satisfy it. And this is that which God intended in the revelation of himself which he made by the proclamation of his name before Moses, Exod. 34:7, "That will by no means clear" (or "acquit") "the guilty,"—namely, for whom no atonement is made.

And it is to instruct us herein that this holiness of God is expressed by fire, Heb. 12:29, "Our God is a consuming fire,"—"devouring fire" and "everlasting burnings," Isa. 33:14; and that "a fiery stream" is said to proceed from him, and that his throne is like "a fiery flame," Dan. 7:9, 10. Now it is certain that God acteth not in any external work by a mere and absolute necessity of nature, as fire burneth. This, therefore, we are not taught by this representation of the holiness of God. But if we may not learn thence, that as eventually fire will burn any combustible thing that is put into it, so the holiness of God requires that all sin be assuredly punished, we know not what to learn from it; and it is certainly not made use of merely for our amazement.

An account of the nature and holiness of God is given us to the same purpose, Ps. 5:4–6, "For thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness: neither shall evil dwell with thee. The foolish shall not stand in thy sight: thou hatest all workers of iniquity. Thou shalt destroy them that speak lies: the LORD will abhor the bloody and deceitful man." All the actings of God in the hatred and punishing of sin proceed from his nature; and what is natural to God is necessary. The negative expression, "Thou art not a God that hath pleasure," etc., verse 4, includes strongly the affirmative, expressed verse 5, "Thou hatest all workers of iniquity." And this he doth because he is such a God as he is,—that is, infinitely holy and righteous. And that hatred which is here ascribed unto God contains two things in it:—(1.) A natural displicency; he cannot like it, he cannot approve it, he cannot but have an aversation from it. (2.) A will of punishing it proceeding therefrom, and which is therefore necessary, because required by the nature of God. Expressions are here multiplied, to manifest that sin is contrary to the nature of God, and that it is inconsistent therewith to pass it by unpunished. But if the punishing of sin depend upon a mere free act of the will of God, which might or might not be without any disadvantage unto his nature, there is no reason why his holiness or righteousness should be made mention of, as those which induce him thereunto and indispensably require it. This is that which from this consideration is confirmed unto us,—namely, that such is the holiness of the nature of God, that he cannot pass by sin absolutely unpunished: for it is contrary unto his holiness, and therefore he cannot do it; for he cannot deny himself.

14. Again, God in the Scripture is proposed unto us as the supreme judge of all, acting in rewards and punishments according unto his own righteousness, or what the rectitude and holy properties of his own nature do require and make just, good, and holy. Although his kingdom, dominion, government, and rule, be supreme and absolute, yet he ruleth not as it were arbitrarily, without respect unto any rule or law. That God should have any external rule or law in his government of the world, is absolutely and infinitely impossible; but his law and rule is the holiness and righteousness of his own nature, with respect unto that order of all things which, in his will and wisdom, he hath given and assigned unto the whole creation. In respect hereunto he is said to do right as a ruler and a judge: Gen. 18:25, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" הֲשֹׁפֵט כָּל־הָאָרֶץ expresseth that σχέσις of the divine nature, and that office as it wer of God, which in this matter he represents himself by unto us as vested withal. He is that supreme rector or governor of all the world, who useth and is to use righteousness in his government, or to govern righteously. Before such a one the just and the unjust cannot, ought not to be treated or dealt withal in the same manner; for although none be absolutely righteous in his sight, yet some may be so comparatively, with respect unto some kind of guilt and guilty persons. According as the distance is between persons, so the righteousness of God requires that they be differently dealt withal.

But it is pleaded, "That the intention of the expression here used is to plead for mercy, that the just should not be utterly destroyed with the unjust; and that we improve the testimony unto a contrary end, namely, to prove that God must punish all sin." But all that is hence aimed at is no more but that God is denominated just and righteous from that righteousness whereby he punisheth sin; which therefore can be no free act of his will, but is an essential property of his nature. And if so, then doth that righteousness of his require that sin be punished; for God doth right as a judge, and a judge cannot acquit the guilty without injustice. And what an external law is to a subordinate judge, that God's righteousness and holiness is unto him, as he is the judge of all the earth. And this appeal of Abraham unto the righteousness of God as he is a judge is founded in a principle of the light of nature, and as such is repeated by our apostle, Rom. 3:5, 6. And unto this end is God, as the ruler of the world, represented as on a throne, executing justice and judgment; the introduction of which solemnity is of no use unless it instruct us that God governeth the world as a righteous judge, and that justice requireth that he inflict punishment on sinners: Ps. 9:7, 16, 97:2, 3, 89:14, "Justice and judgment are the habitation of thy throne;" that is, they always dwell and reside there, because God on his throne acts according to the justice and righteousness of his nature. And hence he is both denominated righteous, and declared so to be, in and by the punishment of sin, Rev. 16:5, 6. See Rom. 1:32; 2 Thess. 1:6; Exod. 9:27; which places I have to the same purpose pleaded and vindicated elsewhere.

15. The whole of what hath been thus far pleaded may be reduced unto the ensuing heads:—

(1.) God is naturally and necessarily the supreme governor of his rational creatures with respect unto their utmost end, which is his own glory. Upon the supposition of his being and theirs, an imagination to the contrary would imply all sorts of contradictions.

(2.) The law of obedience in and unto such creatures ariseth naturally and necessarily from the nature of God and their own; for this original law is nothing but that respect which a finite, limited, dependent creature hath unto an absolute, infinitely wise, holy, and good Creator, suited unto the principles of the nature which it is endued withal. Therefore it is indispensably necessary.

(3.) The annexing of a penalty unto the transgression of this law was nothing but what the righteousness of God, as the supreme ruler of his creatures, did make necessary, as that without which the glory and holiness of his rule could not be preserved upon the entrance of sin.

(4.) The institution of punishment, answerable unto the sanction of the law, is an act of justice in God, and necessary unto him as the supreme governor of the universe.

16. And this is the first ground whereon the necessity of the satisfaction of Christ, and of the atonement he was to make as our high priest, is founded; for on supposition that God, in infinite grace and mercy, would eternally save sinners, the punishment due unto their sins was to be undergone by him who interposed himself between them and the justice of God which required it. Now, as there are some who believe the satisfaction of Christ, on the abundant testimonies given unto it in the Scripture, and yet resolve the reason of it into the infinite wisdom and sovereign pleasure of God only,—with whom I do not now expressly deal, because although we differ about the way, we agree in the end,—so the Socinians employ the chief of their strength in opposition unto this righteousness of God, as knowing that if it be maintained, they are cast in their whole cause. I shall therefore remove all those objections which they principally fortify themselves with against the evidence of the truth asserted, and their exceptions also which they put in to the testimonies and arguments wherewith it is confirmed, and thereby put an end unto this Exercitation.

17. He whom I shall first begin withal is Socinus himself, who in all these things laid that foundation which his followers have built upon. And as in almost all his other works he casually reflects on this righteousness of God, so in that, De Jesu Christo Servatore, he directly opposeth it in two chapters at large, lib. i. cap. i., lib. iii. cap. i. In the first place he designeth to answer the arguments produced by his adversary for it, and in the latter he levieth his objections against it. And in the first place, he proceedeth solely on the supposition that the righteousness which we here plead for, and that mercy whereby God forgiveth sins, are contrary and opposite unto one another, so that they cannot be properties of his nature, but only external acts of his will and power.

This is the foundation of his whole discourse in that place, which he asserts as a thing evident, but undertakes not at all to prove. But this supposition is openly false; for the justice and mercy of God may be considered either in themselves or with respect unto their effects. In neither sense are they contrary or opposite to each other. For in themselves, being essential properties of the nature of God, as they must be, in that they are perfections of an intelligent Being, they differ not from the universal rectitude of his holy nature, but only add a various respect unto external things; so that in themselves they are so far from being opposite, as that God is denominated just from the exercising the perfections of his nature in a way of justice, and merciful from a like exercise in a way of mercy. Absolutely, therefore, and essentially they are the same. Neither are their effects contrary or opposite to each other, only they are diverse, or not of the same kind; nor are the effects of the one contrary unto the other. To punish, where punishment is deserved, is not contrary to mercy; but where punishment is not deserved there it is so, for then it is cruelty. And yet also in that case, the part of wrong, namely, in punishing without desert, is more opposite to justice itself than the cruel part is to mercy. And so is it where punishment exceeds guilt, or where proceedings are not according unto an equal measure or standard. Nor is to spare through or by mercy contrary to justice; for if to spare and pardon be not for the good of the whole, for the preservation of order and the end of rule, it is not mercy to pardon or spare, but facility, remissness in government, or foolish pity. Secure those things in rule and government which justice takes care of and provides for, and then to spare in mercy is no way contrary unto it. If these things be not provided for, to spare is not an act of mercy, but a defect in justice. And if these things were not so, it would be impossible that any one could be just and merciful also, yea, or do any act either of justice or mercy: for if he punish he is unmerciful, that is, wicked, if punishment be contrary to mercy; and if he spare he is not just, if sparing be opposite to justice. There is therefore nothing solid or sound, nothing but an outward appearance of reason, really contrary to the highest evidence of right reason indeed, in this sophism, which is laid as the foundation of the opposition made to the righteousness of God pleaded for.

18. On this false supposition Socinus grants a twofold righteousness in God with respect unto sin and the punishment thereof;—one which he perpetually useth whilst he destroys obstinate, impenitent, and contumacious sinners; the other whereby sometimes he punisheth sinners according unto his law, which yet are not obstinate, without any expectation of their repentance. And these several sorts of justice in God he confirms by sundry instances in the place before alleged. But it is plain that these things belong not unto the question under debate; for they respect only the external manner and acts of punishing, and nothing is more fond than thence to feign various righteousnesses in God, or to conclude that therefore every transgression of the law doth not require a just recompense of reward. Nor is it supposed that the justice of God doth so exact the punishment of sin as that all sin must be immediately punished, in the same manner, especially as unto temporal punishments, which respect this life. It belongs unto the sovereign authority and infinite wisdom of God, as the governor of the world, so to dispose of the time, season, manner, and measure of the punishment due unto sin, as may most conduce to the end aimed at in the whole. Thus he cuts off some in their entrance into a course of sin; others he "endureth with much long-suffering," though "vessels of wrath fitted to destruction," Rom. 9:22. And this he doth because he is willing so to do, or so it pleaseth him. But hence it follows not that finally he pardoneth or spareth some, or punisheth others, merely because he will.

That, therefore, whereby he deceives himself and others in this matter, is the exclusion of the satisfaction of Christ from having the place of any cause, or from being of any consideration, in the matter of pardoning sin; for this he expressly pleads and contends for in this place, as is evident from the words before cited, wherein he allows no more to Christ and his mediation but only that he came to declare that God would forgive us our sins. His whole proof, therefore, is but a begging of the thing in question. For the reason why God constantly punisheth them who are obstinate in their sins and impenitent, is really because their sins deserve, in his justice and according to his law, so to be punished; and they are not spared, because they obstinately refuse the remedy or relief provided for them, in that they fulfil not the condition whereby they might be interested in the sufferings of Christ for sin. "He that believeth not shall be damned;" that is, shall personally be left unto the justice of God and sentence of the law. [As to] those whom God spareth and punisheth not, it is not because their sins do not deserve punishment, or because the justice of God doth not require that their sins should be punished, but because they are interested by faith in the satisfaction made by Christ when he underwent the punishment due to their sins by the will of God. And this is the rule of punishment and sparing, as they are final and decretory, according unto a sentence never to be repealed nor altered. As for temporary punishments, whether they are corrective only or vindictive, their dispensation depends absolutely on the will and pleasure of God, who will so order and dispose them as that they may be subordinate unto his final determination of the eternal condition of sinners. But this exclusion of the consideration of the interposition of Christ, in a way of suffering punishment for the procuring of the pardon of sin, is that which disturbs the whole harmony of what is taught us concerning the justice and mercy of God in the Scripture.

And the venom hereof hath so infected the minds of many, in these latter days, that they have even rejected the whole mystery of the gospel, and taken up with a religion which hath more of Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Gentilism in it, than of Christianity. And indeed if it be so, that in the remission of sins there is no respect unto the Lord Christ, but only that he hath declared it, and showed the way whereby we may attain it, it must be acknowledged that there is no righteousness in God requiring the punishment of sin; as also, that it was merely from an act of the will and pleasure of God that by any sins we deserve everlasting punishment. For neither, then, was the sanction of the law, or the constitution of the penalty of its transgression, any act of justice in God, but of his will absolutely, which might not have been; and so, notwithstanding the state and condition wherein we were created, and our moral dependence on God, and God's government over us, man might have sinned, and sinned a thousand times, and broken the whole law, and yet have been no way liable unto punishment,—namely, if God had so pleased; and it was as free unto him to reward sin as to punish it. For if you allow any reason to the contrary from the nature and order of things themselves, and our relation unto God as rational creatures, made meet to be subject unto him in a way of moral obedience, you introduce a necessity of punishment from the righteousness of God, which is denied. And on this supposition, upon an alike act of the will of God, sin might have been made to be virtue, and obedience sin, and so it might have been the duty of man to have hated God, and to have opposed him to the uttermost of his power; for all the merely free acts of God's will might have been otherwise, and contrary to what they are. And if you say it could not be so in this case, because the nature of God and his righteousness required it should be otherwise, you grant all that is contended for. This false supposition made way for the twofold righteousness which Socinus feigns in God; and the instances which he gives in the confirmation of it respect only God's actual punishing of sin and sinners in this world, some sooner, and some after more forbearance, which none deny to proceed from his sovereign will and pleasure.

19. The same author in the same place betakes himself to another plea, and will not allow that God doth at all punish sin because he is just, or that his so doing is an act of justice in him; for so he speaks, lib. i. cap. i. p. 1: "Ea res quæ ad Deum relata, misericordiæ opponitur, non justitia appellatur, sed vel severitas, vel ira, vel indignatio, vel furor, vel vindicta, vel simili alio quopiam nomine nuncupatur." Ans. There are no things in God that are opposite or contrary one unto another; and this sophism was before discovered. Nay, anger and fury, though they denote not any thing in God, but outward effects from that which is in him, are not opposed to mercy; for mercy being a virtue and a divine perfection, whatever is contrary unto it is evil. Only, as they denote effects of justice, they are diverse from the outward effects of mercy. This therefore proves not that that, from whence it is that God punisheth sin, is not justice; which must be proved, or this man's cause is lost. I do acknowledge that both צֶדֶק and δικαιοσύνη are variously used in the Scripture when applied unto God, or do signify things of a distinct consideration; for upon the supposition of the rectitude of the divine nature in all things, righteousness may be variously exercised, yea, it is so in all that God doth. Hence Socinus gives sundry instances where God is said to be righteous in acts of mercy and goodness, as very many may be given; for besides that the rectitude, equality, and holiness, which are in all his ways, are known from his righteousness in the declaration that he makes of himself and his dealings with men, in a way of goodness, kindness, benignity and mercy, there is universally a supposition of his promise of grace in Jesus Christ, the accomplishment whereof depends on his righteousness; which therefore may be pleaded, even when we pray for mercy, as it is often by David. For the faithfulness of God in fulfilling his promises, whether in the pardon of our sins or the rewarding of our obedience, is his righteousness in his word. Thence is he "justified in his sayings," Rom. 3:4; that is, he is declared righteous in the fulfilling his promises and threatenings. Yet this hinders not but that God is just when he "taketh vengeance;" that is, when he doth so and in his so doing, Rom. 3:5.

That anger and fury are not properly in God all do acknowledge. The outward effects of the righteousness of God in the punishing of sin are so expressed, to declare the certainty and severity of his judgments. To say that God prescribes a penalty unto the transgression of his law, and executeth accordingly, merely in anger, wrath, or fury, is to ascribe that unto him which ought not to be done unto any wise law-maker or governor among men. Nor will it follow that because God is said to punish sin in anger and wrath, therefore he punisheth sin only because he will, and not because he is just, or that his justice doth not require that sin be punished. Yea, it thence follows that the justice of God is the cause of the punishment of sin; for to act in anger and fury any otherwise than as they are effects of justice is vicious and evil. God doth not, therefore, punish sin because he is angry; but to show the severity of his justice, he maketh an appearance of anger and wrath in punishing. These things belong to the outward manner, and not the inward principle of inflicting punishment.

20. In the first chapter of his third book he again attempts an opposition unto this righteousness of God. "Justitia ista," saith he, "cui vos satisfaciendum esse omnino contenditis, in Deo non residet, sed effectus est voluntatis ipsius. Cum enim Deus peccatores punit, ut digno aliquo nomine hoc opus ejus appellemus, justitia tunc eum uti dicimus." Therefore it seems do we deal benignly with God; and what he doth only in anger and fury we give it a worthy name, and say he doth it in righteousness! But what shall we say when God himself ascribeth his punishing of sin to his justice and judgment in governing the world? This he doth plainly Ps. 9:7, 8, 50:6, 98:9; Rom. 1:32, 3:5. Shall he also be said to find out a worthy name for what he doth, though he do it on such accounts as wherein the thing signified by that name is not concerned? It is a hard task, doubtless, to prove that God doth not "judge the world in righteousness." But he hath reason, as he supposeth, for his assertion; for he adds, "Quod autem justitia ista in Deo non resideat ex eo maxime apparere potest, quod si ea in Deo resideret nunquam is ne minimum quidem delictum cuiquam condonaret; nihil enim unquam facit aut facere potest Deus quod qualitatibus quæ in ipso resident adversatur. Exempli causa, cum in Deo sapientia et æquitas resideat, nihil unquam insipienter, nihil inique facit aut facere potest;"—"That there is no such justice in God appears from hence, that if there were, he could never forgive the least sin unto any; for God doth nothing, nor can do any thing, that is contrary to the qualities which reside in him. For instance, whereas there is wisdom and equity in God, he can do nothing unwisely, nothing unjustly." So he. But he seems not to observe that herein he pleads our cause more forcibly than his own: for we say, that because this justice is a natural property of God, he can do nothing against it, and so cannot forgive any sin absolutely without respect unto satisfaction made unto that righteousness; and when this is done, to pardon and forgive sin is no way adverse or contrary unto it. This whole difficulty is reconciled in the cross of Christ, and can be so no otherwise; for God set him forth to be a propitiation, εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, Rom. 3:25; which when it is done, as pardon is a fruit or effect of mercy, so it is consistent with the severity of justice. See 2 Cor. 5:21; Rom. 8:3; Gal. 3:13, 14; Heb. 9:13–15. And the whole ensuing discourse of Socinus in that chapter may be reduced unto these two heads:—First, A supposition that Christ did not nor could undergo the punishment due to our sins; which is to beg the matter in question, contrary to Scripture testimonies innumerable, many whereof I have elsewhere vindicated from the exceptions of himself and his followers. For let this be granted, and all his discourse about the impossibility of pardoning any sin, upon the supposition of such a righteousness in God, falls to the ground. And if he will not grant it, yet may he not be allowed to make a supposition on the contrary to be the ground of his argument whereby he endeavours to overthrow it. Secondly, He confounds the habits of justice and mercy with the acts of them. Hence would he prove an inequality betwixt justice and mercy, because there is so between punishing and pardoning. And so also God declares that he delights in mercy, but is slow to anger. But actually to pardon is no way opposite to justice, where satisfaction is made; nor to punish [opposite] unto mercy, where the law of obtaining an interest in that satisfaction is not observed. And all that God declares in the Scripture concerning his justice and mercy, with the exercise of them towards sinners, is grounded on the supposition of the interposition and satisfaction of Christ. Where that is not, as in the case of the angels which sinned, no mention is made of mercy, more or less, but only of judgment according to their desert.

21. The author of the Racovian Catechism manageth the same plea against the vindictive justice of God, and gathers the objections unto a head, which Socinus more largely debated on, cap. viii. De Morte Christi. And although little be added therein unto what I have already cited, yet it containing the substance of what they are able to plead in this cause, I shall take a view of it in the words of these catechists: "Eam misericordiam et justitiam qualem hic adversarii inseri volunt, negamus Deo inesse naturaliter. Nam, quod attinet ad misericordiam, eam Deo non ita natura inesse ut isti sentiunt hinc patet; quod si natura Deo inesset non potest Deus ullum peccatum prorsus punire; atque vicissim si ea justitia natura Deo inesset ut illi opinantur, nullum peccatum Deus remitteret. Adversus enim ea, quæ Deo insunt natura, nunquam potest quidquam facere Deus. Exempli causa, cum Sapientia Deo insit natura nunquam contra eam quidquam Deus facit, verum quæcunque facit, omnia facit sapienter. Verum cum Deum constet remittere peccata et punire, quando velit, apparet Deo ejusmodi misericordiam et justitiam, qualem illi opinantur, non inesse natura, sed esse effectus ipsius voluntatis. Præterea eam justitiam quam adversarii misericordiæ opponunt; qua Deus peccata punit, nusquam literæ sacræ hoc nomine justitiæ insigniunt, verum iram et furorem Dei appellant; imo justitiæ Dei in scripturis hoc attribuitur cum Deus peccata condonat, 1 Joh. 1:9; Rom. 3:25, 26." And hereon they conclude that there was no need, nor can there be any use, of the satisfaction of Christ. Ans. First, The design of this discourse is to prove that justice and mercy are not properties of the divine nature; for if they be, it cannot be denied but that the sufferings of Christ were necessary that sin might be pardoned. Now, herein we have against our adversaries the light of nature, and that not only as teaching us, by the conduct of right reason, that there is a singular perfection in these things, which must therefore be found in Him who is so the author of all goodness and limited perfections unto others as to contain essentially and eminently all goodness and perfection in himself, but also it is not difficult to evince the actual consent of all mankind who acknowledge a Deity unto this principle, that God is just and merciful, with that justice and mercy which have respect unto the sins and offences of men. There is, indeed, this difference betwixt them, that justice is ascribed unto God properly, as a habit or a habitual perfection; mercy analogically and reductively, as an affection. And therefore mercy in God is not accompanied with that sympathy and condolency which are mixed with it in our human nature. But that natural goodness and benignity whence God is ready to relieve, whereof his sparing and pardoning are proper effects, are that mercy of God which he represents unto us under the highest expressions of tenderness and compassion. See Ps. 103:8–14. And in such declarations of himself he instructs us in what apprehensions we ought to have of his nature; which if it be not gracious and merciful, we are taught by him to err and mistake. So when God showed unto Moses his glory, and made a declaration of himself by his name, he did it not by calling over the free acts of his will, or showing what he would or could do, if so be he pleased, but he described his nature unto him by the essential properties of it, that the people might know who and what he was with whom they had to do, Exod. 34:6, 7. And yet among them is that mercy reckoned which is exerted in the pardoning of iniquity, transgression, and sin. The same is to be said concerning the justice of God; for this vindictive justice is nothing but the absolute rectitude of the nature of God with respect unto some outward objects, namely, sin and sinners. Had there, indeed, never been any sin or sinners, God could not in any outward acts have exercised either vindictive justice or sparing mercy; but yet he had been notwithstanding eternally just and merciful.

And there is this difference between the justice and mercy of God on the one hand, and his power and wisdom on the other, that these latter, being absolute properties of the divine nature, without respect unto any other thing, do constitute their own objects; so that in all the works of God he doth not only not act against them, but he cannot act without them, for all that he doth must necessarily be done with infinite power and wisdom. But for the other, they cannot outwardly exert or act themselves but towards objects antecedently qualified; whence it is enough that God neither doth nor can do any thing against them. And this he cannot do; for, secondly, it is weakly pleaded that if God be merciful, he cannot punish any sin. For to punish sin absolutely is no way contrary to mercy. If it were, then every one who correcteth or punisheth any for sin must needs be unmerciful. Nor is it contrary unto justice pardon sin when satisfaction is made for it; without which God neither doth nor can pardon any sin, and that for this reason, namely, that it is contrary to his justice so to do. Thirdly, Whence God is said to pardon sin in his righteousness, or because he is righteous, hath been declared before. His faithfulness in his promises with respect unto the mediation of Jesus Christ is so called, which our adversaries cannot deny.

22. Crellius in almost all his writings opposeth this justice of God, ofttimes repeating the same things; which it were tedious to pursue,— besides, I have long since answered all his principal arguments and objections, in my Diatriba de Justitia Divina. I shall therefore here only call one of his reasons unto an account, whereby he would prove that there was no necessity for making any satisfaction unto God for sin, because I find it to prevail among many who are less skilled in disputations of this nature. And this is that which he insists on, Lib. de Deo, cap. iii. de Potestate Dei. He lays down this as a principle: "Deus potestatem habet infligendi pœnam, et non infligendi; justitiæ autem divinæ nequaquam repugnat peccatori, quem punire jure possit, ignoscere." He is treating in that place about the supreme dominion and free power of God. And hereunto he saith it belongeth to inflict punishment, or to spare and pardon. But he is herein evidently mistaken: for although he who is absolutely supreme over all may punish and spare, yet it belongs not to him as such so to do: for punishing and sparing are the acts of a governor or judge as such; and unto God as such are they constantly ascribed in the Scripture, James 4:12; Ps. 9:8, 9; Gen. 18:25; Ps. 50:6, 94:2; Heb. 12:23. Now, it is one thing what may be done by virtue of absolute sovereignty and dominion, setting aside the consideration of rule and government, and another what ought to be done by a righteous ruler or judge. And whereas he says it is not contrary to justice to spare one who might de jure be punished, if he means by "a ruler may punish him by right," no more but that he may do so and do him no wrong, were there no more in the case it might be true. But it is not thus at any time with sinners; for not only may God punish them and do them no wrong, but his own holiness and righteousness requires that they should be punished. And therefore the assertion, if accommodated to the cause in hand, must be this, "It is no wrong to justice to spare them who ought to be punished;" which is manifestly false. And Crellius himself grants that there are sins and sinners which not only God may punish de jure, but that he ought so to do, and that it would be contrary to his justice not to punish them: Adv. Grot. ad cap. i. p. 98, "Deinde nec illud negamus rectitudinem ac justitiam Dei nonnunquam eum ad peccata punienda movere; eorum nempe quibus veniam non concedere, non modo æquitati per se est admodum consentaneum, verum etiam divinis decretis ut ita loquar debitum, quales sunt homines non resipiscentes, atque in peccatis contumaciter perseverantes; maxime si illud peccati genus in quo persistunt, insignem animi malitiam, aut apertum divinæ majestatis contemptum spiret, si enim hujusmodi hominibus venia concederetur, facile supremi rectoris majestas, et legum ab ipso latarum evilesceret, et gloria ipsius, quæ præcipuus operum ejus omnium finis est, minueretur."

What here he grants concerning some sins, we contend to be true concerning all. Neither do that justice, equity, and rule which require these sins of contumacy and impenitency to be punished, depend on a free decree or act of the will of God only, for then no sin of itself or in its own nature deserves punishment. And it implies a contradiction to say that it doth so, and yet that it depends merely on the will of God. And in that book De Deo he hath other conceptions to this purpose: Cap. xxiii. p. 180, "Est ratio aliqua honestatis, circa quam Deus juste dispensare non potest;" and p. 186, "Deo indignum est contumacium scelera impunita demittere;" and cap. xxviii., "Nec sanctitas nec majestas Dei usquequaque fert ut impune mandata ejus violentur." If it be thus with respect unto some sins, it must not be because of sin, but only of some degrees of sin, if it be not so with all sin whatever. And who can believe that the nature of sin is not contrary unto the holiness and majesty of God, but that some certain degrees only of it are so? and who shall give in that degree of sin when it becomes so inconsistent with God's holiness and majesty? It is said that this is stubbornness and impenitency. But whoever sins once against God will be impenitent therein, unless relieved by the grace of Jesus Christ, which supposeth his satisfaction. And this is evident in the instance of the angels that sinned.

23. The defence which he makes of his former assertion, containing the substance of what remains of their plea against the necessity of the satisfaction of Christ, I shall particularly examine, and put an end unto this Exercitation. He therefore pleads, "Nemini sive puniat sive non puniat facit injuriam; siquidem de jure ipsius tantum agitur; neque enim nocenti debetur pœna, sed is eam debet; et debet quidem illi, cui injuria omnis ultimo redundat, qui in nostro negotio Deus est; jus autem suum si rem spectes ut persequi cuique licet, ita et non persequi, ac de eo quantumlibet remittere: hæc enim juris proprii, ac dominici natura est."

Ans. "Jus Dei," δικαίωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ, "the right of God," in this matter, is neither "jus proprium," which answers the right of every private person, nor "jus dominicum," or the right of absolute dominion, but the right of a ruler or supreme judge, whereunto the things here ascribed unto the right of God in this matter do not belong, as we shall see. For whereas he saith, first, "That whether he punish or do not punish, he doth wrong to none," it is granted that no wrong is done to men; for, by reason of his sovereignty, he can do them none. But where punishment is due unto any sin, it cannot be absolutely spared, without the wrong or impeachment of that justice in whose nature it is to require its punishment. It is not, then, properly said that if God should not punish sin he should wrong any, for that he cannot do, do he what he will; but not to punish sin is contrary to his own holiness and righteousness. And for what he adds, secondly, "That punishment is not due to the offender, but that he owes his punishment unto him against whom the injury is done, who in this case is God;" I say, certainly no man ever imagined that punishment is so due to the offender, or is so far his right, as that he should be injured if he were not punished, or that he might claim it as his right. Few offenders will pursue such a right. And whereas it is said that the injury in sin is done to God, it must be rightly understood; for the injury that is done unto him hath no analogy with that which is done by one private man unto another. Neither doth our goodness add any thing to him, nor our sin take any thing from him: Job 35:6–8, "If thou sinnest, what doest thou against him? or if thy transgressions be multiplied, what doest thou unto him? If thou be righteous, what givest thou him? or what receiveth he of thine hand? Thy wickedness may hurt a man as thou art; and thy righteousness may profit the son of man." But that which is here called "injury," is the transgression of the law of the righteous Judge of all the world; and shall he not do right? shall he not recompense unto men according to their ways? And therefore that falls to the ground which he adds as the proof of the whole: "For as it is lawful for every one to prosecute his own right, so every one may forego it, remit of it, or not prosecute it, at his pleasure." And this is that which is principally insisted on by them in this cause, namely, that the right of punishing being in God only, he may forego it if he please, seeing every one may recede from or not pursue his own right at his pleasure. But a person may have a double right. First, that which ariseth from a debt, or a personal injury. This every man may pursue, so as that hereby he wrongs not any unconcerned therein, nor transgresses any rule of duty prescribed unto himself; and every one may at his pleasure remit, so as no prejudice redound thereby unto others. But our sins in respect of God have neither the nature of debts properly, nor of personal injuries, though they are metaphorically so called. And there is a right of rule or government, which is either positive or natural. Of the first sort is that which magistrates have over their subjects. Hereunto belongs the right of exacting punishment according to the law. Now, this is such a right as hath duty inseparably annexed unto it. This, therefore, a righteous magistrate cannot forego without destroying the end of magistracy in the public good. For a magistrate to say, 'I have, indeed, a right to punish offenders in the commonwealth, but I will forego it, seeing all its exercise depends upon my will,' is a rejection of his duty, and an abrenunciation of his authority. But, lastly, the right of God to rule over all is natural and necessary unto him: so therefore is our obligation unto obedience, or obnoxiousness unto punishment. To say that God may forego this right, or remit of it, is to say that he may at his pleasure cease to be our Lord and God; for the same nature of God which necessarily requireth our obedience doth indispensably require the punishment of our disobedience. And so have we closed our first argument in this cause, with our vindication of it.

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A DIGRESSION

Concerning the sufferings of Christ, whether they were of the same kind with what sinners should have suffered, or whether he suffered the same that we should have done.

UNTO what we have argued in the foregoing Exercitation it is generally objected, "That if the justice of God did thus indispensably require the punishment of sin, which was the ground of the satisfaction made by Christ, then it was necessary that Christ should undergo the same punishment that the sinners themselves should have done, namely, that which the justice of God did require. But this was impossible," as is pretended. And to overthrow this apprehension, that the Lord Christ underwent the same punishment in kind which we should have done, or as was due unto us, they have thus stated the opinion of them whom they do oppose. "Some," they say, "do maintain that our sins are to be looked on as our debts, or under the notion of debts, and God as the creditor, requiring the payment of them. Wherefore our Lord Jesus Christ, by his death and sufferings, paid this debt; so that his death was 'solutio ejusdem,' or the payment of what was due in the same kind. This, say some learned men, gave great advantage unto Socinus; who easily proved that there was no necessity for a mere creditor to exact his debt, but that he might at his pleasure 'cedere jure suo,' or forego his own right. And this must needs be supposed of God in this matter, whose love, and grace, and pardoning mercy, are so celebrated therein." And to confirm this argument it is usually added,—which is the main thing pleaded by Socinus and Crellius themselves,—"That the Lord Christ neither did nor could undergo the penalty due unto us, because that was eternal death. And to plead that either Christ should have undergone it, if he could not have delivered himself from it, or that what was wanting unto his sufferings as to their duration was compensated by the dignity of his person, is to acknowledge that indeed he did not undergo the same punishment that we are obnoxious unto."

Learned men, and those sound in the substance of the doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ, being differently minded, either in the thing itself or about the sense of the terms whereby it is expressed, I shall endeavour to state right conceptions about it, or at least express my own, without a design to contradict those of any others. And,—First, For the consideration of our sins under the notion of debts, and God as a creditor, it is generally known that before the rising of any heresy, the most learned men had expressed themselves with such a liberty as advantage hath been thence taken by such adversaries of the truth as afterwards arose. Thus the Scripture having called our sins our debts, and made mention of the payment made by Christ, and compared God to a creditor, before Socinus called the whole matter of the satisfaction of Christ into question, it is no wonder if the truth were commonly expressed under these notions, without such distinctions as were necessary to secure them from unforeseen exceptions. He with whom Socinus first disputed on this subject was Covetus; and he doth indeed make use of this argument to prove the satisfaction of Christ, namely, "That our sins being our debts, justice required that there should be payment made of them, or for them." But the truth is, he doth not take his argument from the nature of debts in general, but from the especial nature of these debts, as the Scripture calls them: for he made it appear that these debts are such as are crimes, or transgressions of the law of God; on the account whereof the persons that had contracted these debts, or were guilty of these crimes, became liable and obnoxious unto punishment in the judgment of God, who is the sovereign ruler over all. There is, therefore, a distinction to be put between such debts as are civil or pecuniary only, and those which are criminal also. And when the Scripture sets out our sins as debts, with such circumstances as allude unto pecuniary debts and their payment, it is to make the thing treated of obvious unto our understandings by a similitude exposed unto the acquaintance of all men; but as our sins are really intended, the expression is metaphorical. And Socinus, in his disputation about the nature of debts, creditors, and payments, had no advantage but what he took by a supposition that the terms which were used by his adversary metaphorically (his argument being taken from the thing intended) were urged by him in their proper sense; which indeed they were not. And so, whereas all his dispute respects civil or pecuniary debts only, he was far enough from triumphing over his adversary, who intended such as were criminal. Wherefore, as this notion, of debts, creditors, and payments, need not yet be forborne in a popular way of teaching, because it is made use of in the Scripture to give us a sense of our condition upon the account of our sins, especially a declaration being made that these debts will be exacted of us; so in a disputation about the truth, it is necessary to declare of what nature these debts are, as all generally do, asserting them to be criminal.

Secondly, There is much ambiguity in that expression, of "Christ's paying the same which was due from us." For that term, "the same," may be variously modified, from divers respects. Consider the punishment suffered, it may be it was the same; consider the person suffering, and it was not the same. And therefore it may be said, as far as it was a penalty it was the same; as it was a payment it was not the same; or it was not the same as it was a satisfaction. For it was only what the law required, and the law required no satisfaction as formally such. Punishment and satisfaction differ formally, though materially they may be the same. I judge, therefore, that Christ was to undergo, and did undergo, that very punishment, in the kind of it, which those for whom he suffered should have undergone, and that, among others, for the reasons ensuing:—

1. Christ underwent the punishment which, in the justice or judgment of God, was due unto sin. That the justice of God did require that sin should be punished with a meet and due recompense of reward, we have proved already, and shall afterwards further confirm. To answer and satisfy this justice it was that Christ suffered; and therefore he suffered what that justice required. And this is what is pleaded for, and all. We should have undergone no more but what in the justice of God was due to sin. This Christ underwent,—namely, what in the justice of God was due to sin, and therefore what we should have undergone. Nor can it be supposed that, in the justice of God, there might be two sorts of penalties due to sin, one of one kind, and another of another. If it be said that because it was undergone by another it was not the same, I grant it was payment, which our suffering could never have been; it was satisfaction, which we by undergoing any penalty could not make; but he yet suffered the same penalty which we should have done. No more is intended but that the Lord Christ underwent that punishment which was due to our sins; which I cannot see how it can well be denied by those who grant that he underwent any punishment at all, seeing the justice of God required no other.

2. That which was due to sin was all of it, whatever it was, contained and comprehended in the curse of the law; for in the curse God threatened the breach of the law with that punishment which in his justice was due unto it, and all that was so. I suppose this will not be denied. For the curse of the law is nothing but an expression of that punishment which is due unto the breach of it, delivered in a way of threatening. But now Jesus Christ underwent the curse of the law; by which I know not what to understand but that very punishment which the transgressors of the law should have undergone. Hence our apostle says that he was "made a curse for us," Gal. 3:13; because he underwent the penal sentence of the law. And there were not two kinds of punishment contained in the curse of the law, one that the sinner himself should undergo, another that should fall on the Mediator; for neither the law nor its curse had any respect unto a mediator. Only every transgressor was cursed thereby. The interposition of a mediator depends on other principles and reasons than any the law was acquainted withal. It was therefore the same punishment, in the kind of it, which was due to us, that the Lord Christ was to undergo, or it was that which neither the justice nor the law of God required.

3. It is said expressly that God caused all our iniquities to meet on him, Isa. 53:6, or "hath laid on him the iniquity of us all;" that he bare our sins, verse 11, or "bare our sins in his own body on the tree," 1 Pet. 2:24; whereby he who knew no sin was made sin for us, 2 Cor. 5:21;—the sense of all which places I have elsewhere pleaded and vindicated. Now, unless we will betake ourselves unto the metaphorical sense of our adversaries, and grant that all these, and the like expressions in the Scripture innumerable, signify no more but that Christ took away our sins, by declaring and confirming unto us the way of faith and obedience, whereby we may obtain the pardon of them, and have them so taken away, we can assign no sense unto them but that the Lord Christ underwent the punishment due unto our sins in the judgment of God, and according to the sentence of the law; for how did God make our sins to meet on him, how did he bear them, if he did not suffer the penalty due to them, or if he underwent some other inconvenience, but not the exact demerit of sin? And there is no other sense given of these places by them who plead for the satisfaction of Christ but this, that he bare the punishment due to our sins; which is all that is contended for.

4. Christ suffered in our stead. He was our Ἀντίψυχος. And it is usual with all learned men to illustrate his being so by the instances of such as have been renowned in the world on that account; which they have clear warranty for from our apostle, Rom. 5:7. When one would substitute himself in the room of another who was obnoxious unto punishment, he that was so substituted was always to undergo that very penalty, whether by loss of limb, liberty, or life, that the other should have undergone. And in like manner, if the Lord Christ suffered in our stead, as our Ἀντίψυχος, he suffered what we should have done. And to conclude, if a certain punishment of sin be required indispensably, on the account of the holiness and essential righteousness of God, I know not on what ground we can suppose that several sorts or kinds of punishment might be inflicted for it at pleasure.

It remains that we consider the principal objections that are usually levelled against the truth asserted, and either answer them, or show how that which we maintain is not concerned in them nor opposed by them.

First, therefore, it is objected, "That the punishment which we should have undergone was death eternal, but this Christ did not, nor could undergo; so that he underwent not the same punishment that we should have done." Ans. Death as eternal was in the punishment due unto our sin, not directly, but consequentially; and that "a natura subjecti," not "a natura causæ." For, that the punishment of sin should be eternal arose not from the nature and order of all things, namely, of God, the law, and the sinner, but from the nature and condition of the sinner only. This was such as that it could no otherwise undergo a punishment proportionable unto the demerit of sin but by an eternal continuance under it. This, therefore, was not a necessary consequent of guilt absolutely, but of guilt in or upon such a subject as a sinner is, who is no more but a finite limited creature. But when, by God's appointment, the same punishment fell on Him whose person, upon another consideration, was infinitely distanced from those of the sinners themselves, eternity was not of the nature of it. But then it may be said, "That the admission of one to pay or suffer for another, who could discharge the debt in much less time than the other or offender could, is not the same that the law required; for the law takes no notice of any other than the person who had offended. And if a mediator could have paid the same, the original law must have been distinctive,—that either the offender must suffer or another for him." Ans. These things are for the most part true, but not contrary to our assertion, as is pretended, through a misapprehension of it. For the law requires no such thing as one to suffer for another, nor, absolutely considered, doth admit of it. This was from God's gracious dispensation of or with the law, as the supreme Lord and ruler over all. The law itself takes notice only of offenders, nor hath any such supposition included in it as that the offenders must suffer or a mediator in their stead. But this the law hath in it, and inseparable from it, namely, that this kind of punishment is due to the transgressor of it. And by God's gracious substitution of Christ in the room of sinners, there was no relaxation made of the law as to the punishment it required; nor is there any word in the Scripture giving countenance unto such an apprehension. That there was a dispensation with the law so far as that one person should undergo the punishment (namely, the Son of God) which others did deserve, he becoming a mediator for them, the Scripture everywhere declares. Upon the supposition of his substitution in the place and stead of sinners, could there be any word of Scripture produced intimating such a relaxation of the law as that it should not require of him the whole punishment due to sin, but only some part of it, or not the punishment which was due to sinners, but somewhat else of another kind that was not in the original sanction and curse of it, there would be an end of this difference. But this appears not, nor is there any thing of sound reason in it, that one should suffer for another, in the stead of another, and thereby answer the law whereby that other was bound over unto punishment, and yet not suffer what he should have done. Nor is it pleaded, in this case, that the dignity of the person makes up what was wanting in the kind or degree of punishment; whence it is supposed that it would follow that then he who so suffered, suffered not what others should have done who were not so worthy. It is only said, that from the dignity of the person undergoing the same kind of punishment that others should have done, that respect of it which consisted in its duration, and arose from the disability of the persons liable unto it otherwise to undergo it, could have here no place.

It is yet further pleaded, "That if the same be paid in a strict sense, then deliverance would have followed ipso facto, for the release immediately follows the payment of the same; and it had been injustice to have required any thing further of the offenders when strict and full payment had been made of what was in the obligation." Ans. To discuss these things at large would require a larger discourse than I shall now divert unto. But,—1. It hath been showed already, howsoever we allow of that expression of "paying the same," it is only suffering the same for which we contend. Christ underwent the same punishment that the law required, but that his so doing should be a payment for us depended on God's sovereign dispensation, yet so that, when it was paid, it was the same which was due from us. 2. This payment, therefore, as such, and the deliverance that ensued thereon, depended on a previous compact and agreement, as must all satisfaction of one for another. This compact, as it concerned the person requiring satisfaction and the person making it, we have before described and explained; and as it concerns them who are to be partakers of the benefit of it, it is declared in the covenant of grace. Deliverance, therefore, doth not naturally follow on this satisfaction, but jure fœderis; and therefore was not to ensue ipso facto, but in the way and order disposed in that covenant. 3. The actual deliverance of all the persons for whom Christ suffered, to ensue ipso facto upon his suffering, was absolutely impossible; for they were not [in being], the most of them, when he suffered. And that the whole of the time, way, and manner of this deliverance dependeth on compact, is evident from them who were delivered actually from the penalty long before the actual sufferings of Christ, merely upon the account of his sufferings which should afterwards ensue. 4. Deliverance is no end of punishment, considered merely as such; none is punished properly that he may be delivered; however, the cessation of punishment may be called a deliverance. 5. Mere deliverance was not the whole end of Christ's sufferings for us, but such a deliverance as is attended with a state and condition of superadded blessedness. And the duties of faith, repentance, and obedience, which are prescribed unto us, are not enjoined only or principally with respect unto deliverance from punishment, but with respect unto the attaining of those other ends of the mediation of Christ, in a new spiritual life here and eternal life hereafter. And with respect unto them may they justly be required of us, though Christ suffered and paid the same which we ought. 6. No deliverance ipso facto, upon a supposition of suffering or paying of the same, was necessary, but only the actual discharge of him who made the payment, and that under the notion and capacity of an undertaker for others: which in this case did ensue; for the Lord Christ immediately on his sufferings was discharged, and that as our surety and representative.

But it may be further objected, "That it is impossible to reconcile the freeness of remission with the full payment of the very same that was in the obligation; for it is impossible that the same debt should be fully paid and freely forgiven." Ans. It is well if those who make use of this objection, because they suppose it of force and weight, are satisfied with their own answers unto the Socinians when it is much urged and insisted on by them. For it seems at first view that if the freedom of pardon unto us exclude any kind of satisfaction to be made by another for us, that it excludes all; for as to the freedom of pardon, wherein soever that freedom doth consist, it is asserted in the Scripture to be absolute, without any respects or restrictions. It is not said that God will so freely pardon us that he will not require all that was due, the same that was due, but somewhat he may and will. It is not said that he will not have a suffering of this kind of punishment, but the suffering of another kind of punishment he will. And so to suppose is a thing unworthy of the grace and righteousness of God. To say that God freely remitted our sins, abrogating the law and the curse of it, requiring no punishment, no satisfaction for them, neither from ourselves nor from the Mediator, hath, at first view, an appearance of royal grace and clemency, until, being examined, it is found inconsistent with the truth and holiness of God. To say that God required the execution of the sentence and curse of the law, in the undergoing of the punishment due unto sin, but yet, out of his love and infinite grace, sent his Son to undergo it for us, so to comply with his holiness, to satisfy his justice, and fulfil his truth and law, that he might freely pardon sinners,—this the Scripture everywhere declares, and the so doing is consistent with all the perfections of the divine nature. But to say that he would neither absolutely pardon us without any satisfaction, nor yet have the same penalty undergone by Christ which his justice and law required as due unto sin, but somewhat else, seems to be unworthy of the holiness of God on the one side, which is but partially complied withal, and of his grace on the other, which is not exalted by it, and is a conceit that hath no countenance given unto it in the Scripture. Wherefore, the absolute freedom of pardon unto us is absolutely consistent with Christ suffering the same penalty which was due unto our sins.

And whereas it is pleaded, "That satisfaction and remission must respect the same person, for Christ did not pay for himself, but for us, neither could the remission be unto him; so that what was exactly paid by him, it is all one as if it had been paid by us;" unless it be cautiously explained, it hath a disadvantageous aspect towards the whole truth pleaded for. The Scripture is clear that God pardoneth us for Christ's sake; and no less clear that he spared not him for our sakes. And if what Christ did be so accounted as done by ourselves as that payment and remission respect immediately the same person, then be it what it will, more or less, that was so paid or so satisfied for, we are not freely pardoned, but are esteemed to have suffered or paid so much, though not the whole. This is not that which we do believe. But satisfaction was made by Christ, and remission is made unto us. He suffered, the just for the unjust, that we may go free. In brief, Christ's undergoing the punishment due unto our sins, the same that we should have undergone,—or, to speak with respect unto that improper notion, his paying the same debts which we owed,— doth not in the least take off from the freedom of our pardon; yet it much consists therein, or at least depends thereon. I say not that pardon itself doth so, but the freedom of it in God, and with respect unto us, doth so. For God is said to do that freely for us which he doth of grace; and whatever he doth of grace is done for us freely. Thus the love and grace of God in sending Jesus Christ to die for us were free; and therein lay the foundation of free remission unto us. His constitution of his suffering of the same punishment which was due unto our sins, as the surety and mediator of the new covenant, was free and of mere grace, depending on the compact or covenant between the Father and Son, before explained. The imputation of our sin to him, or the making him to be sin for us, by his own voluntary choice and consent, was in like manner free. The constitution of the new covenant, and therein of the way and law of the participation of the benefits of the sufferings of Christ, was also free and of grace. The communication of the Holy Spirit unto us, enabling us to believe and to fulfil the condition of the covenant, is absolutely free. And other instances of the freedom of God's grace, with respect unto the remission of sin, might be given. Unto us it is every way free. In our own persons we make no satisfaction, nor pay one farthing of our debt; we did nothing towards the procurement of another to do it; we bring neither money nor price to obtain a pardon; but are absolved by the mere free grace of God by Jesus Christ. And there is nothing here inconsistent with Christ suffering the same that we should have done, or his paying the same debt which we owed, in the sense before explained.

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