WE have exhibited the universal virtue and efficacy of the death of Christ, explained in three propositions. In the first it was demonstrated, That this death of Christ was appointed by God and proposed to the human race, as an universal remedy applicable to all men individually. In the second, we have shewn in what sense Christ is said to have died for all, or in what sense the death of Christ may be acknowledged to have been established as an universal cause of salvation, for the good of the whole human race; namely, not as some assert, by reason of its mere sufficiency, or intrinsic value, in which respect the death of Christ, or the blood of the Son of God, is a price more than sufficient to redeem each and all men and angels ; but by reason of the Evangelical covenant established and confirmed by this death and blood of Christ, according to the tenor of which covenant a right accrued to all men individually, on condition of faith, of claiming for themselves remission of sins and eternal life. To these two propositions we have subjoined a third, in which it was shewn, That the universal virtue of the death of Christ having been stated, and the universal covenant of the Gospel having regard to every man, yet that every individual person has indeed, by the. sole benefit of this death, God under obligation to enter into peace with him, and give him life, if he should believe; but has not actual justification or reconciliation, or an actual state of grace and salvation, .before he believes.
There now remains a fourth and last proposition, which may serve chiefly for removing any scruple from the minds of those who extend this universal efficacy of the death of Christ which we defend, further than the truth of the thing permits. For there are some who, because the death of Christ, in the sense aforesaid, is affirmed to have been imposed for the human race, for themselves and all mankind individually, immediately infer, that it is now incumbent on the Divine justice and goodness, that he should administer the means necessary for producing faith to all for whom he thus gave Christ to death. But because it appears more clearly than mid-day light, that to heathens and pagans, upon whom the light of the Gospel never shone, means were not given which immediately suffice to produce faith in them, they resort to an assertion, that suf- ^ ficient means were always given even to such persons, by which they might be led mediately, and, as it were, by degrees, to faith in Christ, if they had made proper use of them. But if any one should inquire what those means of grace are, which are obvious to all men, and are sufficiently able to lead all men to the faith of Christ, they bring before us Nature clothed with the name of Grace. For they say that there are certain remains of spiritual life in all men, namely, in the understanding, some knowledge of God, in the affections, some desire after the knowledge of what is good; of which natural endowments if a man makes a right use, God will give him more grace, and present him with saving faith. Aquinas seems to lean to this opinion (Quest. 14, De veritate, art. 11, Resp. ad. 1,) where he writes in this manner, /f a man brought up in the woods should follow the dictate of natural reason in the desire of good and the avoidiug of evil, it is most certainly to be believed that God will either reveal to him by internal inspiration those things which are necessary to be believed, or will direct to him some preacher of the faith. The opinion, therefore, of those persons amounts to this, that they think that God, by the efficacy and merit of the death of Christ, is now bound, as it were by a statute law, to supply sufficient means to all, by which they may be led to Christ, if they should be willing ; so that on the part of God nothing js wanting that they should not obtain faith and a beneficial participation of the death of Christ. For the solution of this difficulty we have brought forward this proposition to be explained and confirmed, viz.
THESIS 4. The death of Christ being granted to be applicable to all men on condition of faith, tt ts consistent with the goodness and justice of God to supply or to deny, either to nations or to individuals, the means of application, and that according to the good pleasure of his own will, not according to the disparity of human wills. 1 shall premise a few things, and then proceed to confirm the proposition. — First, then, it is to be observed, that those who are of a contrary opinion think (Adver. Tilen, Corv. p. 403, and 109, 121, 158, 119), That God is bound as it were by a fixed decree, and appot..ted law, to grant the talent of grace to those who rightly use the talent of nature. Secondly, they presume, That’ every pagan, although dwelling in the shadow of death, is able, by his own free will, to use this natural talent well or, ill. Thirdly, From this distinction, whether right or wrong, of those who use their natural gifts, they endeavour to give a reason why God should deign to enlighten some with the Gospel and the knowledge of Christ, and not others. They affirm, If any one rightly uses those gifts, he will be led by degrees to a saving knowledge of Christ ; but if he wickedly abuses them, he is deservedly deprived of the knowledge of Christ. Augustine seems to have been of a different opinion (Libro de Nat. & Grat. cap. 8 and 9) where he grants, that the means of salvation cannot be applied to some infants, where also he acknowledges, that adults who have died in that region where they could not hear of the name of Christ, could by no means become righteous by nature aud free-will. We also affirm that there is no decree, no law, or promise of God extant, according to which any one can certainly conclude, This man has used the light of nature rightly or less badly, therefore God will illuminate him with supernatural grace. Arminius indeed says (Vide Armin. contra Perk. p. 218,) that God has promised this in that saying of Christ, To HIM THAT HATH SHALL BE GIVEN. But much more truly and learnedly the Reverend Bishop of Salisbury (De vera Grat. Chr. p. 68) says, Arminius here commits a fallacy, in promising to him that hath in a state of nature, a gift for salvation in a state of grace, and makes the light of faith the reward of diligence in unbelievers. For in whatever thing, and of whatever kind, good use is made, in the same thing he also promises increase, Alvarez, a Papist, informs us on this subject (De Auxil. disp. 56, p. 651), No law was ever made for giving the helps of grace to those who do all that is in their power from the faculty of nature, neither did Christ the Lord by his death merit, or desire to merit, such a law. The Apostle Paul teaches that the dispensation of supernatural grace proceeds, not according to the use and works of the will of man, but according to the purpose and counsel of the will of God : He worketh all things according to the purpose and counsel of his own will (Eph. i. 11.)
Secondly, although we acknowledge that some sparks of natural light remain in heathens, and some imperfect desire of moral good, yet, as the same Bishop of Salisbury whom we have before commended, excellently says, (pp. 66, 67) Because those deformed ruins have no inhabitant but the devil, there cannot be any other than a corrupt use, in the midst of the corruption of these remains. Let the adversaries shew to us even one man from the beginning of the world, who from the good use of nature derived to himself the gift of grace. ltisimpossible (morally speaking) that a heathen in a state of corrupt nature, should not place very many obstacles to Divine grace, so far is he from well using his natural powers, so that he may obtain for himself gratuitous and supernatural aid. Aquinas truly says, (Contr. Gent. lib. 3, p. 160) If through preceding disorder free-will should decline to evil, it will not be at all in his power to offer no impediment to grace. Therefore, they who think that Evangelical grace is given to all those who make a right use of the light of nature, and do not oppose an impediment to grace, dream that there are such men in a state of corrupt nature, as it is not credible there ever were, or are, or will be. For whatever may be called an impediment, no one can remove this impediment but God, as Bradwardine truly teaches (De causa Dei, contra. Pelag. lib. 2, cap. 321). Thirdly, and lastly, we assert, on the testimony of the holy Scripture and of experience, that the Gospel and other means of salvation, were not granted or denied to men for this reason, because some made a right use of the light of nature, or at least made a less evil use of it, and others perversely and wickedly abused it. For it appears from the sacred Scriptures, that the light of the Gospel shone on those thoughtless persons who in the worst manner abused their natural light or talent. Such were the Romans, Corinthians, (1 Cor. vi. 11) Ephesians, (Eph. ii. 8, 21) among whom the torch of the Gospel was lighted up by the Apostles, when they were voluntarily living in the filth of superstition and lusts. It is also not less manifest, to how many the Gospel was never revealed, who lived less wickedly. Who is ignorant that among the philosophers, Socrates, Plato, Xenophon; and among the Romans, Fabricius, Scipio, Cato, made a good use of the light of nature beyond other men? yet none of these on that account became a partaker of the grace of the Gospel. Therefore the reason of the Gospel and supernatural light being given or denied, is not to be sought in the better or worse use of the light of nature, but in the good pleasure of God, who calls or not as it pleases him. These things being disposed of, let us proceed to the proposition itself: which we confirm, in the first place, by an argument derived from the death of Christ, from whence our adversaries think that they can infer the contrary.
Argument l. If by the death of Christ a covenant was established, according to which remission of sins is promised to every one that believeth, but no covenant was established according to which the Gospel is promised to any heathen who uses his natural endowments rightly, or no ways badly, then, the death of Christ being admitted, it is rash to conclude that God is bound by his faithfulness, or goodness, or justice, or any other covenant, to reveal to men the mystery of the grace of the Gospel on account of a better use of nature. But it is most certain, that such a covenant no where exists. Therefore a revelation, or a denial of the Gospel, depends on the good pleasure of God, who withholds or reveals it as it seems good to himself, and not on account of the different kinds of actions of men. We prove the major thus: that God is bound to no man, and owes no man any thing, except of his own gratuitous and voluntary promise. Who hath first. given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again ? (Rom. xi. 35.) Upon which sentence Augustine says (in Psalm Ixxxiii.), 74e Lord makes himself a debtor not by receiving, but by promising ; he hath not promised any thing spiritual to the works of corrupt nature however splendid they may be. He hath not made any law by which he may be restrained from giving spiritual blessings to men however wicked, and covered with all kind of iniquities. We ought not, therefore, to give a reason, from the difference of men or their works, why the Gospel and the knowledge of Christ is obtained by some and not by others; but to acquiesce in the good pleasure of the Divine will; according to the Apostle, (2 Tim. i. 9) He hath called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus, before the world began. But still it may be pretended, Although God is not bound either by debt, or by any promise confirmed by the death of Christ, to reveal Christ to them that make a good use of the light of nature, yet since of his grace he is accustomed to give to men many things which he had not promised; what should hinder us from saying that he has this as his common way of distributing the grace of the Gospel, that he grants it to those who make a better use of the light of nature, and does, not grant it to those who, by abusing the light of nature more than others, render themselves more unworthy of the light of grace? One impediment is, that by this we do not admit the perpetual testimony of Scripture to the contrary, which refers the communication of saving grace, not to the man who works better, but to God, who loves and pities one more than another. (Rom. ix. 18.) Another impediment is, experience itself. For it often happens, that a man from his infancy is very modest, temperate, and a victor over his passions for the most part, and lives and dies in a place where the Gospel of Christ cannot by any means be preached to him : But another, enslaved to lust, and covered with wickedness, is so overruled by God, that he hears, believes, and is saved, We say then that all men, from their bad use of nature, render themselves unworthy of the Gospel; and that God, in communicating or denying the Gospel, is not accustomed to weigh the degrees of human worthiness and unworthiness, and from thence to derive his common rule of bestowing or not bestowing grace; but sometimes denies it to those who have not made good use of the remains of nature, and in the mean time grants it to those who have abused them much worse: and sometimes does the contrary, From whence it appears That the reason of the difference why God grants his grace to one and not to another, ought to be referred to the good pleasure of God himself, and not to the different kind of operations of men.
ARGUMENT 2, Secondly, we prove, that it is not contrary to the Divine goodness, even admitting the death of Christ, still not to grant the means of application to all men whatsoever according to his good pleasure: because the death of Christ is a benefit granted freely by God himself to the human race. But it is just and right that the free application of his own benefit should be in the power of the Benefactor, who is never bound by the giving of one benefit to the giving of another, unless he should have made such a promise; which promise of granting the means by which the death of Christ may be applied, neither can all men promiscuously, nor any person for himself individually, rightly assert was made. Moreover, it is no reflection on the Divine goodness not to grant any benefit to one, if he does not bring an injury upon any one, or unjustly deny to or deprive any one of a benefit due to him; but illumination by the grace of the Gospel, the death of Christ being supposed, yet is not due to nature, now corrupted by sin. Thus Bannes says (In. 1, qu. 23, art. 3, p. 279,) The same argument is not cpplicable to natural and supernatural illumination, because that which is natural i$ due to nature, but the illumination of grace is not due to nature, especially as it is so corrupted by sin, but is conferred by grace. If it is conferred by grace, then it is not due to all. For among the twelve articles which pertain to the Christian faith, Augustine has put this second (Epist. 107), The grace of God is not given to all men. If it is conferred of grace, then it is not given or denied according to the good or bad use of natural light ; for, as Prosper rightly remarks, (Resp. 8, ad Capit. Gallor.) It is impiety to affirm that the grace by which we are saved is either given in payment for meritorious deeds or restrained by evil ones. And, (De Vocat. Gent.) There are no wickednesses so detestable as to drive away the gift of grace. Those therefore who are desirous of defending the justice and goodness of God by human conjectures, contend that he supplies the gratuitous means of salvation to all who make use of their natural endowments either aright or not badly, but denies them to others who have abused the same gifts, (as Augustine says) being ignorant of the height and depth of Divine grace, form improbable fables. Whether, therefore, we will or not, if the cause is sought Why those means, by which they may apply Christ to themselves for salvation, are granted to some individuals, and not to others, we must overlook the disparity of men, or of human works, and ascend to the free good pleasure of God, as Prosper elegantly observes, (Carmine. de Ingratis. cap. 35) Since the same cause equally implicates all, they are not to be distinguished by merit, who are far from possessing the gift.
ARGUMENT 3. From the fact we argue thus as to the’ right; God does not omit to do any thing, which it would be an impeachment upon Divine goodness, justice, or wis- . dom not to do. This cannot be doubted, since it is impossible that he who is Goodness, Justice, and Wisdom itself, could ever depart from the rule of goodness, justice, or wisdom in doing or not doing any thing. I add, therefore, the minor, and affirm that, the death of Christ being admitted, yet God has heretofore denied, and does now deny to many nations and many individuals, those means without which the death of Christ is applied to no one. This will evidently appear, whether we consider the immediate means of salvation by which man is placed in a state of spiritual life and salvation, and in the actual participation of the death and merits of Christ, such as repentance, faith, regeneration, and sanctification; or whether we regard the external means, which, as instruments, God makes use of to produce the former, such as the sending of teachers and pastors, the preaching of the Gospel, and all other helps, without which those internal and immediate means of salvation cannot ordinarily be produced. With respect to the former, faith and a saving knowledge of Christ, is a special gift, granted to some, denied to others, according to the good pleasure of the Divine will. Z4 is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given (Matt. xiii. 11.) No man can come unto me, except it were given unto him of my Father (John vi. 65.) By grace are ye saved, through faith ; and that not of yourselves; at ds the gift of God (Ephes. ii. 8.) All men have not faith (2 Thess. iii. 2.) So likewise as to repentance, regeneration, sanctification, all which are given to some because the special mercy of God procures them, but are denied to others, because the same mercy does not unfold its riches to them. Turn thou us unto thee, O Lord, and we shall be turned (Lament. v. 21.) He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth (Rom. ix. 18.) Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God (John i. 13) Blessed be God, who according to his abundant mercy hath begotten us again (1 Pet. 1.3.) I omit other passages. From these it appears, that God gives or denies to men those means, by which union with Christ and salvation are immediately connected, according to the good pleasure of his will, not according to the difference of the human will. This all the orthodox Fathers have stoutly defended against the Pelagians. Ambrose, on Luke vii. 9, says, God calls whom he thinks fit, and makes religious whom he will, Augustine observes, (Epist. 107) We know that grace is not given to all men, nor according to the merits of their will to whom it is given. In the same Epistle he teaches further, That those to whom this grace is not given, differ for the most part by no merit, no will from others, but are in a similar case with those to whom it is given. As in natural birth the formation by Divine power precedes all will of man to be born; so in spiritual birth, in which we begin to put off the old man, no man can have a good will of his own motion; as Fulgentius observes (lib. de Incarn. & Grat. cap. 19,) and again, (cap. 21) If God by his grace should not give to man, man could never be willing to believe in God, because grace does not find this will, but produces it in man. It is clear, therefore, that God does not give those internal means promiscuously to all men, by which they may apply to themselves the death of Christ. Nor can our opponents here pretend, that this Divine giving and not giving of faith derives its origin. from the resistance or non-resistance of the human will, since the Scriptures expressly refer this to the good pleasure of God in being willing or not willing to shew compassion ; and the Fathers in express words exclude the disparity of the wills of men before grace received.
Hitherto we have disputed about immediate means, let us now descend to the external means, whereby these are conferred. The death and merit of Christ had its efficacy in the acceptation of God from the origin of the world ; yet, under the Old Testament, God did not grant to all men every where the external means of its application, but, as the Psalmist says, He sheweth his word unto Jacob, &c. He hath not dealt so with any nation (Ps. cxlvii. 19, 20.) And of the same sentiment is St. Paul, (Acts xiv. 16) God in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways. Prosper has noticed the same thing (De lib. arbitr. p. 225.) He says, [t is not removed from common observation, what countless numbers of mankind in so many ages have died, sunk in their errors and impieties, without any knowledge of the true God. And looking to the times of the New Testament, he says, (De vocat. Gent. 11. 17) There are also now, in the exireme parts of the world, some nations upon whom the grace of the Saviour hath not shone. From which things it follows, that, even the death of Christ being admitted, God is nevertheless not bound, by reason of his goodness or justice, to provide and offer to all men individually the means whereby they may apply Christ to themselves. For with respect to God the argument well follows from fact to right both affirmatively and negatively, God does this, therefore he does justly ; God does not do this, therefore he is not bound by any right that he should do it.
OBJECTION 1. Some persons meet this argument by— The reason why the Gospel is not preached every where arises not so much from this, that those who should preach it are not sent by God, as because those who are sent refuse to go. This is the opinion of Corvinus (contra Tilenum, p. 105.)
Reply. But if God, by reason of his goodness and justice, as it were from some kind of congruity, the death of Christ being supposed, were bound to communicate to all sufficient means of application, he would not suffer any one through carelessness to defraud another of a benefit due to him, especially of such an one as that, without which no salvation is to be hoped for. Moreover, it implies a contradiction, that God, by his ordinary law should provide and administer to all men the means relative to the application of Christ, and not administer them to some, because of the carelessness of the preachers. As if the care of the preachers were not to be numbered among these means without which the knowledge and application of Christ preached cannot be obtained, Further, If the goodness and justice of God should require this, that these means of applying Christ should be administered to all, without doubt he would kindle, at least in some of the preachers, a mind and care of preaching and offering the Gospel to some individuals in a nation. For it is he who knows how to send forth labourers into his harvest, according to his good pleasure. And lastly, what carelessness of preachers was the cause that the Gospel was not preached by any one to the Americans two hundred years ago, when nobody ever dreamt that there were such nations in existence? We must, therefore, refer it to a higher cause, namely, the free good pleasure of God in granting or denying these means. He by his special providence directs them to be administered by his servants, as may be seen Acts xvi. 6, 7, They were forbidden of the Holy Ghost to preach the word in Asia; after they were come to Mysia, they essayed to go into Bithynia, but the Spirit suffered them not.
OBJECTION 2. Secondly, they answer, That those who have been long destitute of the grace of the Gospel, have refused it by their ancestors, and thus their posterity are deservedly deprived of the preaching of the Gospel, because their ancestors despised it. We are not therefore to refer it to the absolute will of God, that the saving light of the Gospel does not shine upon some nations. (Corvin. p. 108, and Voss. p. 671).
Reply. But neither do these things well consist with their opinions. For if God, respect being had to the death of Christ, had determined to administer to all men sufficiently the means of salvation, it would seem not to be equitable, that on account of the preaching of the word, which was despised by their ancestors in the time of Noah, he should deny it to their posterity after some thousands of years. For if notwithstanding the sin of Adam, it was obtained by the death of Christ (according to their opinion) that sufficient means of salvation should be administered to all, it would be unreasonable and unjust to break this, as it were, ordinary law, on pretence of sins committed by some others who were our ancestors. As, therefore, on account of the sin of Adam, God may justly deny to his posterity every spiritual benefit, so we admit that from the sins of the ancestors of others, God may also take occasion to deny to us any gratuitous benefit. But if. by the death of Christ and the concurring goodness of God, a law is established concerning the administration of the means of grace, now, as if on account of the sid of Adam, who was the federal head of all his posterity, God will not abrogate this his decree ; so much less consistent is it, that on account of the sins of others, who do not sustain this common relationship to the human race, their posterity should be deprived of this benefit. In vain, therefore, do they resort to the sins of their ancestors, in order to give a reason for the denial of this thing, who profess, that by virtue of the death of Christ and the goodness of God, it was prepared for all men individually by the Divine decree, and as it were due to them by an established law.
OBJECTION 3. Thirdly, they answer, That the grace of the Gospel is denied to some, because by continued transgression against the law they have shewn themselves to be unworthy of having Divine grace offered to them.
Rerpry. But this answer will make the truth of our opinion more evident. For, in the first place, I assume, what no man in his senses will deny, that every man in the state of corrupt nature, if his sins were marked, has shewn himself to be unworthy of the grace of the Gospel. And I also add, That the worthiness and unworthiness of men, or their greater and less unworthiness, is not the rule according to which God proceeds in dispensing or denying the Gospel either to individuals or to nations. Which things being granted, it will follow, that unworthiness is always found in those to whom the Gospel is denied; but it is in those also to whom it is granted. Therefore this unworthiness will have the nature of a circumstance which always accompanies the persons to whom the Gospel is given or not given; but it will not be a cause of discrimination why the Gospel is given to one and not given to another. Therefore in this matter we must come to the good pleasure of the Divine will alone, who, as it pleases him, grants his aid both to those who do and to those who do not what they can, as Alvarez says (De Auxil. disp. 58.) But since this answer, which teaches that the grace of the Gospel is repelled by the unworthiness of men, seems tacitly to hint that it may be procured ly some degree of worthiness in them, let us hear what the orthodox Fathers have taught against the Pelagians in this matter. Augustine (Epist. 107, p. 500) shews that the saving grace of Christ is not granted nor denied to men according to this rule of greater or less unworthiness. His words have been before quoted. Prosper very often inculcates this (De vocat. Gent. lib. 1, cap. 15), Part of men are delivered, while another part perish; but if we would asciibe this to the merits of their wills, that it might appear that the wicked had neglected grace and the good had chosen it, the case of people innumerable will oppose us, who throughout so many ages have not been enlightened by the preaching of the heavenly doctrine. Nor can we say, that their posterity were any better, upon whom the light has arisen, &c. Again (in Carmine de Ingratis, cap. 12,) Prosper shews that this was the very sentiment of the Pelagians, namely, that God of his own goodness was willing to call all men to grace, but that the will of some, their first light having been extinguished by their vices, had made itself unworthy of a second. But he contends, that on the contrary, examples may be produced (cap. 14) which shew that the hearts of the wicked, in whom nothing good had ever dwelt, and who had no sign or sense of righteousness, were converted by the power of God. The sum of the argument comes to this, That the grace of the Gospel is not given to men because they are judged worthy of it, since no man is found worthy of so great a gift; nor is it denied to men because they are more unworthy than others, since this light has been granted to the worst, while at the same time it has been denied to those who were less depraved. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the secret good pleasure of God, who, that his mercy may shine more conspicu- _ ously, does not regularly grant the light of the Gospel to those who have made a good or a less bad use of the light of nature, but on the contrary, calls to himself the slothful and the negligent, and unworthy and ungrateful sinners. And hence it appears, that God always remains free and that it is in no way inconsistent with his goodness to, give or not to give to any men the Gospel, and other means necessary for the application of the merits of Christ, according to the good pleasure of his will, no account being taken of man’s worthiness or unworthiness, or his greater or less unworthiness.
ARGUMENT 4. The same may be proved by the manifest inconsistencies by which the contrary opinion is maintained. For if by the death of Christ it has been universally obtained that God should be bound by a fixed decree or by some law of congruity as much as possible, to grant to all men individually the grace of the preaching of the Gospel, and of internal sanctification, then it would follow, that the primary reason why one is actually made partaker of both these gifts, and another is not, consists in this, that the one by opposing an obstacle repels this grace, or altogether prevents it from being offered to him, the other neither repels it nor hinders it. Our adversaries do not avoid this consequence. For they do not restrain the difference of the call of the Gospel and saving grace being denied or granted, to the mere will of God, but to various conditions or dispositions considered on the part of men. Thus Corvinus2 says, (contra Tilen. p. 489) Although the word of the cross is not preached every where, yet God is ready to announce it to all those who duly submit themselves to the ministry of the law, that is, who follow the light of the law of nature, which flourishes even in the hearts of heathens. And discoursing of natural gifts (p. 118) he says, That God has left these gifts to the Gentiles, that uf, according to the intention of God, they should use those gifts to glorify God, according to the measure of their knowledge, they should be led to Christ and the knowledge of himself ; but on the contrary, should be left in their ignorance, if they should hold the truth which they had in unrighteousness. Here he openly suspends the call of the Gospel on the use or abuse of natural gifts. The same Corvinus contends that internal quickening grace is so set before all men by an ordinary law, that the difference, why one man is actually made a partaker of this grace and another is not, is restrained to the difference of human wills, and not to the good pleasure of God. Yea, he says, That it is certain that the conversion of no individual in particular is intended by God (contra Boger. p. 263.) But although these things may be pleasing to human reason, they are contrary to the word of God, and may be overturned by manifest inconveniences. For if we admit, either that the external call of the Gospel, or that internal and effectual infusion of regenerating grace are given and deuied according to the various dispositions and operations of men ; it will follow, in the first place, That free-will in a corrupt state, not illuminated with the light of the Gospel, can make such good use of its own natural endowments, as that from thence God, according to his ordinary law, dictated to himself of his own goodness, may be bound to give spiritual grace to a natural man. But this is contrary to the Apostle, who says, (Rom. xi. 6) grace is no more grace, if it be of works. For, as Fulgentius says, (De Incarn. & Grat. Christi, cap. 18) We should not then receive it from the compassion of the Giver, but from the equity of retribution. Secondly, It would follow also, that the reason of predestination and preterition is to be assigned to the different qualities or actions of men, which all the orthodox oppose; since the reason of predestination, which is a preparation of grace, cannot be different from the reason of grace, which is the bringing of it into act. He, therefore, who teaches that the reason of grace being given or not given, is to be sought from hu- man dispositions or operations, necessarily seeks for the same reason of predestination and preterition. Thirdly, It would follow, that God would oppose a law made by himself, when he, as it were, forces grace upon those who place an obstacle to his grace, which the Apostle Paul most humbly confesses that he had done; and yet God mercifully called him to the knowledge and grace of Christ, when he was committing a flagrant sin and rushing against Christ. On which Fulgentius excellently observes (De Incarn. & Grat. cap. 18,) In what the mercy of God prevents us, or preventing what things it finds in us, the Teacher of the Gentiles shews us, not in any other, but in himself, saying, WHo was BEFORE a blasphemer, &c. Here he intimates, indeed, that all men are refractory until preventing grace subdues them. Fourthly, If it be admitted, that this giving or denying of grace, is according as human wills place an obstacle in the way or not, almost all the definitions in the Councils against the Pelagians will be set aside, such as, first, the decree against Pelagius in the Diospolitan Council,3 It is confessed, that grace is not given of merit, in order that it may be true grace, that is, given freely through his mercy, who hath said, Y witt HAVE MERCY ON WHOM I WILL HAVE MERCY. For that grace should be given or not given, according to the use made of natural endowments, as it may be rightly or not, or (as others say) according as a man does or does not what he can, is the same with the Fathers, as to be given of merit, and denied of demerit. Further, neither will the decree of the African fathers in their Synodical epistle4 stand good. Grace itself is in no way acknowledged, unless it be given, and as long as it is not in man, so long he necessarily opposes it in word or in work. How can it be understood, that the grace of the Gospel is to be given to heathens who are in the state of corrupt nature, as it were, on this condition, if they oppose no obstacle to grace, since so long as they are destitute of grace, they necessarily resist it, by the necessity indeed of a depraved disposition and habit. Lastly, they oppose the decrees of the Council of Orange (Canon 4) If any one contends that God waits for our will, in order to cleanse us from sin ; and does not confess, that even if we are willing to be cleansed, this desire is wrought in us by the operation and influence of the Holy Spirit, he opposes the Apostle. And Canon 6, Jf any one subjoius the help of grace to the humility and obedience of man, &c. he opposes the Apostle. I omit others. Let them explain to us, how God cannot be said to wait for the will of man, and to subjoin the help of supernatural grace to the obedience of the law of nature written in the hearts of men, if, the death of Christ being granted, according to his common mode of acting, God gives grace to all, if they make a right use of their natural endowments, and does not give it, if they do not make a right use of them. Since, therefore, all these things are far from the truth, it remains that we should say that God, notwithstanding the merit of the death of Christ, may and does give or deny the grace of applying this merit to individuals, according to the good pleasure and freedom of his own will, and not according to the merits or various operations of the wills of mankind.
ARGUMENT 5. Our opinion is confirmed by the useful ends which it serves to illustrate, and which are altogether abrogated by the contrary opinion. For example, if God, the death of Christ being admitted, be assumed nevertheless to distribute the grace by which it may be applied, or not to distribute to men, according to his own good pleasure, and not according to any disparity of human wills or actions, from thence will appear,—First, the absolute ie berty of God in the first conferring of grace; which Divine attribute in this thing is to be acknowledged by. all. I will give unto this man, even as unto thee, (Matt. xx. 14) is the voice of God asserting for himself his own liberty, even when the merits of men are unequal. But also, I will give to this man and not to thee is a word equally worthy of God, where all things on the part of men are acknowledged to be equal, and it equally goes to illustrate the supreme liberty of God, as St. Paul proves, Rom.ix. For although God were willing to be bound by the virtue and efficacy of the death of Christ, to give remission of sins to those who believe, and to give glory to those who are regenerate and ingrafted into Christ, yet he hath not willed that he should be obliged to give the Gospel to such and such nations or individuals, or to give faith and efficacious grace in consequence of considering any of their actions or dispositions in the state of corrupt nature, without Christ. They, therefore, go to diminish the Divine liberty which God hath reserved to himself, who teach that grace is communicated or denied to men according to their good or bad use of nature; which is the same as if they should say, That grace is prevented by nature.
Secondly, According to our opinion, that which the Scriptures urge so much, becomes conspicuous, viz. the gratuitous and special mercy of God in giving to some men both the light of the Gospel and saving grace. On which Prosper appositely remarks (De vocat. Gent. lib. 2, cap. 31,) There is some part of the human race, which is led by special benefits to eternal salvation. They altogether take away this special mercy, who think that by the death of Christ it was effected that God should offer the means of saving grace to all, but should leave to the special freewill of individuals whether they would obey or resist offered grace; so that if they oppose no obstacle, grace should be given them, but if they do, they should be deprived of grace. For according to the opinion of these persons, God did not shew any special mercy to Jacob or Peter, which he did not shew to Esau or Judas; but Jacob and Peter applied to themselves, by some special operation, what Esau and Judas neglected to apply. This Faustus of Rheis taught openly, (De lib. arbitr. lib. 1, cap. 10) who denied the special dispensation of God concerning the salvation of certain men; which he learnt from Pelagius, as may be seen from Prosper, (Carm. de Ingratis. cap. 10.) But Augustine thought otherwise (De bono persever. cap. 12,) The Lord gives to whom he will because he is merciful; and does not give to whom he will not, that he may make known the riches of his glory in the vessels of mercy.
Thirdly, According to our opinion it follows, that all occasion of glorying is taken away from men, and the glory of human salvation is wholly attributed to God, who distinguishes one man from another, according to the saying of the Apostle, (1 Cor.iv.7) Who maketh thee to differ? What hast thou that thou didst not receive? Fromwhom, says Augustine, but from him who maketh thee to differ from another, to whom he hath not given what he hath given to thee? (De pred. Sanct. cap. 9.) But if the opinion of those should be adopted, who think that by the death of Christ God is made equally benevolent towards all men, and contend that from this equal inclination towards all men, he so administers his grace, that whosoever makes a good use of the light of nature, or does what he can of himself, attracts this grace to himself, and he who makes a bad use of the same light, or does not do what he can of himself, does not obtain it; he who thus becomes a partaker of grace, has just ground of glorying in himself, because, by his own free-will, he made himself to differ from another, from whom he was not made to differ by any special gift of Divine mercy.
ARGUMENT 6. If, the death of Christ being supposed, according to the decree of God, the gift or denial of grace to individuals proceeds not from the absolute freedom of God, but from the difference of human wills and actions, then it is easy for any one to give an account why the Gospel was denied to one nation, why it was granted to another, and why faith, and quickening and regenerating grace is given to some individuals and not to others. For on the part of those that have it, it is answered, That the — light of the Gospel was given to them, because they made a good or not a bad use of the light of nature. On the part of those that have it not, it is answered, that they remain destitute of the light of the Gospel, because they have not made a good use of the light of nature. And so among Christians, if it should be inquired, why one man has faith and regenerating grace, and another has it not? on the part of those who have it, it is answered, Because they were willing to believe, and were unwilling to put any obstacle in the way ; and on the part of those who have it not, Because they would not believe, and would not remove the obstacle to grace. At the same time, there is not one word about the special call, according to his own purpose, wherewith God powerfully inclines the hearts of those to believe whom specially he is willing to pity. I now add, that it is the Pelagians who give so obvious a reason why grace is obtained or not on the part of men, and that it is condemned by all the orthodox ; who always limit the gift or denial of efficacious grace to the secret purpose of the good pleasure of God ; nor do they think that, the death of Christ being admitted, God is so bound to administer his own grace promiscuously, that to have it or not to have it, depends on the difference of human wills. We do not deny the demerit, unworthiness, and voluntary wickedness of those who remain without grace; but we assert, that all labour under this disease until they are healed by the remedy of special grace. Nor do any of the unregenerate by a better will than others, attract grace to themselves, but they receive a better will through efficacious grace given to them of the mere good pleasure of God, according to the saying of the Apostle (Rom. ix. 16,) It is not of him that willeih, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy ; and Phil. i. 13, It is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure. To this Prosper refers the difference between believers and unbelievers, (Ad excerpta Genuens. resp. ad Dub. 4) Many hear the word of truth, but some believe it, others speak against al, these therefore are willing to believe it, the others are unwilling. Who does not know this? Who will deny this? But since for some the will is not prepared by the Lord, tt is to be discussed what may come of mercy, and what of judgment. And a little after, AMercy and judgment are made in the wills themselves. To this secret good pleasure of God, and not to the difference of human wills applying or not applying themselves to offered grace, according to their own innate liberty, Augustine also every where refers the actual participation of grace, (De bono persever. cap. 8) Of two wicked men of adult age, why one is so called that he follows him that calls him, the other is either not called, or is not so calíed that he follows him that calls him, are the inscrutable judgments of God. And (De pred. Sanct. cap. 8) hesays, Why does not God teach all men? If we should say, because those whom he does not teach are unwilling to learn, an answer will be given to us, where it is said, Lurp, THOU WILT TURN AND QUICKEN Us.
Lastly, Aquinas himself does not think that any other reason is to be given why the gifts of saving grace are given to some individuals and not to others, beside the simple will of God. (Contr. Gent. lib. 3, cap. 161.) He says, Although he who sins puts an impediment in the way of grace, and as far as the order of things requires ought not to receive grace, yet sometimes of the abundance of his goodness, God prevents with his help those who offer an impediment to grace, turning them from evil, and converting them to good, &c. Afterwards he adds, He does not prevent with his help all who impede grace, but some, in whom he chooses to shew his mercy, as in others the order of justice is manifested. At length, lest we should refer it to the difference of human wills, that some obtain efficacious grace and are converted, and others do not obtain it and remain unconverted, he subjoins these words most worthy of observation, Since God, from among the men who are held under the same sins, by his preventing grace converts some, but endures others, or permits them to go on according to the order of things, the reason is not to be sought why he converts some and not others; for this depends on his simple will, in the same manner as it proceeded from his simple will, that when he made all things of nothing, some things were made more honourable than others. ‘ Such is the opinion of Thomas Aquinas. Therefore there is not any Divine decree established by the death of Christ concerning grace being administered promiscuously to all men, as it were, with this condition annexed, that individuals should become partakers or not of this grace, as they should put obstacles in the way or not; but the difference between those that place an obstacle in the way, and those who do not, is to be resolved into the mere good pleasure of God, as the primary and radical cause.
ARGUMENT 7. If the will of God, through the death of Christ, be understood as determined to administer grace to all men individually, by which they may apply Christ to themselves and be saved ; yet so, that those only receive and possess grace who have either made a good use of the light of nature, or have not opposed an obstacle to the grace which is offered to them, and all others do not receive grace, then the ultimate reason of obtaining or not obtaining grace and salvation, would not be attributed to the good pleasure of God, but to human free-will. The consequence is clear and strong; because by those who are of this opinion, God is presumed, on account of the death of Christ, to administer and offer to all men grace sufficient to apply Christ to themselves and to obtain salvation ; he is also presumed not to give saving grace to any one of his absolute or mere good pleasure. Thus the Remonstrants, in the declaration of their opinion about the third article of the Acts of the Synod of Dort, (p. 15) say, That the saving efficacy of grace depends not on the congruity of the calling of God (as some Papists assert), nor on the omnipotent power of God, as Prosper (Carm. de Ingr. cap. 14 and 15) and Augustine affirm, (Contr Julian. lib. 5, cap. 3; De pred. Sanct. cap. 2; De grat. & libr. arbit. cap. 20, and De corrept. & grat. cap. 14) but on such an operation as produees its effect most certainly, when man does not oppose that rebellion, which he can oppose from himself. As if they should say, that grace is effectual in certain individuals, because they do not oppose any obstacle to it, when they ought to say, that the reason why an obstacle is not opposed is, because God of his own good pleasure has given effectual grace. I now add a minor, and affirm that it is altogether averse from theology and from truth, to contend that any decree is established by the death of Christ, according to which the certain procuring of grace and salvation is referred, not to the absolute will of God, but to the determination of the human will. For the method of obtaining or not obtaining salvation, which is resolved into the freedom of the human will, was the first grace, which was given to the first Adam, as Augustine has rightly observed, (De corrept. & grat. cap. 11 and 12) but that is far more powerful which is given in Christ to all who are saved ; from which it arises that they should be willing and only witling, in order really to overcome the reluctant will of the flesh. Therefore, after Christ is given to us, this distinction, that some have that grace by which they apply Christ to themselves for salvation, and others have it not, is to be referred, not to the difference of human wills, but to the good pleasure of the will of God.
ARGUMENT 8. Our last argument is derived from the testimonies of the Fathers, who willingly confess, that to some persons, and that according to the good pleasure of the Divine will, those means and gifts are not granted, by which they may be able to believe in Christ and obtain salvation ; which God would never omit to do, if, the death of Christ being admitted, the goodness, wisdom, and justice of God required that it should be supplied to all men individually. Nor shall we quote only certain individual Fathers, but produce a few testimonies from those who were engaged with the Pelagians and Semipelagians. But I premise one thing worthy of observation, When we say that the orthodox Fathers who opposed Pelagius and the Pelagians, admit that grace is given to all men, out of regard to the death of Christ, the word grace is not to be extended beyond its proper limits (as the Pelagians formerly extended it). For whatever is graciously granted by God to men, may in some sense be called grace. Thus the light of nature with which God illuminates every man that comes into the world; that testimony of things created, by. which the heathen are directed to some knowledge of the Creator; those external benefits by which God testifies his philanthropy towards the whole world ; those internal motions with which he sometimes affects the minds of heathens, so as to restrain them from any evil work, or to excite them to any good work, may in this large sense claim the name of grace. The Pelagians concealed the poison of their pestilential doctrine under this general notion of grace. But neither do the Scriptures so understand the grace given by Christ, nor the holy Fathers, who, after the rise of Pelagius, learnt to speak more cautiously. Under the name of the grace of Christ, or saving grace, received in the sense of the Scriptures, those benefits and supernatural gifts alone are meant, which are directly ordained for obtaining salvation through Christ, but not infallibly : such as the preaching of the Gospel; the illumination of the minds of men in the mysteries of the faith, and, in one word, whatever supernaturally tends to unite men to Christ and place them in a state of salvation, yet does not of itself unite them to him, or translate them from a state of death to a state of salvation. This preaching and knowledge of the Gospel the Apostle has designated by the name of grace, (1 Cor. 1. 4, and ii. 11), and hence it is that St. Peter (1 Epist. iv. 10) calls preachers stewards of the manifold grace of God. So Augustine calls the Gospel itself, (De pecc. mer. & rem. lib. i. 22) the Christian grace; and Prosper calls it the grace of salvation, (De voc. Gent. lib. ii. cap. 17) and in this sense he affirms that some nations were living without the grace of God, (Sentent. 10, super Capit. Gallor.) namely, when they were living where no one preached to them the Gospel of Christ. There are also other supernatural gifts which place those who have them in a state of salvation. such as a good Will, Faith, Conversion, Regeneration, and, in short, those which belong only to men who are ingrafted into Christ and reconciled to God. And these Augustine thinks are to be properly called by the name of the grace of Christ. But the former, viz. the preaching and knowledge of Christian doctrine, he applies to this grace of Christ properly so called, so far as they serve to produce and promote it. In his book on the grace of Christ (Epist. 95, cap. 10, 47) he professedly treats of it, so as to shew, that by this name he means not the illumination of the mind and excitement of the will, but faith itself and the gift of a good will. This grace of Christ he paints in lively colours, and calls it the grace whereby we are justified from iniquity and are saved from infirmity ; the grace which we have not iu common with the wicked, but that whereby we become the sons of God. Let us now attend to the testimonies of the Fathers. First, we shall produce those which affirm that the grace of the preaching of the Gospel, the death of Christ being supposed, is due or given to all men, yea, affirm that it is denied to some, and that according to the purpose of the Divine will, which would never be done, if grace were due to all by the merit of the death of Christ. Augustine (de bono persev. cap. 8) observes, Of two wicked men of adult age, why one ts socalled, that he should obey the call, and another is either not called at all, or not effectually, is to be referred to the inscrutable judgments of God. Here he plainly acknowledges that some are not called at all. And (cap. 14) he teaches, that to some who by the supreme judgment of God are not separated from the mass of perdition, these means are not granted by which they might believe. In both of these passages he asserts the denial of means, and refers to the inscrutable abyss of Divine predestination, and not to the differences of human wills or actions, as the Pelagians and Semipelagians did. See also cap. 11, where he refers it to the will of God, and secret predestination, that God does not grant assistance to some. Prosper plainly asserts that the means of saving grace, or the call to grace, are denied to some, (Resp. 4 ad Cap. Gall.) where he does not repel this objection as false, That all men are not called to grace, but acknowledges that this may be truly said of all those, to whom he hath not made known the mystery of the cross of Christ, and the redemption of his blood. And (Sentent. 4) as afore-mentioned, We cannot say that there is a call of grace where there are as yet no sacraments of the Church. in which passage is to be observed, that he opposes those who defend the opinion of grace procured for and offered to all — for Christ’s sake, and who imagine, I know not what calling and sufficiency of grace, in the midst of the darkness of Paganism. What Prosper has spoken of little children, we may say of adults, (Resp. ad obj. 4) Let them be proved to be called in any way, to whom the planter could not preach, nor the waterer assist. Fulgentius, (lib. 1, de verit. Predest.) To men who are capable of reason, God either grants or denies means suitable to salvation, shelving his justice towards some, his mercy to others. His meaning is, That God sends or does not send preachers of the Gospel, according to his good pleasure; he sends when he is willing to shew his mercy ; he does not send when he chooses to manifest his justice. I add also from Fulgentius, that the common guilt which all men have contracted in Adam, suffices to justify the denial of the grace of the Gospel to any man. His words are, This grace of God by which we are saved is not given for any preceding good desert, nor yet is it denied for any preceding evil desert. For the first man transmitted. the deserts of his sin to all his posterity, &c. From which it appears, that according to the opinion of Fulgentius, original sin is a sufficiently just cause why the grace of Christ should be denied to any man. Which Aquinas himself acknowledges, (23 2® qu. 2% art. 5% resp. ad 1”) where he says, the help of grace is mercifully given to some, to others of justice it is not given, in punishment of preceding sin, at least of original sin. From all these things, we have what we proposed to confirm in the first place, viz. That there is no law decreed or appointed, by the merit of the death of Christ, for administering the means of the grace of the Gospel to the whole human race: but that God, notwithstanding any respect to the death of Christ, may of right deny, and actually has denied to some, even the call of grace.
Secondly, from the same Fathers we shall shew, that that grace, which we call by way of eminence the grace of Christ, that is, which makes a man to be a living member of Christ, and a partaker of salvation and eternal life, is not prepared and offered, much less given to all by the merit of the death of Christ, but is prepared and offered and given to some, and is not prepared for or given to others, and that according to the absolute good pleasure of God. Augustine (Contr. duas epist. Pelag. lib. 2, cap. 2) says, According to the purpose of God one is called, another is not called. To him who is called he gives gratuitously that which is good ; of which good, calling is the chief: to him who is not called, he renders evil, because all are guilty, since by one man sin entered into the world. From which words it appears that calling according to purpose, which communicates faith and love, and places man in a state of salvation, is given to some, and is denied to others. Moreover it is also evident, that this grace is given to them to whom it is given, not on account of any special obedience of the will of the person who receives it, but of the special mercy of God, who calls and inclines the will to obedience. It appears further, that the common guilt which all have contracted in Adam, is enough to defend the justice of God in respect of those whom he passes by as to the gift of saving grace, which even Bellarmin does not dare to deny, as may be seen (lib. 20, de Grat. & lib. arb. cap. 4.) A second testimony of Augustine is contained (lib. 4, Contra duas epist. Pelag. 6,) He who makes men his sheep, makes free the wills of men to the obedience of piety. But why he makes some men his sheep, and does not make others, is a question which pertains to that depth, which the Apostle desiring to look into, stopped and exclaimed, Ou, vag DEPTH of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out. — (Rom. xi. 33,) In these words, by making some and not others his sheep, he means nothing more than making some faithful and obedient, and not making others so. Both are attributed to God, and that according to the purpose of his secret will. Therefore there has not been established by the death of Christ such a decree, as some have formed, for preparing, offering, and giving to all men that grace by which they may be rendered believing and obedient, under the condition of free-will embracing it. A third testimony is taken from (De Pred. Sanctor. cap. 9,) Faith, both in its commencement and perfection, is the gift of God. And that this gift is granted to some and not to others, cannot be doubted at all by any who do not wilfully oppose the most plain words of Scriptures. But why it is not given to all, ought not to stagger the believer, who believes that from one all are under condemnation. He clearly teaches that the grace of faith is not given to all; and that there is no need of seeking any reason why this grace is not given, since that damnable state in which we were all born is sufficient to shew the justice of God, even if he should not give the grace of salvation to any mortal man. A fourth testimony is derived from the book (De corrept. & Grat. cap. 5.) where the unbelieving and rebellious are reproved in this manner, I should be rightly blamed, if I had it not (that is, faith and obedience) of my own fault, that is, if Icoudd give it to myself, or take it, and should not do so, or if God should give it and I should be unwilling to receive it. But when the very will is prepared by the Lord, why do you blame me, &c. Augustine answers in this manner, (cap. 6) The original depravity through which God is disobeyed, is of man, because by falling, through his own evil will, from that uprightness in which God at first made him, he became depraved. Therefore the damnable origin should be blamed, that from the grief of correction the will of regeneration may arise, if he who is corrected is a child of promise, that God may by his secret inspiration work within him both to will and to do. To this I add a passage very similar, from Epist. 105. Pelagius objects, What are we to do, who live wickedly, since we have not received grace from whence we should live well? Augustine replies merely, They cannot truly say they have done no evil, who of their own accord live wickedly. And a little after, They may impute this to themselves, who are of that mass, which God hath deservedly and justly condemned on account of the sin of one. tis to be observed, that in both these passages Augustine allows that there are some to whom God hath denied his grace; and also, that those to whom it is not given, cannot take it to themselves; and further, that original guilt and depravity is a sufficient reason why God should deny the grace of Christ to any one, according to his own will. Moreover, it is also to be observed, that Augustine does not imagine that the saving grace of Christ is any thing offered to the human will, which knocks in order that it may gain admittance, but something communicated, which heals and quickens the will to which it is given. The last testimony which we shall produce from Augustine is contained in Epist. 107, where he enumerates against the Pelagians twelve opinions relating to the catholic faith, the fourth of which is, We know that the grace of God is not given to all men. But lest any one should pretend, that by the death of Christ it was effected, that grace is prepared for and offered to all, although it may be possessed or not, according as men are willing or not to accept it ; this opinion also is excluded in the fifth and sixth: of which we shall speak more hereafter. From Augustine let us proceed to Prosper. He says (ad excerpta Genuens. resp. ad dub. 4, When the word of truth is preached, some willingly believe it, others do not believe it ; but it is because God opens the hearts of some, and does not open the hearts of others. Which is the same as if he had said, that the grace of faith is given to some, and denied to others. And (resp. ad dub. 8,) What else can we say of the Tyrians and Sidonians, than that it was not given to them to believe? But why it was dented to them, let them say tf they can, &c. Prosper asserts two things: first, that the gift of faith is denied to some men: secondly, that the cause why it is denied, is inscrutable. Lastly, in his book de Ingratis, (cap. 6) he states it to be an error of the Pelagians,
Quod sine delectu sen lex seu gratia Christi
Omnem hominem salvare velit; donümque vocantis
Sic sit propositum ut nullus non possit ad illud
Libertate suá proprióque vigore venire.
That without any choice, or law, or grace of Christ, he wills the salvation of every man; and the gift of calling is so proposed that there is no one but might come to tt by his own freedom and strength.
Then he paints the opinion of the Semipelagians in these colours, cap. 10;
Gratia qua Christi populus sumus hoccohibetur — :
Limite vobiscum, et formam banc adscribitis illi ;
Ut cunctos vocet ilia quidem invitetque, nee ulium
Preteriens, studeat communem adferre salutem
Omnibus, &c. '
The grace by which we become the people of Christ is restrained by you in this limit, and you ascribe this form to it ; that it calls and invites all, and not passing by any, endeavours to bring a common salvation to all, &c.
eso Dic, unde probes quod gratia Christi,
Nullum omnino hominem de cunctis qui generantur.
Przetereat ?
Tell me, from whence you can prove that the grace of Christ does not pass by any man at. all of all who are born? Therefore, any one who contends that grace is given to all, is esteemed by Prosper to have the fibres of Pelagian virulence. Let us now hear Fulgentius. In his book (de verit. Predest. Biblioth. Patr. tom. 6, p. 158,) he has these words, The holy Fathers who held the truth of Apostolical preaching most certainly knew, and left it in their books to be known, that the grace of Christ is not given to all men generally, A little after, We should not therefore think that the grace of God is given to all men. For all men have not faith, and some do not receive the love of God that they may be saved. In whom, nevertheless, it is the fault of the human will, that they do not believe or love God, which, as long as grace, the gift of God, does not change, either does not understand the commands of God, or despises them when understood, &c. Again, No man can desire, or ask for, or even know this grace, unless he should first receive it from God. What is more plain, if Fulgentius be believed, than that quickening grace is not given by God to all men, and that it cannot be possessed by any one to whom it is not given from above? If plainer words are wanted, I add (from the book de Incarnat. & Grat. Jesu Christi, p. 89,) God who prepares the will, himself also gives it. If God should not give it to man by his grace, man can never be willing to believe in God, because grace does not find this will, but works it in man. You see that the opinion of those Fathers who opposed the Pelagians and Semipelagians, is in agreement; That quickening and saving grace is not given to all men, and that a vitiated will can indeed, from its own depravity, loathe the grace which is not given to it, and repel it when it is offered in the external means, but it cannot lay hold of and take to itself this quickening grace by the strength of its own innate liberty.
But since the very marrow of Pelagianism consists in the way in which they pretend that quickening grace is administered to men by God, and is accepted by men, let us shew what the adherents to the Pelagian faction, and what the orthodox Fathers, state on this subject, by bringing forward the testimonies on both sides.
With respect to the Pelagians. They maintain that quickening and regenerating grace so flows to all men from the death and merit of Christ, through the mercy of God, that to be quickened and regenerated, or not to be quickened and regencrated, depends primarily on the will of man embracing or despising grace. To this then their opinion amounts, That saving grace is offered to all men, in Christ, of the pure mercy of God, but is given to no one of his absolute good pleasure. But if it should be particularly inquired, Why is the saving grace of Christ given to one, and not given to others? they answer, Because one is willing to receive it when it is offered, the other is unwilling. But let them speak for themselves. Vitalis of Carthage5 (apud Augustinum, Epist. 107) contends, that grace Sollows the will of man, and is given to men because they are willing to receive it. The remnants of the Pelagian heresy, the Massilians,f say, (apud Prosperum in Epist. ad Augustin.) As far as it pertains to God, eternal life is prepared Jar all; but as far as it relates to the freedom of the will, it is apprehended by those who of their own accord believe in God, and receive the help of grace through the merit of their believing. Pelagius himself says, (apud Augustin. de Grat, Christi. contra P. & C. lib. 1, cap. 31, p. 781) That men who make a good use of their free-will deserve the grace of God, but others having a free-will, by which they may come to faith, and merit the grace of God, through making a bad use of their freedom, are destitute of grace and incur damnation, Faustus of Rheis says, It is of the goodness of God, that man is called, it is of his own will that he readily obeys.
But let us turn from the antient Pelagians and Semipelagians, to those who abominate the naue of Pelagians, but are not averse from their error. In this class I place those Papists who teach that grace is efficacious through the consent of the human will; so that if it should happen that the will assented, then God would grant quickening grace, but if it should resist, then the operation of God, who is willing to quicken and regenerate the soul, is rendered vain, Among these also I think Arnünius and his disciples are to be numbered, who suspend the giving or denying of saving grace upon the will of man, so that they say, That God does not will the conversion and regeneration of any one of his absolute good pleasure, but that he wills the conversion and regeneration of all on this condition, viz. if they should not resist his exciting grace, but he leaves them unconverted, if they do resist it. Thus the Remonstrants speak, (Acta Synod. p. 21, Explic. 3, & 4 art.) If the reason be inquired why one is converted and not another, it is answered, One is converted because God converts him, since he does not oppose new contumacy ; the other is not converted, because he opposes a new contumacy. In which they state the reason of the gift and denial of Divine and saving grace to arise from the different acts of the human will, but a deep silence is always observed by them on the subject of God removing, of his special mercy, the stony and rebellious heart, or his not removing it, according to the liberty of his own will. Thus also Corvinus does not ascribe it to the difference of Divine, but of human will, that we have or have not that grace by which we are converted and saved. (Contra Bogerman, p. 263.) I¢ is certain, the conversion of no one in particular is intended by God. A little after, Granting all the operations which God makes use of to effect conversion in us, still conversion remains so much in our power that we cannot be converted. Such is their opinion.6
But very different is that of the holy and orthodox Fathers. They taught that the grace which quickens, regenerates, and converts the soul, was not given or denied according to the assent or dissent of free-will, but according to the gratuitous and absolute will of God, as he is willing or unwilling to take away the innate hardness of the human heart. Let us produce Augustine in the first place, who, always admitting the accomplishment of the work of human redemption on the cross, contends that some have grace because God of his special mercy hath wrought in them that they should receive it; and that others have it not, because God did not choose to soften their rebellious hardness by having compassion upon them. What he has stated is very plain, (Retract. lib. 1, cap. 10) What I have said, that all men are able to turn themselves to fulfil the commands of God, if they are willing, let not the Pelagians think that is spoken according to their opinion. For it is altogether true that all men can do this if they will; but the will is prepared by the Lord, and ts so much increased by the gift of love, that they are able to do it. From which words it appears, that the conversion of the human will to God does not depend on this condition, if it is willing to obey of its own excitement; but that the will and the power depend on the preparation of God, and the gift of love. Again, Augustine says, (Epist. 107) How is it said, that all men would receive grace, if those to whom it is not given did not refuse it of their own will, when it is not given to many infants. who have not a contrary will? And shortly after, How are the merits of the human will weighed in this matter, since those to whom that grace is not given are in a similar condition with those to whom it is given, and yet by the just judgment of God it ts not gives to them? But let us hear the sentiments of others. Prosper says, Who disputes that free-will becomes obedient to the exhortation of him: that calls, when the grace of God hath begotten in it the desire of believing and obeying? The grace of God is not therefore given to the will on condition of obedience, but having been given, it produces obedience. Aguiin (De vocat. Gent. lib. 1, cap 18,) The will of God is the cause of receiving grace in all men of every condition and age; with him the reason of election is concealed ; from that grace desert arises, but tt is veceived without merit. This testimony is to be observed, because although this author, whoever he was, contends that the help is not totally taken away from any men, yet he does not think that it is so offered to all, that the difference why one receives it and another does not, is referred to this, that one is willing to receive it, the other to resist it; but he refers the cause of the reception of grace to the secret election of God, and consequently also the cause of its not being received, as far as it is a mere denial, to the secret non-election of God. But if it should be considered as a moral omission on the part of men who resist grace, then it is to be referred to the corruption of mankind. But to proceed. Fulgentius every where refutes this error of the Pelagians, who think that saving grace is procured for and offered to all men in Christ the Redeemer, as it were on this condition, that some should have it, because they were willing to receive it, others should be destitute of it, because they chose to repel it. But he teaches that a good will was given to some, and that it could not but be repelled by all to whom it is not given. We produced some of his testimonies before, we will now subjoin some others. (Lib. 1, de ver. Predest. p. 158,) Not indeed because we will, do we receive grace, but neither is grace given tous whilst we are willing. A little after, p. 159, Grace alone prodaces a good will in us, it alone gives faith to the will, The will, which has not faith, cannot have any merit of faith to be received, because not to have faith is to displease God. Again, (lib. 2, not far from the beginning, p. 160) Jt is the part of God to give his grace to what men he will, and as much as he will. He does not give it as due to the wills or works of men, but being merciful and kind, he gratuitously pours it into the hearts of those whom he has enlightened. And therefore he freely grants it to whom he will, and as much as he will, because he is not invited by any beginning of good will, nor by the effect of any good work, before he bestows grace. These things are a death-blow to Pelagian and also to Arminian sentiments, which state that quickening and saving grace (of which Fulgentius speaks) are prepared or given to no one according to the purpose of the election of God, but are contingently given or denied to some according to the different condition of the human will obeying or opposing it: which theology displeased even the sounder Papists. A few testimonies of whom we shall add by way of overweight.
Dominicus Bannes (in 1, Aquin. qu. 32, conclus. ult. p. 278) says, God determined from eternity, by a will either ab solute or consequent, not to give to all men supernatural assistance. But tf any one should inquire why he rather confers these gifts on some persons in particular, but deuies them to others, this depends on the simple will of God, neither is any reason of it to be sought, as Augustine and Thomas teach us. A little after, Therefore let the Christian and humble divine learn with Thomas and Augustine to be ignorant, rather than with the curious to be wise more than he ought, lest he should fall into the Pelagian heresy, by referring a difference of this kind to free-will, as tts first and radical cause, namely, Because one was willing to be converted, the other was not willing. He adds further what strikes at the sinews of the Pelagian and Arminian theology, The concurrence of free-will is an effect necessarily consequent, by the necessity of consequence, from Divine efficacious aid. In these words the learned Bannes rejects and condemns the opinion of those who contend that regenerating and saving grace are procured for and set before all men on account of the merit of Christ. And he also refutes those who resolve the reason why some are regenerated or converted, and others are not, into the willing and refusing of mankind. And he further teaches, that our concurrence or non-resistance, that is, our being willing is the necessary effect of effectual grace given, and therefore is not the reason of its being given or received.
Alvarez (De auxiliis Divine grat. disp. 58, p 262) says, If we should assert that there was a law made by God, for in- Jallibly giving effectual aid to those that well used, or were willing to use sufficient aid of their own innate liberty alone, then the beginning of effectual grace would be from nature, and from the innate liberty of the man, who is willing to make a good use of sufficient aid. This is the very law or decree of God which is contended for with such earnestness by Arminius, Corvinus, and other Divines of the same school. For they say, that sufficient grace is given to all, on account of the merit of Christ, the Mediator; but that effectual grace, or that which actually converts and regenerates, is given on this condition, if they make a good use of it when it excites them, or is sufficient for them; that is, if the will, being excited by grace and made able, puts forth its innate power of willing; which is ascribing the beginning of effectual grace to nature. Alvarez says again, (ibid.) This conclusion is false ; Because man being excited by God is willing to consent, therefore he is assisted. But this is true: Because man being excited by sufficient grace is assisted with effectual aid, therefore he co-operates. Which he fully proves (Disp. 99,) where he also asserts that this proposition is most true, Because God wills that man should will, therefore man wills. These things are diametrically opposed to the opinions of the Arminians, who deny that any antecedent will of God is the cause why some believe rather than others, and are converted and effectually saved ; and refer all this difference to the antecedent will of men, who, when they are excited by grace common to others, are willing beyond others to believe, to convert themselves, to lay hold of salvation.
William Estius,7 formerly Professor in the Academy of Douay, (in 1 Sentent. disp. 46, sec. 2, p. 222) says, We ought not to imagine in God any will, desire, or endeavour, by which he wills, endeavours, strives, and as far as he can ef- Sects, that all men should be saved. which nevertheless does not therefore follow, because the bad will of man resists his good will, and through its prevailing and hindering, the will of God ais frustrated. But this is almost all which some contend was procured by the death of Christ, namely, that God, by offering saving grace to all men promiscuously, is willing to save those who of their own accord apply themselves to obtain his grace, and condemns those who resist it.
In the last place, Bellarmin may be produced, who does not acknowledge that there is any decree of God connected with the death of Christ, by which God hath determined to give effectual or actually regenerating grace to all men on this condition, If they should not refuse it of their own will. (Lib. 1, de Grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 12) He rejects the opinion of those who teach that it is in the power of men to make that grace effectual, which otherwise would not of itself be more than sufficient. He shews that they oppose Augustine and the holy Scriptures, who say, that all men would receive the grace of God, if those to whom it is not given did not refuse it of their own will. (Page 423.) And further, he urges his opinion with this objection, That af effectual calling did not depend on the purpose of God, but on human will, no room would be left for predestination. To which may be added (lib. 1, cap. 1, p. 455,) We believe that God of his absolute will will save many, both children and adults, and that of his absolute will he will not save others. (See Augustini Enchiridion, cap. 102, 103.)
But to what purpose are so many testimonies concerning grace and free-will, when we are employed in explaining the question concerning the death of Christ, as far as it is considered as an universal cause of human salvation? Truly, because the Pelagians formerly taught, and many are now fallen into the same opinion, which asserts, That, through the death and merit of Christ the Redeemer, saving or effectual grace is equally set before all men, to be granted on this condition, If they should not refuse it of their own will; and is denied on this condition, If they should refuse it: as if the death of Christ had been granted to men of the pure mercy of God, but effectual or saving grace flowed to men according as they made a good or bad use of their free-will in exciting, embracing, or repelling grace, and salvation was given to those who were willing to be saved from the fountain of their own willing, as Prosper sang, (lib. de Ingratis, cap. 6.)
In this Dissertation then,-concerning the universal efficacy of the death of Christ, as it was our design to shew, against those who endeavour to limit it, That it was a kind of universal covenant, established with the whole human race, concerning the giving of remission and eternal life to all men individually on condition of faith;—so it was also to be demonstrated, against those who extend this universal efficacy of the death of Christ beyond its proper limits, That no law, no decree was established, in the appointment of the death of Christ, concerning the giving of the means of supernatural grace, or concerning the giving of saving or effectual grace itself to all men on the condition, If they make a good or not a bad use of the light of nature; or on the condition, If of their own will they should not refuse it. Therefore, the death of Christ being granted, God is bound by his faithfulness, according to the covenant of the Gospel, to give remission of sins and eternal life to every one that believes and repents; but by no covenant is he bound to give faith itself, love, or saving grace to him that excels another in acting by the strength of his free-will. Moreover, the gift or denial of effectual and saving grace, the death of Christ being granted, remains as free to God, as the gift of Christ himself was, which is understood not to be due or given to any acts of the human will. Therefore the obtaining or not obtaining of effectual and saving grace, is to be referred in its first origin, to the purpose of God in shewing mercy and pity, or not shewing it; and not to the free-will of man choosing or not choosing. Hitherto we have disputed of the death of Christ as far as its virtue and efficacy pertains to all men. In what follows, we shall explain it as far as it is limited to the elect children of God.
* BnapwanDINE (Thomas) a learned English Divine of the 14th Century. He was born at Hartfield, in Sussex, and educated at Merton College, Oxford, where he took the degree of D.D. and became Proctor and Divinity Professor of the University, and after being appointed Chancellor of the Diocese of London, attended Edward III. as his Confessor during his warsin France. Whilst so situated, a vacancy occurred in the See of Canterbury, and the Monks elected him Archbishop; but Edward, who was fond of his company, refused to part with him. Another vacancy happening soon after, the Monks elected him a second time, and Edward yielded to their desires, and Bradwardine was consecrated Archbishop in 1349 ; but he died 40 days after his consecration at Lambeth, and was buried at Canterbury. He excelled in Mathematical knowledge, and wrote several treatises on that science which have been published; among them is one on the quadrature of the circle. He was most distinguished, however, for his accurate and solid investigations in Divinity ; and is best known as the author of a book against Pelagianism, entitled De Causa Dci. ‘The reader unacquainted with it, but desirous of knowing something of the contents of a thick and closely printed Latin folio, or of the nature of a work as profound in argument as it is elaborate in illustration, may consult Milner, who, in Vol. IV. of his Church History, has given a good account of it. The original itself is well worthy of examination, if it were only to convince some of the would-be-thought theologians of our time, that humility and reserve would become them better than a jejune expression of opinions on suhjects which have so occupied men of gigantic minds; and to display to others the deep piety and ardent devotion which existed with solid learning, extensive acquirements, and a lofty genius. The fame of this work, it is said, led Chaucer, in his * Nuns’ Priests’ tale,” to rank Bradwardine with St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. An Apologue in this treatise appears to have furnished Parnell with the story of his beautiful Poem “ The Hermit.”— The best Edition is that by Sir Henry Saville, printed at London, in 1618. Vol. II. p. 477 ↩
* John Arnold Corvinus was not more distinguished as a lawyer than as a theologian. During the theological disputes which raged in Holland in the former part of the 17th Century, he espoused the side of the Remonstrants or Arminians, among whom he laboured as a minister. Disgusted with the persecutions to which he was exposed, he was obliged in 1622 to retire into the Duchy of Sleswig, whence he proceeded into France. He was admitted Doctor of Law at Orleans, and afterwards practised as an advocate at Amsterdam, where he was appointed professor of Law. Besides various excellent works on the civil law, some of which are deservedly es. teemed to this day, he wrote several theological pieces, the most distinguished of which is his Defensio Sententie Jac. Arminii de predestinatione, gratiá Dei, libero hominis arbitrio, &c. adversum Daniclem Tilenum. Lugduni, 1613, 8vo. He is said to have converted his adversary. Corvinus died in 1650. (Biographie Universelle, tom. X. p. 27.) Vol. II. p. 487 ↩
* This Council was convened in the year 418, by two Bishops of Gaul, Heros and Lazarus, who joined with Orosius, a Spanish Priest of that period, and drew up a Petition embodying the errors wherewith they charged Pelagius, as contained in his books, and taught by Coelestinus his disciple. This accusation was preferred to a synod of fourteen Bishops, held at Diospolis, antiently called Lydda, a city of Palestine. Eulogius of Ceesaria was President, and John of Jerusalem held the second place. Pelagius appeared and disowned the errors attributed to him. Augustine has recorded the acts of this Council in the Book of Pelagius’s acts, and has also given an abridgment of them in his 106th Letter.——Vide Du Pin and Milner, Vol. II. p. 489 ↩
* This refers to a Council held about the same period and on the same occasion as above described. Vol. II. p. 490 ↩
* ViTALIS was a Spaniard contemporary with Augustine, and considered as the founder of tlie Semipelagians. Before he fell into the errors here attributed to him, he had been bewildered on other grounds, and wrote his Diocesan, Capreolus Bishop of Carthage, to know if he might say, that God is born of a Virgin. ——Vide Du Pin, Vol. II. Cent. 5, p. 49. Vol. II. p. 505 ↩
† These were Presbyters of Marseilles originally called Massalia. Pelagianism having lost its first ground, these men took refuge in the more specious notions of Vitalis.— Vide Milner, Vol. II. p. 388. Vol. II. p. 505 ↩
* William Estivs, an eminent Dutch divine of the Roman communion ; he was born at Gorcum, in Holland, about 1542. After he had finished his Classical studies at Utrecht, he studied Divinity and Philosophy at Louvain, where he taught those studies for ten years; and afterwards became Professor of Divinity in the University of Douay, was subsequently elected to the Chancellorship, and died there in 1613. He was equally distinguished for his learning, modesty, and benevolence. Of his numerous works, the following are most known, viz. 1. Commentarii in quatuor libros Sextentiarum. Douai, 1615. 4tomis,fol. Du Pin says that this is one of the best theological works of which the Roman Church can boast. 2. Annotationes in precipua difficiliora Scripture loca, Antverpie, 1621, folio: of this work, which appears to have been highly esteemed, there were several Editions. 3. In omues B. Pauli et aliorum. Apostolorum Epistolas Commentaria. Douai, 1614, 2tomis, folio. Du Pin commends this as one of the best works of the kind; but it appears that Estius was prevented by death from proceeding further than 1 John v., and that the rest of the Commentary was supplied by Bartholomew De la Pierre. (Vide Chalmers’s Biographical Dictionary, and Moreri. ) Vol. II. p. 510 ↩
