William Jenkyn
The nature of the subject, and indeed, the very expressions of the Apostle, of not keeping, and leaving, puts us upon explaining three particulars.
1. What was the original cause that these angels made a defection; or that they kept not their first estate.
2, What was that first sin whereby this defection was made, or, their first estate not kept.
3. In what degree and measure it was made, it being here said, they kept not their, &c. but left their own, &c.
1. For the first.
1. God, who is infinitely and perfectly good and holy, the fountain of all goodnesse, and goodnesse it self, was not the cause of the sinfull defection of these angels; nor had it been justice in God to have condemned them, for that which himselfe had caused; or to make them fall, and then to punish them for falling: And whereas it is objected, that God might have hindred them from falling, therefore he was the cause thereof. I answer, 1. Not every one who can hinder an evill is accessary to it, unlesse he be bound to hinder it; but God was not here so bound. Angeli & homines ex officio debeut Deo. Deus nihil debet nisi ἐξ εὐδοκίας, quum se ipse obstring it ultro, ex promissionibus gratiae. Illi ex natur â debent; Deo natura debetur ipsa. Junius in loc. Asserunt malam esse naturā, quae immutari nullo modo potest. Aug. con. 2. ep. Pet. Nor oweth he any thing to any of his creatures, further then he bindeth himselfe. Angels and men are bound to God Ex officio, by duty: nothing from God is due to them, but of his own good will and pleasure, when freely and of his own accord he binds himself to them by his promise of grace. Angels and men owe to God all they are, all they have, all they have lost; they are debtors to God by nature, and even nature it selfe is owing to God.
2. Nor secondly, Were the angels made to sin (as the Manichees fondly and falsly imagined) by some first evill cause, which (as they held) was the original and fountain of all sin; and whereby a necessity of sinning lay upon creatures from the very being of nature, which therefore could not be changed from being evill, but was so, unavoidably, unalterably.
3. Nor thirdly, Do I conceive that this sin of the angels proceeded from any error or ignorance in their understanding before their sin, as if their understanding first judged that to be good, which was not, and therefore they afterwards sinn’d in willing and embracing that good; for this were to make them erroneous before they were unholy; miserable, before they were sinfull; whereas the ignorance of that which ought to be known is a part of sin, and all misery is a fruit of sin. Illa ignorantia five error secundùm quem omnis peccans ignorat et errat, propriè non est causa peccati, sed potius aliquid peccati. Peccat enim homo eo ipso, quòd ratio pravè judicat. Peccat inchoativè, sicut consummativè peccat, in eo quod voluntas malè eligit. Nam omne peccatum quasi duabusillis partibus constat, &c. Error judicii non est separandus à peccato, sed in plena ejus ratione includitur. Estius in l. 2. sent. dist. 22. That ignorance or error (saith Estius) whereby he who sins is ignorant and erroneous, properly is not a cause of sin, but something of sin; for a man who judgeth amisse, sins inchoatively; as he whose will chuseth wickedly, sins consummatively and compleatly; for all sin (he saith) doth as it were consist, and is made up of two parts, false judgement, and evill election; and the error of judgement is not to be separated from sin, but to be included in, and Involvitur ignorantia malae electionis sub ipso malae electionis peccato, tanquam aliquid ei intrinsecum: propriè dicimus omnem qui peccat, eo ipso quo peccat, errare: impropriè autem omnem peccantem ex errore peccare. Id. ib. involved under the sin it selfe of evil election, as something intrinsecall to it; and that every one who sins, properly is said to err in that he sins, and improperly said to sin, by, or from error. And thus the soundest among the Schoolmen, answer the Objection against the possibility of the fal of the angels, taken from this ground, that every sin proceeds from ignorance; which cannot (say they) be true of the sin of the angels.
4. Fourthly, I conceive that sin, being a defect, a privation of good, and a want of due rectitude, hath not properly any cause whereby it may be said to be effected or made. Sin is not a nature or a being, for then it should be a creature, and appetible (every creature desiring it’s being) and by consequence good. Nor yet is it a meer negation of good, for then the bare absence of any good belonging to another creature, would be a mans sin. But sin is a privation of that good, which hath been, and should be in one. Now in regard sin is a privation and defect, Let none (they are the words of Augustine) enquire after the efficient cause of an evill and sinfull will, of this their being not an efficient, Nemo quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis; non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens. Causas defectionum istarum, cum efficientes non sint, sed defiicientes, velle invenire, tale est, ac si quisquam velit videre tenebras, vel audire silentium, quod tamen utrumque nobis notum est, ne que illud nisi per oculos, neque hoc nisi per aures, &c. Aug. l. 12. d. c. D. c. 7. Vitio depravari, nifiex nihilo facta, natura non posset: per hoc ut natura sit ex eo habet, quod à Deo facta est; ut autem ab eo à quo facta est, deficiat, ex hoc, quod de nihilo facta est. Aug. de civ. Dei. l. 14. c. 13. Non ex conditione naturae, sed ex dono gratiae. Aquin. par. 1. q. 63. Esti. dist. 7. § 9. Solum illum actum à rectitudine declinare non contingit, cujus regula est ipsa virtus agentis: si enim manus artificis esset ipsa regula incisionis, nunquam possit artifex nisi rectè lignum incidere: sed si rectitudo incisionis sit ab alia re gula, contingit incisionem esse rectam, vel non rectam; Divina autem voluntas sola est regula sui actus, quia non ad superiorem finem ordinatur; omnis autem voluntas cujustibet creaturae rectitudinem in suo actu non habet, nisi secundùm quod regulatur. Id. Ib. but onely a deficient cause; for to depart from that which is chiefe and highest, to that which is lesse and lower, is to begin to have an evill, and a sinfull will: To enquire therefore after the causes of that defection, when as they are not efficient, but deficient, is as if a man would go about to see darknesse, or to hear silence: both which notwithstanding, are known to us; the former by the eye, the later by the ear; and yet not by any species, or representation, but by the privation thereof: darknesse cannot be seen, unlesse it be by not seeing: nor silence perceived, unlesse by not hearing.
5 The originall or beginning of the sin of these Angels, was the defectibility and mutability of their own will; whereby, though for the present, they willed that which was good, and might have willed to have persevered therein; yet being mutable, they might also will evill, and so fall from God. Every creature as its made of nothing, may again, unlesse sustained by God, return to nothing; and in that respect it was that the intellectuall creature might make a defection from him who created it, and deviate from the rule of divine righteousnesse: for (as St Augustine observes) the being of nature comes from hence, that its made by God: the defection of nature from hence, that its made of nothing. If there be any creatures therefore, which cannot sin, they have not this from the condition of nature, but from the gift of the grace of God: And Aquinas seems to argue rightly, that according to the condition of nature, none is exempted from a possibility of sinning, but only God: in regard that sin being the declining of an act from the rectitude of the rule, it is onely impossible for that act not to decline from rectitude, the rule of which, is the very power and will of the agent; for (as he well illustrates it) if the hand of the artificer, were the very rule of cutting a piece of timber, the artificer could not but cut the wood evenly and rightly; but if the rectitude of the cutting, be by another, an externall rule, the cutting may either be right, or not right. The divine will is onely the rule of his act, as not being ordained to any higher end: but the will of every creature hath in its act no rectitude, but as it is regulated by the will of God, which is its ultimate end. And hence it is, that notwithstanding the nature of the intellectuall creature was good, yet evill is said to arise and proceed from it; and that Augustine so frequently, and others after him, assert, that evill hath its originall and beginning from that which was good: For though evill doth not proceed from good, (saith Saint Augustine) as that good was made by God, yet it did proceed from good, Vid. l. 1. cont. Jul. Pelag. c. 3. as that good was made of nothing, and not of God. And whereas it is objected against this, that a good tree cannot bring forth evill fruit; Catholica fides dicit, non prolatum esse malum, nisi de bono; & iniquum, nisi de justo; ex bouis mala orta sunt. Et de nup. & concup. c. 28. Ecce ergo ex bono oritur malum, nec fuit omnino unde oriri posset nisi ex bono: nec ideo tamen potuit ex bono criri malū, quia bonum factum est à Deo, sed quia de nihilo factum est, non de Deo. Vide August. in. Enchirid. cap. 15. Nec fuit prorsus unde primitus oriretur voluntas mala, nisi ex angeli & hominis natura bona. Esti. in l. 2. dist. 34. §. 1. therefore evil could not arise from the nature of angels; and the angels could not sin of themselves: it’s answered by the fore-mentioned Father, That though a good tree cannot bring forth evill fruit, yet good ground may bring forth evill plants; out of the same soil may grow both thorns and vines: and though from the good act of the will, sin cannot arise, yet out of the same nature, may sprout and arise a will either good or evill. Nor was there any beginning, from whence at first a sinful will should arise, but from the intellectuall nature which was created good. Nor doth this defectibility of the intellectuall creature at all countenance the profane cavils of those, who hence would needs inferre, That God might have made the world better then he did; and that he had done so, if he had made the intellectual creature free from all possibility of sinning. For 1. It is a Question (though perhaps too curious) and by some learned among the Schoolmen diversely maintained, whether it was possible for any creature to have been made impeccable by nature, Johan. Major. in 2 dist. 23. q. Ambr. l. 3. de fid. ad Grat. l. c. 2. Una sola substantia divinitatis quae mori nescit. Anima moritur, nec angelus immortalis, &c. in angelis naturae capacitas vitio obnoxia. Nec ex immortali natura habet, sed ex gratia, si se ad vitia non mutat. Hierom in 6. Gal. Exceptâ Trinitate, omnis creatura etiamsi non peccat, tamen potest peccare. Aug. cont. Max. cap. 12. Jun. in Jud. Creaturarū natura coelestium moripotuit, quia peccare potuit. Angeli qui non peccaverunt, peccare potuerunt. Per hoc solus Deus habet immortalitatem, quia non cujusquam gratiâ, sed naturâ suâ, &c. Greg. de Val. q. 14. punct. 1. Aquin. 1. p. q. 63. Esti. l. 2. d. 7. Etiamsi ab initio tales conditi fuissent quales nune per gratiam confirmationis facti sunt, nec sic tamen ex conditione naturâ impeccabiles essent, sed ex dono gratiae; quod etsi hactenus naturale dici posset, quia cum ipsa natura datum esset, & in natura insitum, eâ dem tamen naturâ, atque essentiâ salvâ, posset auferri. Solus Deus est qui non gratiâ cujuspiam, sed naturâ suâ, non potest, nec potuit, nec poterit peccare. Aug. l. 3. cont. Max. c. 12. or free from all possibility of sinning. Some of them indeed determine it affirmatively: but herein they oppose the Fathers, Ambrose, Augustine, and Hierome. The two former of whom teach, that, because its said that God only hath immortality, it follows, that he only hath immutability, and so by consequence, only by nature impeccability. The same argument is also used by the learned Junius, who denyes that simply God could have made the Angels better then they are by nature, because then they should have been most constant in their own perfect goodnesse by themselves, which can only be attributed to God. Also to the forecited Fathers, agree the Schoolmen of the greatest note, among whom Estius asserts, That supposing that the Angels had been from their beginning created such as they are now made to be by the grace of confirmation, yet even so they had not been impeccable, or free from a possibility of sinning, by the condition of nature, but by the gift of grace: which although it may be termed naturall, as given with, and implanted in their nature: yet it might have been taken away and removed, without the destruction of their nature. And he saith, Its no derogation from the power of God, that a Creature cannot be made by nature impeccable: for the thing spoken of is not in the number of possibles; Res de qua agitur non est de numero possibilium. Includit enim contradictionem, ut quod creatum est, i.e. ex nihilo productum, deficere non possit. Ideo non potest Deus facere creaturā ex natura impeccabilem, quia facere non potest ut creatura non fit creatura. Siquidem eo ipso quo creata est, defectibilis est, Deo potente subtrabere vel esse, vel operari, vel ipsius operationis rectitudinem, ex quo manifestum est, non negatione, sed positione creaturae per naturam impeccabilis derogari potentiae Dei. Est. in 2. sent. Dist. 7. § 9. and it is a contradiction to say, that a Creature, that is, a thing made of nothing, should not be able to change, and that therefore God cannot make a creature by nature immutable, because he cannot make that a creature should not be a creature; which as such, is defectible, God being alwayes able to withdraw its being, or the operation of its being, or the rectitude of its operation. Whereby (saith he) its manifest, that not by the denying, but by the granting that a creature may be impeccable by nature, we derogate from the power of God.
But 2. I answer with Aquinas p. 1. q. 36. a. 2. that God appointing an inequality in the things which hee created, hereby made the world after the best manner. The perfection of the whole, requires, that there should be an inequality in the severall Creatures, that so there might be all degrees of goodnesse made up: and this is one degree of goodnesse, that somthing be so good, that there should bee an impossibility for it ever to swerve from its goodnesse; and another degree of goodnesse is, that some things should bee made defectible, and in a possibility of leaving their goodnesse. And as the perfection of the world requires, that there be not only incoruptible, but also corruptible creatures; so likewise, that there should be some things defectible from goodnesse. If angels might have been made more excellent in themselves, yet not in relation to that goodly order, and admirable beuty which God hath caused in the world, by making them in that capacity wherein they were created. A Captain, a Colonel, are better then a common souldier in an army; but yet its better for the order and beuty of the army, that some should be common souldiers, and commanded, than that all should be Officers and Commanders. And God (as Aug. Ench. c. 11.27. Melius judicavit de malis bene facere, quam mala nulla esse permittere. Augustine saith) thought it better to bring good out of that which was evil, then not at all to suffer evil to be. For he that is perfectly good, would not suffer evil in his works, unlesse he were so omnipotent, as to bring good out of that evil.
2. By way of explication of this second branch, 2d Branch. it may be enquired, what was that first sin, whereby this defection was made, or this first estate of the angels not kept. And here sundry opinions offer themselves.
Some falsly expounding that place of Gen. 6.2. Philo. Orig. Josephus, Irenaeus, Justin Mart. in Apol. pro Chr. Clem. Alex. strom. l. 3 Tertul. l. de hab. mul. Lactant. The sons of God saw the daughters of men, that they were fair, and they took them wives, &c. imagined, that the angels being taken with the love of women, sinn’d by lust. Strange it is, that so many learned men among the ancients, should embrace an opinion so flatly opposite to Scripture and reason. For not to speak of the spirituall nature of angels, whereby they are incapable of Carnall and sensible pleasures, or of the different nature of their (by some supposed) bodies from ours, theirs being (if they be at all) not compounded of the elements, but so pure, and thin, that its impossible they should be fit for generation; the Scripture plainly teacheth that the angels fel from their integrity before there were any daughters of men in being; besides, Christ tels us, that the angels in heaven neither marry, nor are given in marriage, Mat. 22.3. Others conceive that the first sin of the angels was hatred of God; Odium omne ex amore est. Nascitur odium Dei tanquam prohibentis amantem ab eo quod inordinatè amat. Est. in 2. l. sent. dist. 6. §. 2. the adhering of the angels unto God being by love, their departure from God (they say) must needs be by hatred; but this opinion seems false, because hatred of God must needs proceed from inordinate love of something else, God being hated because he hinders the creature from something which it loves inordinately. Hatred therefore could not be the first sin, but the irregular affecting of something else, or some other sin.
A third opinion is of those who hold, that the first sin of these angels, was envying the dignity of man, in being created after the image of God; but this is confuted by Augustine, who saith, That pride must needs go before envy; and that envy was not the cause of pride, but pride the cause of envy; for none can by envy hate anothers excellency, unlesse by pride he first inordinately love his own, Superbi endo invidus, non invidendo quisquam superbus est. Aug. Invidus ex hoc, de bono alterius dolet, in quantum bonum alterius aestimat sui boni impedimentum. Aquin. 1. p. q. 63. a. 2. Bern. in Cant. ser. 22. Greg. l. 34. moral. c. 14. Ambros. in Psal. 37. Hierom. in Es. 14. August. l 12. de Civ. Dei c. 6. Ab illo qui summus est aversi ad se conversi sunt, & hoe vitium nihil aliud est quam superbia. Proprium objectum superbiae est excellens mensuram à Deo praefixam. Bona vero spiritualia cum secundum se excessiva esse non possunt, consequens est, ut ex hoc primum habeant rationem vitiosi appetibilis, ex quo primum habent rationem excedentis & in commensurati alicui; hoc autem constat esse divinam dispensationem & regulam: Cajetan. in 1. p. sum. q. 63. a. 2. Quid est supcrbia nisi perversae celsitudinis appetitus? Aug. de civit. D. l. 14. cap. 13. which he apprehends to be impaired by anothers.
A fourth (to adde no more) and the most probable opinion, is, of those who hold that the first sin of these angels was pride. And this is the opinion most received and commonly embraced by the Fathers: and after them received generally by the Schoolmen and others. Aquinas seems strongly to prove, that it could be no other sin but pride. A spirituall nature (and such is the angelicall) can only (saith he) affect some spiritual object, as being that which is only agreeable to it; now there can be no sin in affecting spirituall objects, which in themselves are good, unless it be because in affecting of them, the rule of the superiour is therein not obeyed; and this is the sin of pride. For the proper object of pride (saith Cajetan) is something exceeding that measure prefixed and limited by God. Now in regard spirituall things cannot be excessive, nor can we have too much of them in respect of themselves, because the more of them the better; it followes, that then they come to be sinfully desired, when they begin to exceed, and to become incommensurate to the divine rule and dispensation: the affecting them in which inordinate measure, namely, beyond the limits prescribed by God, was the sin of pride in the angels. That this pride then, or an affecting (as Augustine calls it) of some spirituall highness, beyond the bounds of Gods will, was the first sin, seems very probable by reason; but more then probable by that of Paul, 1 Tim. 3.6. where the Apostle gives this reason, why a Bishop must be no novice, Ne ob superbi am incidat in eandem damnationis poenam cum diabolo. Est. in Loc. lest (saith he) heing lifted up with pride, he fall into the condemnation of the divell; in which place I understand not why the Apostle expresseth the condemnation or punishment of the divel to deterre from pride, unlesse the divel had faln into condemnation for that sin, and unlesse the Apostle had intended to shew the danger of being proud, by setting down the punishment of the divel for that sin.
But more particularly, if it be enquired, wherein this pride of the angels did consist, and what that highnesse was, which they did affect beyond their measure; I think, the answer hereunto can be but conjecturall and uncertain.
Some conceive that it was revealed to the Angels, soon after their creation, that the humane nature should in time be hypostatically united to the divine, that the Son of God, in humane nature, should be the head of men, yea of angels; that hereby mans nature was to be exalted above the very angels, Heb. 1.6. and that they were commanded to worship and submit to him. Hereupon (say some) they desired that the dignity of this union with the divine might be afforded to their own angelical nature. But (say others) they refused to consent and submit to Gods pleasure in the former discovery; Vid Zanch. de op. Dei. in this (say they) stood the pride of angels. And of this opinion is Zanchy, whose chiefest argument is taken from that deadly hatred which Satan hath ever put forth against the doctrines of the Person and Offices of Christ, and his incessant opposing of beleeving and affiance in him.
Others conjecture (for indeed none in this point can do much more) that the angels desired to be equal with God, and that they aspired to the divinity it self. And here they distinguish of a twofold will in the angels; 1. A will of efficacy, which others term a will of intention. 2. A will of delight and complacency. According to the former, they say, that the angels did not desire to be equall with God, as if they had intended or used means to attain to divinity; For this the angels knew was absolutely impossible; but according to the later will of complacency, they say, the angels might desire to be equall to God; namely, wish it as a pleasing and delightfull thing to them: as a sick, a dying man, who despaires of recovery, desires health, though not as using means to procure it, because he judgeth it impossible to be obtained, yet as a good and most pleasing benefit; and thus (they say) these angels had this will of delight, or a velle conditionatum, such a will, whereby, if it had been possible to have attained to the divinity, Scotus in l. 2. sent. dist. 6. Estius in dist. 6. §. 6. they would have used means to have done it; and this was the opinion of Scotus, and after him of sundry others, who consider the tentation that Satan laid before our first parents, Ye shall be gods: And afterward being blinded with pride, his endeavouring to have Christ worship him, and his propagating the adoration of himselfe among heathens, under the names of sundry gods.
The most probable opinion is that of Augustine, Suâ potestate delectati, velut bonum suum sibi ipsi essent, à superiore communi omnium beatifico bono, ad propria defluxerunt. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 12. c. 1. It seemeth that there was no other way for angels to sin, but by reflex of their understanding upon themselves, who being held with admiration of their own sublimity and honour, their memory of their subordination to God, and their dependency on him was drowned in this conceit; whereupon their adoration, love, and imitation of God, could not chuse but be also interrupted. Hooker. L. 1. §. 14. and after him, Aquinas, Cajetan, and others, who think that the pride of the angels, was in desiring and resting in their own naturall perfection, as their ultimate end. That as God is blessed by his own nature, having no superiour from whom to draw his blessednesse, so did these angels desire to be, and would needs rest in the perfection of their own nature, neglecting that rule of their superiour, whereby they were called to desire the attaining supernaturall blessednesse by the grace of God. Or as some expresse it, this pride stood in a staying within themselves, a reflecting upon their own excellency, and by consequence, an affecting an independency upon any superiour vertue in being and working, making themselves the first cause, and the last end of their own motions; for, since next unto God, every reasonable created being is nearest unto it selfe; we cannot conceive how it should turn from God, and not in the next step turn unto it selfe.
The third particular to be explained in this first part of the Text, Nemo sanae fidei credit apostatas angelos ad pristinam pietatem correctâ aliquando voluntate converti. Aug. ep. 107. Prosp. l. 1. de vit. contempt. c. 3. De angelis hoc Deus disposuit, & implevit, ut si quis eorum bonitatem voluntatis perderet, nunquam eam divino munere repararet. Fulgent. l. de sid. c. 3. Daemones nec malâ unquam possunt carere voluntate, nec poena. Vid. Aquin. at 1. p. q. 64. a. 2. Angeli boni non habent ex suâ naturâ, immutabilitatem ex bono in malum, sed ex sotâ gratiâ, qui tamen cum plenâ deliberatione, bonum eligerunt, atque ita nec mali habent naturâ suâ, immutabilitatem ex malo in bonum, sed ex sola privatione gratiae. Greg. de Valent. Disp. 4. q. 15. punct. 2. is the degree and measure of the defection of these angels; they fell finally, they kept not, &c. they left their, &c. they quite forsook God, his image, heaven it selfe, and that office therein assigned unto them. And as the holy are confirmed in goodnesse, so the fallen angels are hardned in the love of that which formerly they made choice of. This is intended by Christ, in those words, John 8.44. There is no truth in him, they cannot so much as will to do well, but they do immovably cleave to wickednesse. These trees, as they have faln, so they lie. Angels went so far, that they never turn; they fell so low, they never arise. This is proved from their eternall misery, which the Scripture mentions in this verse, and else where frequently; this everlastingnesse of their punishment, including the perpetuity of their sinning; and such an eternall forsaking of them by God, that they shall never have righteousnesse repaired in them again. The school-men are too curious, in inquiring into the ground of this total & final fal of the angels into sin. Aquinas, and his followers hold, that their obstinacy proceeds from the very nature of the wils of angels, according to which (say they) angels are so inflexible and immovable, that they can never hate that which once they have chosen, nor chuse that which once they have hated; but, as I conceive, Valentia overthrowes this opinion, by arguing, that if the immutability of the good angels from good to evill, be not from nature, but from grace only, who yet did with ful deliberation chuse that which was good; then the immutability of the evil angels from evil to good comes not from nature, but from the just and totall deprivation of grace. Others of them assert, That God preserves in the wils of the divels an hatred of himselfe, and that this preservation is an act of punitive justice, and that God causeth that wicked habit in the wils of the divels, whereby they are necessarily inclined to sin; and this impious opinion is asserted by Occham, Biel, and Aureolus; which I note by the way, as wishing that while the Papists behold a supposed mote in the eye of holy Calvin, they would observe those reall beams which are in the eyes of their own most famous Schoolmen, as to this point of making God the Authour of sin. But those who speak more modestly and piously, then either of the former, give this reason of the obstinacy of the fallen angels: namely, the totall and perfect privation of all holinesse: which is considerable, 1. On their part; and so its that defective and depraved quality (as Junius cals it) that utter impotency to all good, Qualitas defectiva. intended by those words of our Saviour, [There is no truth in him,] and flowing from that defection (as its fountain) called by our Saviour, a not abiding in the truth; and here by Jude, a not keeping their first estate: which defection is so set down by Jude, Si non servaverunt, sed dereliquerunt, profectò habcre destiterunt, & privati sunt eo quod habebant; quod autem privati sunt, semel, id est, ἐφάπαξ privati sunt, ut qui naturam suam eo privaverint, quae cum non possit esse otiosa, &c. Jun. in loc. (saith Junius) as that this totall impotency to, and privation of all good in the angels, is also comprehended; For (saith he) what they kept not, they ceased to have, and were deprived of; and what they were deprived of, they lost totally, (ἐφάπαξ, as he expresseth it) once for all, as those who deprived their very nature therof. And since the nature of these angels, (though it cannot be holy, yet also) cannot be idle, it enclines incessantly to the contrary to that of which it was deprived, there following effects of the same kind with this constant privation. 2. On Gods part, who hath determined never to bestow upon the fallen angels reliefe and assistance for their recovery, (which being denied to them, it is impossible that ever they should turne from their sin to God) but to deliver them totally up to the bent of their own depraved nature. God having so layed out their state, and ordered the nature thereof, that their fall should be the term of their being holy (and it’s natural for every thing not to move when once arrived at it’s term, Hoc est angelis casus, quod hominibus mors. but there to stop) and that as the end of life is the term beyond which God will not offer to sinners his grace, so that the fall should even be the same to the angels, which death is to man.
1. Observat. 1. The best of created perfections are of themselves defectible. Every excellency without the prop of divine preservation, is but a weight, which tends to a fall. The angels in their innocency were but frail, without Gods sustentation. Even grace it self is but a creature, and therefore purely dependent. ‘Tis not from its being and nature, but from the assistance of something without it, that it’s kept from annihilation; The strongest is but a weakling, and can of himself neither stand nor go alone; let the least degree of grace make thee thankfull, let not the greatest make thee proud. Hee that stands, should take heed lest he fall. 1 Cor. 10.12. What becomes of the stream, if the fountain supply it not? what continuance hath the reflection in the glass, if the man who looks into it turn away his face? The constant supplies of the spirit of Jesus Christ are the food, the fuel of all our graces; The best men shew themselves but men, if God leave them; He who hath set them up, must also keep them up. Its safer to be humble with one talent, then proud with ten: yea better to be a humble worm, than a proud angel.
2. Nothing is so truly base and vile as sin. Observat. 2. ‘Tis that which hath no proper being, and is below the lowest of all creatures; It’s very nature stands in the defection of nature, and privation of goodnesse; what is it but the deflowring and fall, the halting and deformity of the creature? So obscure is its extract, that there can be no being properly assigned to it, as its originall cause. It came not from nature as it was, but as it was of nothing. Sin alone debaseth and disennobleth nature: What prodigious folly is it to be patient under it, much more to be proud of it? what generous princely spirit can contentedly be a servant of servants? A slave to sin is guilty of a more unsutable condescention; sin alone is the souls degradation. We never go below our selves, but in sinning against God. Omnis elongatio ab altissimo est descensio. Parisiens. They who glory in sin, glory in their shame; they who are ashamed of holinesse, are ashamed of their glory. Sin removes from the highest, and therefore it must needs be a descending.
3. Observ. 3. In defection from God, there is an imitation of the divel. He was the first who left his first estate. Every backslider followes Satan, though every one goeth not so farre as hee; all decayes in holinesse are steps towards his condition; Satans chiefest industry is to pull others after him; he loves to have followers, and not to be sinfull and miserable alone; if he can make men to decline in grace, Luk. 22.31. he can be contented to let them thrive in the world; he cares for no plunder but that of jewels: and being the greatest enemy, he studies to deprive us of our greatest happinesse. Christians! of all decayes, take heed of those that are spirituall. Better to lose thy gold, then to lose thy God; to be turned out of thy house, then to part with holinesse and heaven. He that loseth all the comforts in the world, can but be a beggar; but he who forsakes God, becomes a divell. Of this largely before.
4. Observ. 4. ‘Tis hard to be high, and not to be high-minded, to be adorn’d with any excellencies, and not unduly to reflect upon them. Its a naturall evill to make our selves the centers of our own perfections, 2 King. 18.33, 34, 45. Rom. 10.3. Phil. 3.6, 9. Ezek. 38.2, 6. to stay and rest in our excellencies. Men of power are apt to deify their owne strength; men of morality to advance their own righteousnesse, and to rely on their merits; men of wisdome to set up their own reason. How just is it with God to hinder the creature from inchroaching upon his owne prerogative; to make those low, Humiliatio humilitatis mater, Psal. 9.19, 20. who otherwise would not be lowly; and to let them know that they are but men? God singles out such to be the most notable monuments of his justice, and their own folly, who vie with him in divine prerogatives. Act. 12.23. If God hath appointed that we should go out of our selves unto things below for a vitall subsistence, to bread for food, to clothes for warmth, &c. much more will he have us to go out of our selves for a blessed and happy subsistence; more being required unto blessednesse then unto life. Psal. 10.14. Zeph. 3.12. Hos. 2.7. It’s the poor who commits himselfe to God: Nothing will make us seek for help above our selves, without an apprehension of weaknesse in our selves. The vine, the ivine, the hop, the woodbind, are taught by nature to cling and to wind about stronger trees. Men commit themselves to the sea naked, and do not load themselves with gold, treasure, and rich apparel. How fearfull should poor worms be of that sin, which God allowed not in angels, and whereby they became divels! Let us be cloathed with humility, 1 Pet. 5.5. The adorned with this grace, are only meet to attend upon the King of Glory; Quis sicut Deus. even an Archangel, Michael, hath humility imprinted on his name; Humility is the ornament of angels, and pride the deformity of divels; If heaven will not keep a proud angel, it will keep out a proud soul. In all conditions of highnesse, we should take heed of highmindednesse. As 1. in the highnesse of worldly advancements; poverty and disgrace are the food of humility; Riches and honour are the fuel of pride. I have read of a bird that is so light and feathery, that it alwayes flies with a stone in its mouth, lest otherwise the winds should carry it away. In high conditions we shall be carryed away with pride, unlesse we carefully keep our hearts. David and Asa were both lifted up in their outward greatnesse: Its hard to walk in slippery places of prosperity, and not to slip by pride; we commonly most forget God and our selves when he remembers us most. 2. In the highnesse of raised endowments, abilities and performances; Its said of Nazianzen that he was high in his works, and lowly in his thoughts: a rare temper! our very graces and good works not seldome occasion pride. I have heard of a man who having kill’d an Elephant with his weapon, was himselfe kill’d with the fall thereof. And nothing is more ordinary than for high services (possibly the conquest of some corruption or tentation) to usher in that pride which may hurt the performers. Sciendo bona opera, nesciamus illa. Magna & rara virtus, manifestam omnibus, tuam te solum, latere sanctitatem. We should know our good works, as if we knew them not. It’s a rare and noble temper, when that worth which all others observe, is only hid to him, in whom it is. How few are there who hide their beautifull endowments by humility, as Moses’s parents did their beautifull son for safety; and with Moses, when hee spake with God, pull off their shoos, and hide their faces; Uncover and acknowledge the lownesse, the infirmities, and cover the beauty and comelinesse of their services! When Satan spreads our gifts and graces, let us spread our sins, our weaknesses before our eyes; and so the soul may have its ballast evenly proportioned, and on both sides. There’s no poyson hurts so dangerously, although delightfully, as the contemplation of, and reflexion on our seeming deservings. Scotus dist. 6. q. 2. art. 2. Scotus calls the sin of the angels Luxuriam spiritualem, a kind of spirituall luxury, whereby they were too much delighted in their own excellencies. Its only a Christian of strong grace, that can bear the strong wine of his commendations without the spiritual intoxication of pride. Its as hard, humbly to hear thy self praised, as it is patiently to hear thy selfe reproached. That Minister (of whom I have heard) was a rare example of humility, who being highly applauded for a sermon preach’d in the University, was by a narrow observer found weeping in his study (presently after) for fear that he had sought, or his auditors unduly bestowed upon him applause. Lutb. pref. in Gen. Ridiculum est si anxius es quomodo honoraretur homo nondum creatus: tu es nihil. Nieremb. de ador. in spir. How heavenly was the temper of John the Baptist; when he said, Christ shall increase, but I shall decrease! It was a good fear of Luther; namely, lest the reading of his books, should hinder people from reading the Scriptures. Would wee account our selves nothing (and indeed in our selves we are so) we should think it as ridiculous a thing to be solicitous for our own, as for that mans honour who is not yet created.
5. The better the persons are who become wicked, Observ. 5 the more obstinate they are in wickednesse. When angels fal into sin, they continue in it with pertinacy; the hottest water cooled, becoms the coldest. They whose light of knowledg is most angelicall, sin with highest resolution, and strongest opposition against the truth. The greater the weight of that thing is which falls, the more violent is its fall, and the greater is the difficulty to raise it up again. They who leave God notwithstanding their clear light, are justly left by God to incurable darknesse. None should so much tremble at sin, as those who are inlightned; obstinacy is most like to follow their impiety. It may be impossible to recover them. Seducers (saith the Apostle) wax worse and worse, and do not only shew themselves men in erring, but divels in persevering. But of this before. Ver. 4.
6. The happinesse of beleevers by Christ, Observ. 6. Est in nobis per hanc Dei gratiam in bono recipiendo & perseveranter tenendo, non solum posse quod volumus, verum etiam velle quod possumus. Aug. de cor. & gra c. 11. 1 Pet. 1.5. 1 Pet. ult. 10. is greater than that of Angels meerly as in the state of nature. These had a power to stand, or fall; we by Christ have a power whereby we shall stand and never fall. By creation the creature had a power, either to abide with God, or to depart from him; But by Regeneration, that fear of God is put into the hearts of his people, whereby they shall not depart from God. Jer. 32.40. And this power of not falling, is in them indeed, but not from them. The faithfull are kept by the power of God, through faith, unto salvation. They are stablish’d, setled, strengthned. Created will, hath a power to will to presevere in that which is good, Prima gratia data primo Adamo, est quâ fit ut habeat homo justitiam, si velit; sed gratia potentiae est in secundo Adamo, quâ fit ut velit, tantóque ardore diligat, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiscentem, voluntate spiritus vincat. August. de Cor. & gra. c. 12. but it hath not the will it selfe, to presevere, neither the act of preseverance, as the regenerate will hath. Of this before, p. 64, 65. 83, 84, 85, &c. 72, 73.
Thus far of the sift part of this verse, viz. the defection of these angels. The second followes, namely, their punishment; and herein first, that of the prison is considerable; which is twofold. 1. Everlasting chains. 2. Darknesse.
For the first, Everlasting chains. It may here be inquired.
1. What we are to understand by these chains.
2. How, and why these chains are everlasting.
1. What is meant by chains. The word in the Originall is δεσμοῖς, in bonds, which bonds are not to be taken literally for those materiall instruments or bonds, whereby things are bound, that they may stand firm and steddy, or persons are hindred from acting what they would, or drawn whither they would not; but metaphorically (as are also those chains into which Peter saith these fain angels were delivered) for that condition, 2 Pet. 2.4. of punishment and woe, wherein they shall remain like prisoners in bonds. Certus inclusos tenet locus nocentes, utque fert fama impios supplicia, vinclis saeva perpetuis domant. Senec. in Herc. Fur. The Metaphor being taken from the estate of malefactors, who in prison are bound with chains, to hinder them from running away, that so they may be kept to the time of judgement and execution; or who by the Mittimus of a Justicer are sent to the Gaol, there to lie in chains till the Sessions. And thus these angels are kept in chains or bonds of three sorts. 1. They are in the chain of sin, bound by the bond of iniquity, as the phrase is 〈Greek〉. Act. 8.23. and Prov. 5.22. the wicked are said to be holden with the cords of their sins; and deservedly may sins be called bonds or chains, they both holding sinners so strongly, as that without an omnipotent strength, they can never be loosed; as also being such prison-bonds as goe before their appearing at the bar of the last and dreadfull Judgement. The bonds of sin, wherein wicked men are held, are often by the goodnesse and power of God loosed; but the bonds of sin, wherein wicked angels are held, shall be everlasting; there is, and ever shall be a total inability in those cursed creatures to stir hand or foot in any wel-doing; they are in arctâ custodiâ, Non dicit Apostolus, peccavit ab initio, sed peccat: nam ex quo diabolus peccare coepit, nunquam peccare definit. Bed. A peccatis nunquam feriatur, quia sicut non dormitabit, neque dormiet qui custodit Israel, it a nunquam dormitat, ne que dormit qui impugnat Israel. Est. in 1 John 3.8. Vid. Jun. in. Jud. Non voluntatis confessio, sed necessitatis extorsio. Hier. close prisoners in these chains of iniquity, stak’d down, wedg’d, wedded to sin, chained as it were to a block; hence it is said, 1 John 3.8. that the divell sinneth from the beginning; whereby may be noted, not only how early he began, but also how constantly he poceedeth in sin: for (as Bede well observes) it is not said, he sinned, but he sinneth from the beginning; to note (saith he) that since he began, he never ceased to sin: he keeps no holy dayes, makes no cessation from pride and other impieties; and as he sleeps not who keeps, so neither doth he who opposeth Israel, he walketh about, seeking, &c. 1 Pet. 5.8. to this purpose our Saviour saith, John 8.44. that the divell hath no truth in him, to note his utter impotency (saith Junius) to any thing of goodnesse and integrity; and when he speaks a lie, he speaketh of his own, according to his custome and disposition; and when he speaks truth, he borroweth that, to the end, he may deceive. Satan cannot lay down his sinfull inclination; he is totus in mendaciis delibutus, (saith Calvin) stained and soak’d in sin. In a word, this chain of sin, which he hath put on, Calv. in Joh. 8.44. he never can or will put off.
2. These faln angels are in, and under the chains of Gods power, The strong man is bound by a stronger then himselfe: The old Dragon was bound for a thousand years, Rev. 20. and the chain which curbed him, was the power of God: this power hinders him both from escaping the evill which he undergoes, and from effecting and causing that evill which he desires. Satan shall for ever be miserable in sustainingwhat he would not, and in not obtaining what he would: The impossibility of his being happy, Quòd aufertur nocendipotestas, pro maximo tormento reputant. Esti. p. 60. in 2. Sent. necessarily followes his impotency to be holy, purity being the path to blessednesse. All the forces of hell cannot scale the walls of heaven: There is a gulfe fixt between faln angels, and happinesse, which they can never passe over; as they can never return to God, so as to love him; so never, so as to enjoy him; they are debarr’d from these joyes unavoidably, which they forsook voluntarily: nor is it a small matter of their punishment to be curbed against the bent and violent inclination of their own will, from stirring an hairs bredth for the hurting any, further then God lengthens out their chains. How painfull a vexation is it to Satan, that he cannot hurt the soul by affrighting, alluring, and seducing, nor our bodies by diseases and pains, nor our estates by losses, nor Luke 22.31. Tormentum diaboli erat exire ab homine, nec posse ei diutius nocere. Vid. Est. in sent. ibid. Quod abyssum deprecantur eo spectat, quod ipsis volupe fit inter homines versari, quò illos seducant, & ad se plures semper pertrahant, id quod in abysso non possunt, ubi sunt nulli quos seducant. Luc. Brugens. Dolet illis in abyssum demergi, in qua ablata sit laedendi & perdendi facultas. our names by disgraces, unless our God gives him chain. Satan hath desired to have you, &c. (saith Christ.) And when the divell besought Christ (Luke 8.28.) not to torment him, it’s by many interpreted, that the torment against which Satan prayed, was that his ejection out of the possessed, whereby he was to be hindered from doing that hurt which he desired; it being immediately subjoyn’d by the Evangelist, For he had commanded the unclean spirit to come out of the man: And whereas ver. 31. the divels further desired Christ, that he would not command them to go out into the deep; Calvin, with others, referre this petition to the great desire of the divels to continue among men, to annoy and molest them: They grieved (saith Calvin) to think of being cast into the deep, wherein they could not have so much power and opportunity of doing harme to men, the destruction of men being the delight of the divell. And this seems further to be confirmed by the words of Mark, Mark 5.10. who saith that the divels desired that Christ would not send them out of the Countrey; whereby they should want opportunities of doing harme to the soules and bodies of men. See Perkins on Jude. Needs then must the chain of divine power, which restrains the divell from hurting men, be a considerable part of his torment, whose work is to go about, seeking whom he may devour.
3. The faln Angels are in and under the chain of their own guilty consciences, which by the tenour of God’s justice, bind them over to destruction; they know they are adjudg’d to damnation for their sins. Let them be where they will, in the earth or air, these chains of guilty consciences bind them over to judgement; they can no more shake off these, then leave themselves. In these the divels are bound like mad-men and band-dogs; they must endure what they cannot endure. Jam. 2.19. The divels fear and tremble; horrour is the effect of diabolicall assent. Judicis sui prae. sentiâ expavefacti, de poenâ suâ cogitarunt. Mala enim conscientia quid meriti essent, ipsis, tacente Christo, dictabat; quemadmodum enim scelerati ubi ad Tribunal ventum est, &c. Calv. in Mat. 8.29. How evidently did this guilty trembling appear, when they ask Christ, whether he was come to torment them before their time? The sight of the Judge (saith Calvin on the place) made these guilty malefactours to tremble at the thoughts of their punishment; their evill conscience told them (Christ being silent) what they deserved: As malefactours, when they are brought to the bar, apprehend their punishment, so did these divels at the sight of their Judge. The faln angels shall ever contemplate what they have done, and how they have finned, as also what they shall undergo, and how they shall suffer: and hereby, as God delivers the damned men into the hands of guilty angels, so he delivers guilty angels over to themselves to be their own tormenters. This fiery furnace of a tormenting conscience (which of all others is the most scorching and scalding) every divell shall carry in his bosome This inward and silent scourge, shall torment him, this arrow shall stick in his side, Daemones quocunque abeant, ubicunque degant, suum secum circumferunt infernum. Beda in c. 3. Jacobi. Aquin. 1. p. q. 64. Art. 4. ad ob. 3. Gr. ἀΐδιος ab ἀεὶ, sicut sempiternus à semper. Though Lorinus upon the place mentions a conceit, according to which ἀΐδιος, should be derived of α, and ἴδιος, as if the word should signifie, [not their own] such chains as belonged not to them by nature, but were put upon them after their sinning, as a punishment. Iren. l. 3. c. 33. Greg. l. 4. mor. cap. 10. Ansel. l. 2. c. 21. Cur Deus homo. Sicutceciderunt nullo alio nocente ut caderent, itanullo alio ad juvante, resurgere debent. Aug. Enchir. c. 29. Quoniam non tota multitudo angelorum Deum deserendo perierat, ea quae perierat perpetuâ perditione remaneret; alia vero creatura rationalis, quoniam tota perierat, &c. this vulture shall prey, this worme shall gnaw, and this hell shall he carry about him where ever he becomes though he may change his place, yet he never changes his state. As the happinesse of the good angels is not diminish’d, when they come to us, and are not actually in the heavenly place, because they know themselves blessed; (as the honour of a King is not impaired, though actually he sits not in his chair of State) so neither is the misery of the wicked angels lessen’d, when they are not actually in the very place of the tormented in hell, because they know that eternall woes are due to them; as the scorching distemper of one in a burning feaver is not removed, though he be removed into a bed of ivory, and the most refreshing place.
2. The second particular to be explained, is, How, and why these chains are everlasting?
By the word in the originall, ἀϊδίοις, which singnifies alwayes, continuing, perpetuall, is intended that the fore-mentioned chains, shall never be shaken off; and that these angels shall stand guilty for ever, expecting the last judgement, despairing, and without any hope of recovery and redemption, they having no Saviour, nor any means allowed them by God for their release. And if it be here demanded, why the faln angels, rather then faln man, stand guilty for ever without any deliverance, or hope of recovery; its by severall men differently answered.
1. Some say, Because man was seduced to sin; but the divell sinned meerly by his own will, without instigation from any other: he fell alone, and must (if at all) rise alone.
2. Others say, Because in the fall of angels, the whole angelicall nature of angels perish’d not; but the first man sinning, the whole humane nature had perish’d, if the goodnesse of God had not afforded a remedy, 1 Cor. 15.22. In Adam all die. Id. in Joh. Tr. 110. Tanto damnabilior eorum judicata est culpa, quanto erat natura sublimior. In offend endo creatorem, tanto execrabilius, beneficio ejus ingrati extiterunt, quantò beneficentius sunt creati. 〈Greek〉. Damascen. l. 2. Orth. Fid. cap. 3. & 4. Gerh. m 2. Pet. 2. Praestat grato corde, Dei φιλανθρωπίαν, in remedio generi humano praestito agnoscere, quam profunditatem divinorum judiciorum curiosius, extra verbi limites, scrutari.
3. Others say, That the nature of the angels being more excellent, and sublime, their fault was more damnable then that of mans; and that so much the more ingratefull to God were they in their fall then man, by how much the more bountifull in their Creation, God was to them, then to man. But I humbly conceive, we may more safely say with Gerhard, It’s better thankfull to acknowledge the love of God to mankind, in affording him a recovery, then to search into the depths of divine judgements, without the warrant of the word, with curiosity.
